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ABSTRACT
This project weaves together the theoretically rich and diverse work of ancient
materialist philosophers, modern philosophy which advanced a theory of monism, and
contemporary philosophies that further extends monism into new terrain, including ‘new
materialism.’ While monism is a strand of this project, the core features of this project are
materiality and bodies; these two concepts create the particular entanglement and central
thrust of this project, which is becoming. While this project is conceptually organized
around matter and bodies, and a particular notion of becoming traced from ancient
through contemporary thought, this project, also, introduces the importance of Gloria
Anzaldúa as a philosophical thinker whose writing is theoretically rich with concepts of
matter and becoming. Using the body, broadly construed, as the framework for which
both matter and becoming are mobilized, this project further complexifies the material
entanglement of becoming by suggesting a never-receding horizon of becoming through
the language of interconnectedness, which is the precise metaphysics that is advanced by
Gloria Anzaldúa. Framed by the entanglement of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, this
project privileges a queer strategy in dismantling the hegemonic interpretation of matter
and bodies by suggesting an Anzaldúan turn through the replacement of interrelatedness.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Writing is a shared act of creation, an act of the imagination for both
writer and reader.
—Gloria Anzaldúa, “Putting Coyolxauhqui Together”
Del Otro Lado: A Brief Bio
A philosopher-poet and critical social theorist, Gloria E. Anzaldúa (1942-2004)
disrupted the landscape of critical Latin@ studies and Chicana feminism(s) with her 1987
oft-cited and seminal work: Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza.1 This book, a
philosophical manifesto and cultural theory/critique, is an important staple in the
Anzaldúan corpus. This text helps shape and in turn shifts to illustrate her theorizing the
positivity of difference, and her pre- and post- borderland work conforms to this, too. She
is often labeled as ‘other’ and on the ‘other side’ (del otro lado) of her contemporaries,
notably scholars who are recognized by the academy as legitimate producers of
knowledge: academic philosophers and critical social and cultural theorists. For some,
she is not an academic; yet, others, readily identify Anzaldúa as an academic. Anzaldúa
transgresses the stable boundary of what an academic is. Her life’s vocation was that of a
writing artist, a shaman, someone who created art with both word and image and who
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Gloria E. Anzaldúa, Borderlrands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute
Books), 1987.
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was intentional about seeking radical social change. What is produced is a materialist
philosophy, self-organizing in both word and image, destabilizing the shape and form of
current materialist agendas and expanding into new contours of a queer materiality /
queer matter. This work transgressed the fiction/non-fiction divide in philosophy and
theory, and in this transgression, Anzaldúa created a new style of critical social theory
that is rooted in the ontological plurality of the self, the materiality that is both her own
body and connecting to the radical interconnected web of other bodies, spanning the
speciated divide. Doing this initiated a new type of relational theory, or connectionist
thinking, which is often theorized as (a) “metaphysics of interrelatedness.”2
Born in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas means that for Anzaldúa she would face
several barriers: language, education, economic, and so forth. I believe because of
Anzaldúa’s fortitude, drive, and perfectionism, she was well poised to change the
landscape of education and institutional structures with her theories, and she notes in her
Borderlands text that she was the first in six generations in her family to leave the
Valley.3 In 1968 Anzaldúa obtained a Bachelor of Arts in English, Art, and Secondary
Education English from the then Pan American University (now University of Texas-Pan
America), and following her undergraduate degree, Anzaldúa returned to the Texas
Valley and worked as a preschool and special education teacher. Anzaldúa returned to
school, this time earning a master’s degree in education from the University of Texas,

2

See AnaLouise Keating’s work.
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Anzaldúa talks about this in Borderlands/La Frontera.
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Austin. While in Austin, and after she completed the coursework for a doctoral degree in
comparative literature, she joined politically active cultural poets and radical dramatists
such as Ricardo Sanchez, and Hedwig Gorski, and in 1977, she moved to California,
where she supported herself through her writing, lectures, and occasional teaching stints
offering classes in feminism, Chicano/a studies, and creative writing at San Francisco
State University, the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Florida Atlantic
University, in Boca Raton, Florida, among other universities. She also entered a doctoral
program in American Literature at the University of California, Santa Cruz, though she
died just prior to defending her dissertation.4 Her program of study was in literature and
there she taught courses and influenced a generation of students on such topics as
autohistorias and women of color theorizing in the U.S.
Anzaldúa is perhaps most famous for coediting This Bridge Called My Back:
Writings by Radical Women of Color (1981) with Cherríe Moraga, editing Making Face,
Making Soul/Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical Perspectives by Women of Color
(1990), and coediting with AnaLouise Keating this bridge we call home: radical visions
for transformation (2002). These books have significantly shaped and shifted the
theoretical landscape. I argue that Anzaldúa’s theories have initiated new paths of
intersectional thinking as a central feature of her theories. This has cultivated what
AnaLouise Keating theorizes as a post-oppositional consciousness. While
4

The dissertation is now being edited for publication, edited by AnaLouise Keating. Also, it is
important to note that the program director at the time called Anzaldúa and communicated that because of
Borderlands/La Frontera’s success and importance, UC Santa Cruz would award Anzaldúa the PhD.
Anzaldúa declined this gesture and instead moved forward to complete a traditional dissertation in the
program.
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intersectionality is a dominant theory in women of colors feminisms, Anzaldúa
revolutionizes intersectionality, and I have come to understand her intersectionality as
that of a type of assemblage thinking that focuses on affinity and differences. A now
staple in feminist theorizing, intersectionality takes seriously the co-constitutive realities
of race, class, gender, class, and sexuality. I see these realities (or interlocking
“standpoints”) in Anzaldúa’s work, yet Anzaldúa does not theorize the sameness of these
standpoints across multiple communities; she invites differences and communities to find
affinity with one another. This does not flatten or freeze differences or legitimate
sameness. Instead, Anzaldúa use affinities as a modality to investigate differences.
Anzaldúa also revolutionizes feminist standpoint theory theorizing, instead, a
participatory epistemology that focuses on relational knowledge production. Her
epistemology develops from Borderlands/La Frontera, through the Interviews /
Entrevistas text, and finally put together in her last published essay during her life, “now
let us shift…the path of conocimiento…inner work, public acts.” It is clear that from
Borderlands through to the end, Anzaldúa blurred the lines between epistemology and
ontology, and recent research suggests that prior to Borderlands/La Frontera, this work
was being done by Anzaldúa herself.5 The semi-autobiographical and philosophymanifesto Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987) is likely where people
(scholars and activists alike) invest in understanding Anzaldúa. Her children’s books
include Prietita Has a Friend (1991), Friends from the Other Side — Amigos del Otro
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AnaLouise Keating makes this connection, too, in her forthcoming text.
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Lado (1993), and Prietita y La Llorona (1996). She has also authored many fictional and
poetic works that can be found in the 2008 Gloria Anzaldúa Reader (edited by
AnaLouise Keating). Her works are both creative and critical, weaving English, Spanish,
and Nauhtl together as one language, an idea stemming from her theory of “borderlands”
identity. Her autobiographical essay, “La Prieta,” was published in (mostly) English in
This Bridge Called My Back, and in (mostly) Spanish in Esta puente, mi espalda: Voces
de mujeres tercermundistas en los Estados Unidos. “La Prieta” was later published in its
entirety in the Gloria Anzaldúa Reader. In her writing, Anzaldúa uses a unique blend of
eight languages, two variations of English and six of Spanish; this ‘transgression’
motivates new forms of knowledge production and theories of reality that mobilize new
contours of interrelatedness. In many ways, by writing in “Spanglish,” Anzaldúa creates a
daunting task for the non-bilingual reader to decipher the full meaning of the text, but the
“Spanglish” is central to her cultural context that spans multiple locations. The use of
multiplicity as difference in language stimulates a type of philosophy of movement and
interconnection in Anzaldúa’s work, which should be understood as part of the
materialist philosophy that Anzaldúa develops. This movement or mobilization is central
to Anzaldúa’s theories that I see intersecting as ethics, epistemology, and ontology, the
politics of which characterize new contours of interrelatedness that produce a new shape
and form of matter and meaning.
Initiating a diverse theoretical approach to the lived and colonized space of the
US Borderlands with the use of philosophy, poetry, autohistoria and autohistoria-teoría
(which is how Anzaldúa describes her singular form of theory-biography that is at once
an exploration and elaboration of personal and collective history), and art, Anzaldúa’s
5

work presents a significant critique to traditional epistemological assumptions regarding
the dualism that proliferates in current day philosophy and critical social theory. Her
work theorizes a notion of materiality, bodies, and Mestizaje, presenting critical social
theorists a new way to interrogate acting in the world, knowing practices, knowledge
production, and reality; this new way resides in the borderlands of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics—an entanglement that is explored in this project that further
initiates the concept of becoming and becoming material. Anzaldúa’s theory of the
mestiza body, including the central retrieval of the consciousness of the mestiza and the
flourishing of her theories of nepantla, is the point that ignited my own investigation
concerning materiality and bodies.6 By seeing Anzaldúa’s significant contributions to
new theories of Mestizaje and the plurality of bodies, I began to see the shape of what
might be considered Anzaldúan materiality, an entanglement of bodily knowing where
bodily is broadly construed and allows for the ontology of becoming to intersect with
bodily materiality.
Scope of This Project
This project investigates the question of matter and bodies, broadly construed,
points toward dynamic and connected ways of being and becoming, ways of knowing,
and the ethics of mattering by exhaustively exploring the philosophy-theory of Gloria
Anzaldúa in two published essays, and exposing a theory of materiality that does not
depend upon a theory of substance metaphysics. Through researching Anzaldúa’s

6

This is largely due to the face that I am a mestizaje person who constantly negotiates nepantla in
my own becoming nepantler@.
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archives and paying careful attention to the trajectory of her theories, I argue that one
should orient Anzaldúa’s theories in philosophical terms. Philosophically, Anzaldúa
privileged a single-matter substance that is often called monism. She defines the material
universe in this way: “The material universe is not made up of things—it is only energy
and lines of force continuing to produce temporary forms that are in a state of continuous
flow.”7 Though she never uses the term monism, it is evident in her writing that she saw
that all matter and things are stemming from the same source, connected in the same web
of being, and further articulates a theory of becoming throughout her work, most
noticeable in her piece El Mundo Surdo. This source may or may not be considered a
“substance” in the technical sense. I prefer to think of Anzaldúa’s materiality (or
Anzaldúan materiality) in similar ways to how Rosi Braidotti and what other Deleuzian
thinkers consider single-matter substance where matter is not dependent upon substance
but stems from the singularity of matter; Spinoza is an example of this. I largely draw
from the New Materialisms movement that rereads Benedict de Spinoza, and together the
work of Anzaldúa with Spinoza-inspired scholars helps mobilize new thinking regarding
materiality. I argue that materiality is central to a queer theory of bodies, and that ‘body’
transcends and moves beyond the anthropomorphic tradition, which proliferates in
feminist and queer theories. I look to Gloria Anzaldúa and her invocation of plural selves,
something other than what is theorized as a unified human self, and a theory of
materiality that vibrates throughout her work. The disciplinary boundaries that revolve

7

The Gloria E. Anzaldúa Archives, The University of Texas, (Box 102, folder 2) 1999, 2014.
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between these pages are ontologies, epistemologies, and ethics and emerge from a diverse
and critical set of theorists. I draw from the continental tradition that includes diverse
feminist, queer, and Deleuzian thinkers to re-imagine ontology, epistemology, and ethics.
The use of post-war French philosophy stimulates my thinking and disrupts the
traditional pairing of Latin@ studies with Anzaldúa. The creative and critical work of
Gloria Anzaldúa ties the dissertation together by reading and utilizing Anzaldúa as a
critical social theorist and philosopher-poet, an agent of writing-material-art. I argue
throughout the dissertation that the philosophy-poetry of Gloria Anzaldúa envisions a
new, perhaps queer, way of producing knowledge by inventing new ways of being and
becoming in the world and queer ways of materializing one’s agency. Ways of knowing
and theories of reality for Anzaldúa are blurred, often residing along the same axis of
analysis. Certainly, this project exists in the borderlands of thinking and feeling; there are
places where fluidity and queerness are privileged over against the concretizing and
certainty of hetero-patriarchal normativities, and disciplinary boundaries are betrayed,
intentionally.
This project takes up the specific challenge of articulating bodies in material
terms over against the more popular discursive tendencies dominating feminist theories
and feminist philosophies. I utilize both queer and feminist Deleuzian scholars to help
make my case for a materiality that does not subsist on a theory of substance, queer
epistemologies that point to a larger and more robust theory of ways of knowing
stemming from the relational work of Gloria Anzaldúa, and the work of Karen Barad
whose work both unmasks and animates the critical and diffractive framework that I use
in this project. I place this all in conversation with Anzaldúa’s own work, archival
8

findings, as well. What results is an entanglement of ontology, epistemology, and ethics,
which enlivens a theory of becoming that is strategically related to the material body,
queer ways of knowing and knowledge production that is central to Anzaldúan bodies,
and a sense of moral agency that points toward a radical queer ethics of interrelatedness.
As a queer project, there are several plumb lines, or strands, that help give
material “legs” to this project. First, there is a commitment to the materiality of the body
as a site for formative philosophical discourse. Secondly, there is a commitment to reimagining reality as that which is becoming. Both materiality and a becoming reality
intersect as they have ontological values or conditions. Third, there is a commitment to
queerness and Mestizaje that is informed by both different ways of knowing and
becoming. It is here in these three points of departures, or intersections, that the plumb
lines make contact and transgress normative stabilized assumptions of what materiality,
bodies, and queerness are. Each of these commitments is derived from the work of
Anzaldúa, and I chart my intellectual genealogy by beginning with the critical social
theory that AnaLouise Keating develops.8 I read Anzaldúa as an enchanted9 philosopher
who helps to dissolve mind-body dualisms and strengthened theories of materiality that
further advance a sense of radical interrelatedness. The body is central to Anzaldúa’s
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In her most recent book, Keating demonstrates a new and emerging critical social theory as a
threshold theory. As the foremost authority on the work and theories created by Gloria Anzaldúa, I see my
work as a critical departure from the work that Keating pursues, but also in relation to the horizon of justice
that Keating imagines.
9

I borrow this term from Jane Bennett, and I situate Anzaldúa as an enchanted philosopher. By
that, I mean that there is genuine wonder in the work of Anzaldúa. She theorizes spirit and the web of
interrelatedness, which maximizes the spirit of wonder and undermines neo-liberal suspicion.
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work and emerges in almost everything Anzaldúa theorizes be it its plurality, materiality,
or becomingness. In light of these three features, I argue that theorizing about the
materiality of body is not only an important topic to research, but also a topic that has the
potential to yield greater understanding for ontology, epistemology, ethics, and agency
that also advances Anzaldúan theories as primarily philosophical.
The project begins with the initial chapter, BRIDGING AND REWRITING ANZALDÚA
AS A ‘GENERATIVE’ MATERIALIST: A NEW LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF MATTER

as a way

of privileging Anzadúa as a philosopher. Next, I offer a genealogy of matter, charting the
particularity of movement and becoming. I do this in three chapters and begin with
Lucretius. Following, I articulate the body in material terms, and I situate my pursuit of
materiality and materialisms in the tradition of Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-DiderotDeleuze more than Hegel-Marx-Adorno, and draw heavily from authors within the New
Materialism movement. I am not concerned with historical materialism, as the HegelMarx-Adorno group theorizes. I come to this project following my engagement with
Gloria Anzaldúa, Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, and the feminist New Materialism(s)
movement. Chapters 5 and 6 detail ways the body has been theorized, noting major
theorists who analyze the body in feminist theory and feminist philosophies. I critique the
failed and passive materiality of Judith Butler. I end each chapter by pointing toward
Anzaldúan bodies that are conceived in material terms and grounded in the thing-ness
and a material-ness of the world that is always becoming, and I use her first published
poem in the first several chapters to do this and then use Anzaldúa’s own theories in
chapters 5 and 6 to illustrate her materiality and material bodies. Evident in these
chapters is the importance of the relationality that signals a becoming material body, a
10

particular phenomenon that is central to this project. Bodies for Anzaldúa transcend the
anthropocene, and while I begin with a humanistic account of bodies, this move is
important as it shows the importance of articulating bodies in material terms over against
bodies as a discursive reality.
Chapter three is my first substantive chapter that details matter (LUCRETIUS, AN
ANCIENT MATTER). I focus on the development of movement in Lucretius’ poem, On The
Nature of Things. I chart the element of movement as becoming in this poem and also
place Anzaldúa’s first published poem at the end of the chapter to illustrate the nature of
becoming and movement that is inherent or native to matter. It is this chapter where I first
claim that Anzaldúa’s poetry and theory is material and should be analyzed on those
terms.
Chapter four follows chapter three and addresses the question of modern matter,
or representatives of modern matter, Spinoza and Nietzsche (MATTER AND ‘VITAL
BECOMING’ IN SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE). This chapter continues the theme of movement
and becoming by looking at the doctrine of conatus in Spinoza and the Will to Power in
Nietzsche. Again, I place Anzaldúa’s first published poem at the end of this chapter to
illustrate once again the material nature of her theory / ontology of becoming.
Chapter five is the chapter on contemporary matter that brings together the
ancient and modern representatives of materialism (CONTEMPORARY MATTER). This
chapter also charts the question of movement and becoming, but does so with the element
of vital impetus discovered in Bergson’s work, the fold in Deleuze, and then brings
together the feminist new materialists into a particular relief for this project. Once again,

11

Anzaldúa ends the chapter and I theorize her poetry as a particular material fold of
becoming.
Chapter six (THE LOGIC OF THE BODY: A GENEALOGY OF A MATERIAL SOCIOSENSORY REALITY) takes up the burden of dualism and points toward the active
evacuation of dualism by putting into conversation Spinoza, Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty,
and finally Anzaldúa. This chapter specifically addresses the importance of materiality
and bodies that go underdeveloped in philosophy, but recognizes the importance of
Spinoza to materiality and bodies. This starting point helps further locate the importance
of Anzaldúa and her theory that I recognize as being a material phenomenology that repoliticizes materiality with phenomenology, a sometimes difficult bridge to build.
Reading Anzaldúa both as a materialist and phenomenologically allows for the prediscursive and post-reflexive theories to take root, or become material. Central to this
chapter is the recognition that there is a nexus or matrix of materiality that is becoming
different, emerging, too, in connection with knowledge production and ethics.
Highlighting the positivity of difference that is becoming, in connection with the
production of knowledge and social practice, helps highlight the important force of
materialism. Chapter six takes up the issue of material and discursive bodies in feminist
theory and feminist philosophy. I see this as an important strand to the development of a
material phenomenology in that feminist materialist thinkers contribute to the rematerialization of bodies by engaging and enacting an active materiality over against the
failed materiality of Judith Butler that I recognize as passive. Chapter seven
(RECONFIGURING & REIMAGINING BODIES: MATERIAL, DISCURSIVE, & DREAMBODIES)
also shows the distinction of Anzaldúa’s theorizing in light of feminist theory and the
12

body. It is also a chapter where I trace the discursive body and the failed materiality of
Judith Butler. I consider this chapter to ground the materiality of bodies in a type of
relationally networked reality. I trace the thinking of three feminist thinkers and conclude
with the horizon of plurality seen in Anzaldúa’s work. Plurality is a particular horizon for
difference in Anzaldúa’s work, I argue.
Foregrounding the work on the materiality of the body points toward a new shape
and form of a spirit-inflected and interrelated ethico-onto-epistemology, animated by
Anzaldúan materiality. Doing this materializes bodies in a particular way and fashions a
new set of theoretical tools to further mobilize Anzaldúa’s materiality as a theory of
being and becoming. I suggest a turn to a diverse set of disciplines (from queer studies,
Latin@ studies, Spinoza and Deleuze) to initiate an enchanted and creative opening for
the materiality of bodies to become (an) ontology (and in many ways to become ‘more’
than (an) ontology—it emerges in the thresholds of onto-epistemology and ethics).
This project does not necessarily depart from Bennett and Braidotti regarding
materiality and bodies, but seeks to use these two thinkers in creative and critical ways
and bridges Anzaldúa’s theory of materiality with these two. The New Materialists help
me gain access to a language around materiality, while Anzaldúa offers me the content
that I analyze. This collective of thinkers propels me into new theoretical terrain that
helps build greater capacity to think about the interrelatedness of ethics, ontology, and
epistemology.
This project, then, is rooted in the emergence of what AnaLouise Keating calls
threshold theories. Threshold theory, according to Keating, is the active underscoring of
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theories and practices of “nonbinary, liminal, potentially transformative status.”10 As
Keating uses this term, thresholds
represent complex interconnections among a variety of sometimes
contradictory worlds—points crossed by multiple intersecting
possibilities, opportunities, and challenges. Like thresholds—that mark
transitional, in-between spaces where new beginnings, and unexpected
combinations can occur—threshold theories facilitate and anact
movements” betwixt and between” divergent worlds, enabling us to
establish fresh connections among distinct (and sometimes contradictory)
perspectives, realities, peoples, theories, exts, and/or worldviews.11
While Keating enacts a type of threshold theory for radical political change, I enact the
thresholds of theory to motivate theoretical transformation that can also be applied to ‘on
the ground’ realities. The theoretical work in this dissertation betrays static disciplinary
boundaries and looks for the in/between spaces for theories to emerge, knowledge to be
produced, and politics to become material. Because of its ‘threshold‘ status, this project
features ideas concerning multiplicity and difference, and seeks to imagine bodies as that
which are always becoming multiple and different, and an orientation to matter that is
always ‘tied’ to the materiality of the body as the condition under which we exist. This
initiates a way to reconsider ways of knowing that are tied to the materiality of the body.
Finally, a turn to queering the materiality of the body and an ontology of becoming helps
show the radical interrelatedness of all things. Upon concluding, I detail the intersections
of ontology, epistemology, and ethics in the language of bodily materiality as an intra-
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active ontology of becoming. I argue this is what points toward the ethics of
interrelatedness that is developed throughout the oeuvre of Anzaldúa. I end in my
conclusion in the same place where I began: materiality and point to where this work can
flourish and next theoretical steps that flourish along a plane of becoming.
If We Read Anzaldúa This Way, Then…
Reading Anzaldúa as a philosopher and critical social theorist pushes the
theoretical envelope(s). This is a first order commitment. While her work transgresses the
fiction / non-fiction binary, her work should also be recognized and interpreted as
philosophy and critical social theory. Doing this work as a first order initiative means that
when we read Anzaldúa as a philosopher, we see the ties to early philosophical thinking
and the links that are strengthened as her work develops. For example, the notes in the
marginalia that I discovered in the archives at the University of Texas, Austin, reveal that
Anzaldúa was reading many more theorists than she cites. For example, in the archives
she has notes on reading Bergson, Butler, Spivak, Derrida, and many others. While her
lack of citation is questioned among scholars, I want to raise up the reality that a queer
woman of color writing philosophical manifestos and critical social theory that sought to
dismantle existing ‘liberationist’ agendas chose to create her work in conversation with
other thinkers but never cites these thinkers. The ethics of this is questionable for some,
but what if there is intention in leaving out the recognized thinkers like Butler in her later
work, and Derrida, Lacan, among others in her earlier work? What does leaving out these
thinkers say to readers who are consuming and analyzing Anzaldúa’s work? Perhaps
leaving out this work creates the space of the intersection or the ethics of interrelatedness.
A careful reader can pick up nuances that are drawn from other philosophers and critical
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social theorists, but the act of leaving out well-known and overly cited theorists of
Anzaldúa’s citation might trigger a new style and politics of writing philosophy. That
said, one cannot read Anzaldúa without recognizing that Anzaldúa participated in a
particular style of academic and cultural production that is often called the politics of
citation. What openings might this version or style of the politics of citation create for
queer women of color? Does it delegitimize their work, or legitimize their work in a
critical manner? I wish to establish the importance of reading Anzaldúa as a philosopher
who created a new stylistic meter in her theory that transcends stable categories and
disrupts normative assumptions, and doing this answers the question of legitimizing
women of colors’ theorizing in a critical manner.
If we read Anzaldúa as a philosopher, then we have a very different point of
departure when we consider her philosophy-theory in fiction and non-fiction works. I
want to suggest a reading strategy for engaging Anzaldúa, and this strategy also applies
to reading this dissertation project. Reading Anzaldúa is never a purely objective task,
nor is it purely subjective. The careful writing art of myth making, poet-shaman
aesthetics12, and her metaphysics of interrelatedness all diffuse throughout Anzaldúa’s
work. Because of this, the reader might be compelled to engage Anzaldúa’s written work
as an interconnecting philosophy that multiplies and connects throughout. Reading
Anzaldúa means that you are met with the future, ignited by the past, and resituated in the
present; Anzaldúa’s theories are a never-receding horizon of difference becoming. She is
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almost the now, but not yet. And so, reading her means you are reading in the space of
the already/not yet. For religion scholars this might signal an eschatological horizon.
Anzaldúa is just out of reach, just over the horizon, she is akin to the force that makes the
sky pink after the sun sets and pink again right before the sun rises; her work is the space
in/between the already and not yet. She is both pre and post everything, like the feeling
before a meal of being famished followed by the feeling after the meal of being satiated.
She does what no other queer or Chicana feminist thinker before her could do: she
upends Plato and Descartes, she quiets Hegel, Levinas, and Foucault, and she puts all the
little thinkers to bed.
Consider it this way: if we imagine the past (or the present, since we teeter on
both the past and present in reading this dissertation project) as a hallway full of doors
marked dualism, binary thinking, either/or, mind/body, transcendence/immanence, then
Anzaldúa makes philosophy contemporary and compelling by drawing a series of escape
hatches on the ceiling of that hallway and marking them borderlands, plural, multiple,
both/and, non-dialectical materialism, immanence and transcendence, and
interrelatedness. Anzaldúa is open, associative, and connective in radical ways. Anzaldúa
is digital (in the sense that so much of her work is contained in draft form in the archive),
affirmative, productive, and innovative, becoming different at each turn. In her we have a
blueprint for navigating the 21st century and beyond. Finally, if we read Anzaldúa as a
philosopher affirming the positivity of difference, multiplicity, and materiality, then we
come to find that she affirms the multiplying differences and heterogeneity over stasis of
homogeneity. As a philosopher of difference, Anzaldúa becomes more different in her
connective theories, and this ultimately shapes both the metaphysics of interrelatedness
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and her poet-shaman aesthetics. That said, we must also read Anzaldúa as an ethicist who
is concerned with re-imagining our moral imagination and actions in the world, and the
ways relationality plays such a significant role in our becoming-being. But! To read
Anzaldúa as an ethicist also means to read her as an onto-epistemologist, and then realize
that these three philosophical domains cannot be untangled. This is the reality of her
differences multiplying and her theories becoming a cartography for the 21st century. To
read Anzaldúa is to participate in the entanglement of becoming.
A Note on Methodology
I do not understand ethics as something that is tied to reason, rights, or duties; it is
something that is strategically tied to ways of being and becoming, ways of knowing and
knowledge production, and the reality that materiality matters in this world. Hence, I
believe ethics is part of the entanglement of ontology and epistemology. Another way to
write this is ethico-onto-epistemology.13 I re-imagine this tripartite way of thinking
(ontology, epistemology, and ethics) as something that is fundamentally important to the
queering of ethics and to the overwhelming reality of interrelatedness and
interconnection. Interrogating materiality points to this! I believe this is seen in the work
of Anzaldúa; we have simply not recognized this interdisciplinary method of thinking,
knowing, acting, being, and doing. I pursue this line of thinking throughout this project,
and as a result, I deploy a diffractive methodology14 and lean into the planetary
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entanglement of becoming. This project, methodologically, yields a new manner of queer
theorizing in that the methodological framework is diffractive. Diffractive signals the
ability for theories and philosophies to intersect, bend, and mobilize. I see this when
ontology, epistemology, and ethics connect. The method-framework of OntologyEpistemology-Ethics-Agency emerges, diffractively so, and the emergence of (a) radical
queer ethics of interrelatedness becomes a material reality.
Diffractive, borrowed from Karen Barad, simply signals my interdependence
upon multiple philosophical standpoints and critical social theories and seeing these
multiple standpoints crossing over one another and weaving together in a critical mode. I
signal this as a queer way of engaging philosophy and critical social theories and
deploying these theories in a critical and creative manner. Pursuing interdisciplinary work
as I have done in this project gives shape and form to my thought that materiality is the
current by which bodies come to be and become, knowledge is produced, and agency is
enacted. This project takes up the challenge to not only articulate a way of thinking and
doing theory from three philosophical domains (ontology, epistemology, and ethics,
diffractively and queerly), but also seeks to re-imagine agency and ethics as that which is
part of an overwhelming reality of interrelatedness, or interbeing. I believe the work that I
do to re-imagine the materiality of bodies as that which is being and becoming and the
ways that materiality is central to thinking (or re-thinking) theories of the body
accomplishes this.
Why Anzaldúa?
In Anzaldúan style, I will answer this from the space between objective and
subjective, hoping to point toward a metaphysics of interrelatedness. I discovered
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Anzaldúa when I was in graduate school in Chicago, IL at Garrett-Evangelical
Theological Seminary. My thesis supervisor had the intuition to introduce me to
Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera, and later to this bridge we call home: radical
visions of transformation. I discovered these books uncovered a way of thinking and
doing theory that I found very compelling. Sitting in a room full of whiteness as a firstgeneration high school graduate, college graduate, and now graduate student initiated an
epistemological rupture for me. During this time in my first graduate program, I looked
for scholars who were similar to me, mining these thinkers for their theoretical gems as I
journeyed in theological education. I found Anzaldúa’s work the most compelling and
under-theorized. As a result, I began reading and re-reading Anzaldúa’s work, ordering as
many of her books or books about her work that I could find to buy. During the time off
between my first entrance into graduate school and my second (doctoral work), I began
rereading Gloria Anzaldúa. I began reading Borderlands/La Frontera with a theoretical
lens much stronger than when I first read it. Being introduced to Feminist Standpoint
Theory in my first graduate program, I began seeing standpoint like contours, but
Anzaldúa’s epistemology was not situated, necessarily, but rather a theory of
participatory expansion relative to epistemology. I found this curious. I also began
rereading this bridge we call home: radical visions of transformation. It was this text that
sparked my interest in queer theory and the questions of epistemology and ontology. I
also saw contours of an ethical paradigm. I read and reread the text trying to trace the
theoretical reality without reading theoretical gaps into the text. Then, in my doctoral
program, I began investigating Gloria Anzaldúa again, and discovered there was a society
that is designed to showcase her work and the work that others develop using her theories
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and methodologies. After attending my first Society for the Study of Gloria Anzaldúa
conference, I was determined to mine Anzaldúa’s philosophy-theory for theoretical gems.
I have not been disappointed! I had also virtually met AnaLouise Keating prior to my
first SSGA, and I met her in person at this meeting. Our correspondence with one another
has fueled my thinking and prompted me to ask the theoretical questions and push the
theory that I see in Anzaldúa beyond its logical end. Keating’s companionship has been
remarkable for my own scholarly development and thinking about Anzaldúa beyond
normative frameworks.
I have read both primary and secondary literature and continue to be compelled
by the philosophy-theory of Gloria Anzaldúa; her theories continue to revolutionize
scholarly and activist communities. In many ways, Anzaldúa’s work became a bridge as I
discovered other decolonial and queer thinkers. I often was reminded of Anzaldúan
concepts when I read other thinkers. I then began to read Gilles Deleuze and Deleuzian
thinkers several years after I began reading Gloria Anzaldúa. I found similarities and
resonances with their work, especially when I would read them together (Rosi Braidotti,
especially). The similarities I discovered prompted me to continue to explore Anzaldúa
and find ways of introducing Deleuze and Deleuzian thinking at critical turning points
within my research. But perhaps this does not completely answer “why?”
Anzaldúa’s craft of writing-art entirely disrupts stable academic disciplines. I
found that I appreciated this unstable (and perhaps queer) way of creating scholarship,
and the affirmation and hope that I discovered in Anzaldúa’s theories. Anzaldúa’s work
creates a sustained reflection for radical social change, culminating in personal and
collective transformation, and it is deeply political. It is perhaps these things that compel
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me to journey on a scholarly path of one who was never recognized by the academy as a
legitimate scholar and only posthumously awarded her PhD.15 Anzaldúa’s work
radicalizes personal and collective transformation. Anzaldúa is concerned with both self
and other, recognizing that the space in between these two beings is a quantum space. I
am compelled by this philosophy-theory because Anzaldúa produced stellar writing
projects, oftentimes agonizing over drafts for years. Now recognized as a founding
contributor to U.S. based queer theory, Anzaldúa remains under theorized. Several
feminist philosophers recognize this, namely Linda Martín Alcoff. Perhaps this is another
reason why I journey this scholarly path: to help energize new ways of theorizing and
interpreting Gloria Anzaldúa’s work.
Anzaldúan Materiality: The Theoretical Arc of the Dissertation
In one of the final essays published during her life, “now let us shift, the path of
conocimiento…inner works, public acts,” Anzaldúa details a theory of reality, an
epistemological framework, the impulse to act justly in the world, and a theory of
materiality. Though never referring to ‘other’ materialist thinkers, especially not the New
Materialists, I have come to read Anzaldúa as a speculative New Materialist thinker and
one who privileged a spirit-inflected materiality throughout her work. Therefore, an
Anzaldúan Materiality is a spirit-inflected materiality that animates Anzaldúa’s theories,
but also animates throughout this project.
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The director of the graduate program at UC Santa Cruz did contact Anzaldúa to let her know
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Matter is all around. We cannot escape it. Anzaldúa’s oeuvre details a rich
commitment to what New Materialists call the active materialization of all things and the
important role that matter and relationality have in today’s world. It is sufficient to say
that Anzaldúa did not theorize about passivity, or the passivity of matter. All matter and
things are constitutive of a type of being and becoming, or a becoming-being in
Anzaldúa’s work. Spirit, an indeterminate being, is alive in all that Anzaldúa wrote, and
vibrational energies oscillate throughout her writings. That said, the theoretical arc
throughout this dissertation project begins and ends with “now let us shift, the path to
conocimiento…inner works, public acts.” This essay frames much of what I am
attempting to do, which is detail a speculative queer material reality, or a queer material
realism—queer matter. I have read across disciplines to help me situate thinkers and
theories with Anzaldúa’s own work, which I have read exhaustively, including secondary
literature. While I begin and end with Anzaldúa’s last published essay as the theoretical
arc, I do not ignore her previous work. I simply use “now let us shift…” as a theoretical
point of departure and return that concretely frames this project.
What is important about this essay is that it gives voice to the scholarship that
began emerging during the 1990’s that is now referred to as New Materialism. New
Materialism reimagines materiality as ontology, which then retextures epistemology and
ethics and privileges a form of materialism over against language and the linguistic turn.
New Materialism is a category of theories that were generated as a response to the
linguistic turn. Infused with commitments to specific knowledge-becoming practices and
a history linked to feminisms, new materialism attempts to offer a different perspective to
signification, materiality, and methodologies of crafting knowledge. It is in this way that
23

materiality becomes an entanglement of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, the
framework of “now let us shift…” To suggest that Anzaldúa unmasks a bodily
materiality is not redundant but rather true. She materializes bodies in her work; “now let
us shift…” shows this. Furthermore, the entanglement of matter and meaning come to the
fore and the positivity of differences populate throughout this essay and her work.
Materiality is not determinative of a certain mechanism, or correlate. It is also not
passive. The entanglement of materiality for Anzaldúa is the active materialization of a
becoming-being that spans the speciated divide, while intersecting or colliding with new
ways of producing knowledge and acting in the world. The juridico-political roots to
Anzaldúa’s work provide a substantial frame for new ways of thinking justly.
The thrust of this dissertation project functions as a cartography. I use “now let us
shift…” as my theoretical frame or arc that creates the rhythm that fuels my interest, and
I detail materiality and bodies through a humanistic and posthumanistic lens. The
humanism with which feminism is imbued rarely reaches beyond the human body. I take
seriously the notion that body is something more than the human container that defines
bodies and that bodies are comprised of other bodies. Decentering bodies to include
countless other types and forms of bodies that are called into being by materiality signals
another turn in (new) materialist scholarship. I do this because feminist scholarship has
focused their theories on historical materialism and humanistic bodies. While throughout
Anzaldúa’s work, her theory on the body points toward a posthumanistic body, I begin
with an unstable human body as my referent.
Working through the Cartesian split, discursive body and Butler’s failed
materiality, I look to New Materialist scholars to help reframe materiality and bodies.
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Keeping “now let us shift…” at the fore, I carefully trace the entanglement of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics throughout this project. The end result is my conclusion of
Anzaldúan materiality, which is rooted in an ontology of becoming and a transcendent
immanence. This points to Anzaldúa’s insistence on an ethic of interrelatedness. This is
the entanglement that is most evident in Anzaldúa’s work—immanence and
interrelatedness, not dependent on correlationism, and a self-organizing process of active
materialization. This is the entanglement of material becoming body.
Beginning with ancient philosophy may seem futile to some. For, what can
Lucretius tell us about today’s philosophical problems? Can he, even? Can the father of
physics shed light on new contours of a materialist philosophy? Likewise, what can
modern philosophers teach us about the flow of material becomings?
Cartographies, usually used to illustrate land and other geographical areas, are
important because they help show the terrain of change, altitude, and other changes that
are pertinent to understanding the geography of place. Some cartographies are
topographical, showing mountains, hills, and water. Others simply are one dimension and
illustrate the connections of one place to another. Like a traditional cartography of place,
a material cartography is important to show the shifts in the ways in which materialism
shapes and shifts, the manner in which the connection of material thought dominates
philosophy, and the ways in which the feature of vital becoming is just one connective
synthesis in a philosophy of materialism. I have chosen one particular element in the
philosophy of materialism and only a handful of thinkers on which to build this particular
material cartography. The feature of vital becoming is the one material thing that I have
chosen to trace throughout a select group of ancient, modern, and contemporary thinkers.
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This material cartography is limited by these thinkers and in turn, this project conforms to
a project that is becoming but only with the material thought of these thinkers that
coalesce. This is an effort to show how the element of vital becoming creates a material
mass in the philosophy of materialism, and I show this by tracing movement and
becoming in Lucretius, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze, and the New Materialists
and ways movement is reflected and refracted in Anzaldúa’s theories.
Though material cartographies have been displaced by philosophies of
structuralism and psychoanalysis (in many respects, the same thing), the philosophy of
materialism can help recover our thinking about truth, reality, and issues of justice, and I
argue that the New Materialists and Deleuzian materialists tackle issues of justice in their
work. I believe a cartography is one way to think about achieving this, but there are other
related importances. I identify them below.
Taking a stratified chronological approach to rethinking materialism and the
emergence of becoming unmasks an importance in the philosophy of materialism and
new dimensions in New Materialist thinking. The major importance that I believe this
strategy unmasks is that there is a connection inherent in the New Materialist philosophy
that is not so new and that what they promote as a vitality in their philosophy is actually
linked to former thinkers that go as far back as Lucreitus. Noting this is not to suggest
that the New Materialists are simply duplicating Lucretius’ thought. I note this to show
the depth to the New Materialist’s material framework, and to also show that New
Materialism engages with other discourses, like feminism and queer theory in productive
ways. Perhaps that is another term to identify in this material cartography: productive.
Materialism, as a long-standing philosophy is a productive philosophy in that there is
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something always generative and generating from this philosophy, and I believe Deleuze
and his followers get at this in a critical manner.
Likewise, performing a material cartography of the above listed thinkers around
the issue of animated material or becoming helps show a new trajectory in New
Materialist thinking that expands their philosophy beyond what some might call ‘strict
philosophy’ toward other creative works that enflesh a New Materialist framework.
Another importance is also to show the entangled reality of a materialist philosophy that
further mobilizes new dimensions of thought, new methodologies, and undoes traditional
disciplinary categories that help initiate new forms of doing and practicing philosophy in
materialist ways. In fact, methodologies and the subject become transversal in New
Materialist thinking. The ‘trans’ part of transversal is important to note, as it does not
refer to transcendence but rather immanence and the radically intersecting material
thoughts that are ever emerging.
So What?
Important to this project is the recognition that Gloria Anzaldúa not only paved
the way for a trans-disciplinary approach to scholarship, but also demonstrated such
scholarship in both writing and art, along with the production of children’s books. Her
life orientating vocation was one of art-making-theory, and she used metaphors of
bridging and webs of connection to illustrate such dynamic work. Philosophy, while it is
the love of wisdom, is also a practice, and Anzaldúa practiced a love for wisdom that was
generated from the whispers of ancestors, myths that performed a strategic vision of
wholeness and difference, and epistemic strategies that stemmed from her body and the
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bodies of the universe. So, what is important about reading Anzaldúa as a philosopher
and theorist, and why should we pursue this endeavor?
The manner in which we engage theory and philosophy matters. Matter matters,
too, as I have argued in this dissertation. And, with a focus on the materiality of the body
and urging to re-imagine bodies as matter becoming different, a particular and differential
strategy lens should be used when reading Anzaldúa’s work. I prefer to bridge together
(or weave, as a particular entanglement of becoming) ontology, epistemology, and ethics
as a particular frame that helps re-imagine ontology as an orientation of becoming,
epistemology as that which is rooted bodily, and ethics that is tied to both the previous
philosophical categories. That in turn generates new practices. This is achievable when
we recognize the entanglement of these philosophical categories and Anzaldúa’s work is
one such theorist philosopher who perfects this entanglement. This is important because
when we re-read her work as a particular entanglement of ontology—epistemology—
ethics, we learn the value of her work as work of philosophy and the productive and
generative output of ideas that is grounded in both decolonial work and queerness.
Recognizing this productive and generative output necessitates new reading strategies
that are informed by the confluence of the multiplicity of ideas from Anzaldúa and the
web of entanglement that is woven throughout her entire work.
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CHAPTER TWO: BRIDGING AND REWRITING ANZALDÚA AS A
‘GENERATIVE’ MATERIALIST: A NEW LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF MATTER
With awe and wonder you look around, recognizing the preciousness of
the earth, the sanctity of every human being on the planet, the ultimate
unity and interdependence of all beings—somos todos un paíz. Love swells
in your chest and shoots out of your heart chakra, linking you to
everyone/everything—the aboriginal in Australia, the crow in the forest,
the vast Pacific Ocean. You share a category of identity wider than any
social position or racial label. This conocimiento motivates you to work
actively to see that no harm comes to people, animals, ocean—to take up
spiritual activism and the work of healing. Te entregas a tu promesa to
help your various cultures create new paradigms, new narratives.
—Gloria Anzaldúa
Anzaldúa’s scholarship, her life’s work, her art-making-theory is framed by the
process of images and communication, lines of flight, if you will.16 This process, or
becoming-being, as she articulates throughout her writing, connects the tongue (the
physical part of the body) with thought, both matters of materiality that should not go
unnoticed. Combined, these two machines of the body (the mouth and the brain, which
are both bodies) help illustrate the connectedness of thinking, being, and becoming. In
this sense, Anzaldúa’s work (from art found in images and art found in narrative or
poetry) stimulates a generative material reality that mobilizes a framework of becoming.
In order to give you a foretaste of the work of Anzaldúa, I wish to detail the importance
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This is illustrated in her essay on the red and black ink, found in Borderlands. I also borrow this
language from Deleuze & Guatarri whose philosophy very much are ‘lines of flight.’
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of her work (that I understand to be at the particular intersection of theory and praxis) in
this chapter. I will use this chapter to connect Anzaldúa’s theory of generative materiality
that I trace throughout her work with the larger work I am attempting relative to the
materiality of the body as that which is becoming. I will do this in the following ways:
The first feature that is important to note is that of motion or movement, which
contributes significantly to Anzaldúa’s theory-making-practice work. Seen particularly in
the titles of this bridge called my back and Haciendo Caras / Making Face, Making Soul,
and even further to this bridge we call home, movement is the art of a becoming motion.
The work of seeing Anzaldúa’s work as ‘becoming motion’ or a ‘generative materiality,’
is in part recognizing the processes by which her theory comes to be, or becomes. There
is always movement in Anzaldúa’s theories, and also in her imaginal work, that helps
frame her theories as something that has an internal force of becoming. In this way,
Anzaldúa’s work in its entirety is the art of becoming motion and contributes to a
generative materiality.
When I theorize movement, it is important to note that sometimes movement is on
the wind-swayed bridge, and other times it is the movement of political action. The title
of these books frames such motion of becoming and secondarily suggests a particular
style of movement that is generative, which is manifest in the in/between spaces of
becoming, often characterized by nepantla. In the Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, a
chronological collection of writings and images, the reader is not only introduced to
published material of Anzaldúa, but is able to chart the motion and movement that is
central to her theory-making-practice work. Likewise, in connection with motion and
movement, the second feature is the concept of bridging and radical interconnectedness, a
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central feature of Anzaldúa’s work. Both bridging and Anzaldúa’s metaphysics of
interconnectedness are woven throughout her work. They give texture to the already
existing philosophical framework of her scholarship. Given the ways in which Anzaldúa
used her own racial positioning as a Chicana and Tejana to bridge with white feminists,
this not only generates a new contour in anti-racist coalitions, but also builds bridges with
difference as a political act. One must also recognize that the act of bridging is not an act
to solidify ideas or actions but to create a much more porous orientation in relationality
that further contributes to a sense of radical interconnectedness. The third feature that is
incredibly important for my work is Anzaldúa’s anti-normativity approach that results in
a new contour of anti-disciplinarity. This feature is important for my work because I
actively leverage Anzaldúa’s resistance to static norms and normativity in her theories
that privilege multiplicity and becoming, a particular philosophical thread that I trace
throughout this dissertation. While norms are incredibly valuable in ethical method and
theories, I find that the anti-normative shift is central to a more robust queer and
decolonial orientation, which conforms to Anzaldúa’s own work as a work of resistance
in an attempt for an orientation of radical interconnection with all things. I do not suggest
that Anzaldúa abandons values; her work is rich with value-laden theories that often are
under-determined, enfleshing a notion of queer freedom. This notion of queer freedom is
non-teleological in orientation, but directed and framed by radical interconnectedness. In
this sense, then, it differs from Spinoza’s conatus, which is strategically teleological.
Anzaldúa’s own anti-normativity helps frame her anti-disciplinarity, which is
helpful for my own work, since I transgress normative disciplinary categories and
privilege theoretical promiscuity over against privileging the singularity of one theory
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over another, or the stability of one singular norm that is not porous or cannot change.
These three features mentioned above help coordinate the porosity of bridging and radical
interconnectedness that is rooted in a generative materiality. These three features, seen
through Anzaldúa’s work, should encourage researchers to mine Anzaldúa’s theories for
their rich philosophical roots. Likewise, these three features fit together as part of the
overarching assemblage theory that Anzaldúa has utilized, particularly the exteriority of
consciousness, nature, myths, and other elements, to displace and replace what it exists in
an effort to continue to chart her becoming-being. This is very much a ‘bottom up’
framework that privileges fluidity and exchangeability through multiplicities.
I see this work as bridging work, a familiar terrain to Anzaldúa’s own theorymaking-practice work. I will attempt to detail generative materiality as a reality and
philosophical register that is not only becoming but also contributing to a larger
ontological frame that connects knowledge production and ways of knowing with our
everyday practices, or ethics. Doing this type of bridging work helps further generate the
radical interconnectedness of ontology-epistemology-ethics, an entanglement of
becoming-being. While Anzaldúa herself does not use the philosophical categories,
others—like Karen Barad—attribute these terms to Anzaldúa’s work. I follow suit in
advancing this thought further to root Anzaldúa’s theory as deeply embedded
philosophical work that is productively decolonial and queer.
In a field (philosophy and critical theory) where Anzaldúa has either been
fetishized or marginalized, it is important also to illustrate the importance of Anzaldúa’s
theories as they relate to a larger philosophical domain that otherwise go unnoticed and
certainly under-recognized. When I speak about Anzaldúa’s work, I am referring to the
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corpus of her work, and do not focus primarily on Borderlands/La Frontera: The New
Mestiza. The importance of looking at the entire corpus of Anzaldúa’s work leverages a
greater philosophical frame, whereas simply focusing on Borderlands/La Frontera: The
New Mestiza minimizes the larger philosophical framework that she deploys. I do not
want to marginalize the robust philosophy that is included in Borderlands/La Frontera:
The New Mestiza, but I wish to expand my focus to include pre- and post-borderland
materials. The importance of illustrating Anzaldúa as a serious thinker and producer of
knowledge destabilizes traditions that have eclipsed her work, among others’ works. To
mobilize Anzaldúa as an important philosophical thinker is to not only transgress
dominant strands of theory and philosophy but to imagine and enact a creative opening to
rethink the domain of philosophy and our love for wisdom, which, for Anzaldúa, is
located in the imagination producing bodies, el cenote.
To begin this important work, I outline generative materiality as a primary
framework for Anzaldúa’s materialism that is supported by what I call animation. I will
argue that animation is a particular style of nomadic movement that is seen throughout
Anzaldúa’s life and work.17 Secondly, I connect generative materiality and its animated
feature with Anzaldúa’s knowledge-making framework that is grounded in a metaphysics
of interconnectedness. Doing this ties together (or bridges) ontology and epistemology,
two domains that have driven the discipline of philosophy and in turn radically
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Anzaldúa moved from the Rio Grande Valley to Austin and to the Bay Area / Santa Cruz,
among other places, during her life. I argue that these nomadic movements contribute to her own theorymaking-art practice.
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marginalized the work of women of color theorists, and most certainly Anzaldúa. What
Anzaldúa gives us in this work that is grounded in the reality of bridging together
domains of thought and action is a way to rethink our reality, and embrace the light of
imagination that is always being animated in the dark, in the folds of matter becoming.18
Certainly, every theory has a practice, and Anzaldúa’s work elucidates this claim. The act
of bridging privileges a relational ontology, or what I call becoming-being, first
mentioned by Anzaldúa in her poetry/narrative of El Mundo Surdo. This language is
found in Anzaldúa’s own work but has yet to be theorized sufficiently. This is one
attempt to theorize the importance of the ways Anzaldúa’s work is philosophically rich
and motivates readers to think in a philosophical register. And, furthermore, this move to
think about Anzaldúa in a philosophical register is a particular style of movement in
philosophy and theory. The move includes the self in all of its plurality of becoming and
is strategically part of the philosophical register through which Anzaldúa theorizes.
Anzaldúa’s Materialism as a Generative Materiality
As I have investigated the account of ‘new’19 materialism, I have discovered that
this account of materialism is one that is in motion, or animated. I have come to
understand this motion akin to a material becoming and I call this material becoming
generative. Generative materiality is matter that is in flux, in process, or becoming. Its
lure is framed by both the affirmative qualities of matter becoming and the negation of
18

Anzaldúa’s dissertation, which she never called a ‘dissertation’ is titled “Light in the Dark.”
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I place ‘new’ in quotes to draw attention to the fact that what is being done in New Materialisms
is not all that new. The language that is being deployed in this philosophical camp is contributing greatly to
philosophy and cultural theories, but it is far from being new.
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what is. The apophatic reality of matter that closes off and creates a new line of flight is
the very potentiality of a becoming-being. It is a material reality that is animated by its
self-organization. Self-organization is an organization that is internal to self, but also in
relationship with other material realities that exist in the web or entanglement of
connection. The relational importance of generative materiality is one that is important to
the work of Gloria Anzaldúa that is also mobilized through the act of bridging. An
example of bridging is the political act of relating with white feminists aobut which
Anzaldúa writes, which for many Chicanas and women of colors during the 1980s and
1990s was problematic. The metaphor of bridging not only creates the capacity of
connection, but it also privileges an open-mindedness to reality becoming material.
Anzaldúa’s poetry is one place to begin thinking about movement and motion
relative to matter. In her first published poem, “Now Let Us Go” or Tihueque, the reader
is drawn into the periscope of becoming. I quote the poem below to build a case for
elements of motion that are internal to poem. I also quote the poem to show the
importance of Aztec myth that materializes as revisionist mythmaking in Anzaldúa’s
work. I do not analyze the poem in terms of meter, measure, or rhyme, but rather the
materiality of the language that is offered, metaphors such as rise that denote movement
and motion. The act of carving hearts and the sun rising all cast a motion-filled shadow
that moves with the poem, and poetic rhythms motivate our thinking regarding a
framework of becoming.
One year in a distant century during Teoteco,
The 12th month of the solar year Five Rabbit,
in the reign of the Four-Water Sun,
I carved 12,000 hearts in honor
of Huitziltopochtli, God of War,
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who made the sun rise each morning.
In each succeeding year thereafter
ceremonial drunkenness robbed me
as many hearts embraced the furnace sacrifice.
Only the hearts of the finest Náhuatl braves
and luckiest prisoners and warriors
at the sacred flesh.
Today I lie in a musty museum
and register 5.5 on the Mohs scale.
But my origin, my volcanic obsidian,
hard as granite
comes in good stead.
In my childhood I was a mirror.
I threw a vitreous luster, dark-green.
But now the iron oxide running in my veins
dulls my edge
and the air bubbles trapped in me
reflect my age
Time passes.
I rest and await the flesh.20
The Aztec calendar uses animals to frame their solar year, and the year of the Rabbit
occupies a particular direction or orientation, South. The only other animal that is
oriented to(ward) the South is the lizard. We can position the South as being ‘bottom’ to
North (Top), and when we reframe South as bottom, as would be the case in sexual
minority or Kink communities, we come to a greater awareness of the role of the South
that might motivate a particular movement in Anzaldúa’s poem that motivates an urgency
of ‘now let us go…’ Recognizing the power of the South (or bottom), one begins to see
how that particular power shapes and shifts reality and recasts a new contour of becoming
motion. When we consider the role of the South or the Valley in Anzaldúa’s life, we

20

This is Anzaldúa’s first published poem that appears in the Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, ed.
AnaLouise Keating.
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come to an awareness that the South, in particular the Global South for centuries, has
been the object of imperialism and the particular subject for colonialism; the South has
bottomed for the Global North and has resulted in ongoing colonialism. The Valley in
Texas has certainly been that, as have the rest of the South in the United States. And, yet,
while we recognize the role of the South, it is also important to recognize the ways in
which the South continues to enflesh power. While this power is not one that is mobilized
in the Global North, it is important to acknowledge the inherent power of the Global
South. Noting this, Anzaldúa writes using the imagery of God. Turning to the motion of
sun and the power of the sun helps to continue this journey of becoming motion.
The imagery of the God of War making the sun rise each morning creates not
only a metaphor of movement but real, actual moments of movement and motion where
the matter of the sun is in flux, rising each morning, and it is interesting to think about the
sun rising at the hands of the God of War when the bottom positioning to that of ongoing
colonialism recasts notions of becoming.
In this sense, the God of War is the cause of the sun coming to light. The sun is
becoming. The sun as subject for part of the ceremonial ritual of the knife becoming,
once a mirror and now a knife, is a central feature to recognizing the ways in which the
multiplicity of interconnectedness frames this poem. It is in this moment of
acknowledging the multiplicity of interconnectedness of Global North (Top) and Global
South (bottom) that reframes such positionings and instead invigorates new contours of
movement.
The language of origin also motivates a type of movement in this poem that
initiates beginnings or becomings, an ever-expanding reality. I interpret this move of an
37

ever-expanding reality as one where Anzaldúa assumes a new positioning relative to the
orientation of the South. One might read a particular contour of power into writing about
the knife’s origin and the ability for the knife to shape and shift. There is power inherent
in the knife’s origin, so how does the orientation of the South (or bottom space) affect the
movement of ‘now let us go’? When Anzaldúa writes about the knife’s origin, as
volcanic obsidian, we recognize and acknowledge that the once obsidian nature has
become something as hard as granite. The use of the language of origin, also, puts this
poetry in motion, not in progression. The poem is moving, though the words on the page
are captured in a particular frame of becoming. Even the language of ‘lying in a musty
museum’ is a type of movement, perhaps nomadic movement, that is illustrated in
Deleuze’s work, but a movement nonetheless. The metaphor that is created by the
language of lying in a musty museum helps further illustrate the becoming nature of
matter and the ways in which matter generates itself and is self-organizing. This frame of
becoming, I argue, is throughout Anzaldúa’s work and the socio-analytic category of the
body can be used in conjunction with the frame of becoming.
Anzaldúa’s material becoming is not spirit phobic, unlike the work of Jane
Bennett. Spirit is alive and captures the nature of this material becoming-being. Spirit is
what mobilizes the movement of becoming and roots the entanglement of
interconnectedness. Important to note when writing about origins is that Anzaldúa
assumes a particular orientation relative to the ceremonial knife. She assumes the knife to
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be her, and in particular, the Indian inside her. In various places,21 Anzaldúa writes about
the Indian inside all of us, the one that we police the most, and who is la Chingadada.22
When thinking about Top and Bottom space in sexual positioning and in thinking about
her assuming the knife to be Indian self, there is a consistent doubling of movement
happening. What I mean here is that the consistent doubling is one of simultanoursly
embracing bottom space and also topping from bottom space. There is not only the
doubling but also the duality of being both / and. Simultaneously, she is assuming Bottom
space and identifying that as the Indian inside of her (and even writes that the knife is
laying down, presumably in a waiting position), but what is interesting is that she infuses
a contour of power into this Bottom space and enlivens the knife (herself) with a
particular agency that is rooted in power becoming, which materializes along planes of
waiting for flesh, according to the poem. This further shows evidence of an animated
matter-reality that is in motion and becoming.
To suggest that Anzaldúa creates a philosophy of animated matter that is
generative and becoming is to say that the foundations of Anzaldúa’s theory-making-artpractices are not rooted in language or what some philosophers and theorists might call
the linguistic turn. Haunted by the becoming nature of matter, Anzaldúa uses language in
material ways. She has done this throughout her writing, and her poetry helps readers
engage this element of her theories. She uses language in material ways by engaging the
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Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, among other places.

22

The literal translation of ‘la chingadada’ is ‘the fucked one.’
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imaginal as a very real and material thing that exists. This ‘haunting’ is always a return to
the material, always a return of the matter becoming different. The poem, I argue, is one
such way. Other examples are the ways in which she writes about walking on the beach
in Santa Cruz and the ways in which her path was undulated.23 This language helps
materialize language and further illustrate the materiality of language. The importance of
pointing out the movement of matter helps strengthen the reality of becoming, a reality
that is in flux or in process. Movement, also, helps illustrate the ways that matter is a selforganizing unit, which is also becoming.
Becoming as a particular feature that illustrates a generative materiality has roots
in matter that is animated. Animated matter that is self-organizing, organic in its essence
or nature, helps to further frame a material reality that is also rooted in movement.24 So,
with the connection of a material reality that is entangled with movement and is also
animated, the result of this equation is becoming. Becoming as a framework of always
being in flux or in process also illustrates the relationality that animation has with matter
that is self-organizing.
I see this frame of becoming particularly useful in interpreting Anzaldúa’s work.
Not only does Anzaldúa’s work privilege ongoing movement but her work also privileges
a frame of interconnectedness and this entanglement of connection or connectedness is a
central part of her own philosophy of becoming. Movement, also, for Anzaldúa can be
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This is a phrase that is used repeatedly in her writing.
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I use the term ‘rooted’ to help illustrate the stability of matter, even in a highly contingent
reality that is our world. Matter is stabilized by its roots of nomadic movement.
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related to a Divine process, I think. She often talks about moving alongside the ocean,
which is a double-movement, and a further entrenching of the entanglement of becoming.
This double-movement is also a lure into becoming, which should not go unnoticed.
I also see the frame of becoming and the frame of interconnectedness as part of
the overall frame of plurality, or multiplicity. That each of these are implicated in the
entanglement of Anzaldúa’s work, which might be understood as a unit but the
multiplicity of the features of the entanglement help produce the ongoing plurality that
has been a part of Anzaldúa’s work from the start. This so-called ‘unit’ should never be
understood as a singularity. Her poem, Tihueque, invites the reader to take note of the
multiplicity of becoming, or the ways in which the self is ontologically plural.25 Noting
this does not diminish her single-substance reality, or monist vision, but it does help
readers bridge together the real capacity of a framework of entangled becoming to
multiply within a web of interconnectedness. It is similar to the entanglement of a spider
web. The spider web is a single entity, but plural and multiple in its connections with the
larger web. It is radically entangled in its becoming as the spider spins repetitiously and
the web becomes a single yet also plural or multiple material reality.
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In reading the Entrevistas / Interviews book, I have a clearer picture that perhaps she not only
thought of herself as a multiple or multiplicitous, but also as plural. And, yes, I do not betray her monism or
monist orientation in suggesting that she is an ontologically plural self; I follow Deleuze and Guattari’ s
formula that monism = pluralism. They cite this in A Thousand Plateaus, and we might be able to
understand this as an aberrant monism. The experience of multiplicity or the multiplicitous self that is a
unified One is not one that emerges from an experience of subtraction, but rather from addition. I follow
this formula as it relates to the ontologically plural self that is always adding more selves through pure
experience.
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The Intersection of Continental Theories and Gloria Anzaldúa: Method and
Tracing Anzaldúan Features in “Materialist” Philosophies
Methodology is always an important place to start when analyzing philosophy.
Derrida creatively used the methodology of deconstruction and illustrated this sometimes
by crossing through terms or words in his writing. In some ways, to read Derrida as a
materialist deconstructionist would be transgressive to the field. Yet, Derrida did as much
constructivist work in the field of deconstructionism as he deconstructed norms within
philosophy. Likewise, Gloria Anzaldúa’s own code-switching and use of Aztec
metaphors and terms, including Nauhtl, creates a new contour of materialism. I use the
term ‘new’ not to denote something that has not existed prior, but to indicate an
emergence, an irruption, of a contour of becoming.
While Gilles Deleuze collaborated with Félix Guattari and generated a new
schizo-analysis for philosophy, Gloria Anzaldúa charted new terrain in her theorymaking-art-philosophy. This new terrain is often found in the work of bridging. Through
this method of bridging that establishes her theory-making-art-philosophy, Anzaldúa was
likely a forerunner in what is now called New Materialism. As mentioned above,
movement and the often-times double-movement remains an important feature to
Anzaldúa’s materialism.
Found in children’s books, poetry, short story, fiction, and theory, along with her
archives, this theory-making-art-philosophy, as I am calling it in this project, helps to not
only destabilize dominant and normative methodologies that are used throughout the
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domain of philosophy, but also illustrates a new turn in the philosophy of materialism.26 I
mention Anzaldúa as a new turn in the philosophy of materialism, because her work not
only bridges together matter and language in compelling ways, but her work ignites our
thinking in new materially tangible ways. The tangibility of Anzaldúa’s work is
something that is keenly important for tracing her as a materialist philosopher.
Tangibility, also, illustrates Anzaldúa’s aesthetics and affect (a predecessor to what is
now termed affect theory). The tangibility of Anzaldúa’s work is an important feature to
her materialism, that is often dismissed as creative writing. Yet! In a popular category,
such as creative writing, readers encounter a growing philosophical register whose intra
activity is identity, aesthetics, and philosophy. The identity category that is deployed in
Anzaldúa’s work transgresses traditional representational politics. The Mestiza, while
existing on an ontological plane that is always becoming, does not conform to traditional
second wave feminist identity categories. The Mestiza transcends these politics of
representationalism by including aesthetics and a larger ontological framework that I see
as that of becoming.
Important to this is the way Anzaldúa offers readers new tools in the construction
and the ‘doing’ of a materialist philosophy, and the most important tool is that of the
imagination, or the imaginal. One of the turns that I see as important in emerging
materialist philosophies that relates to Anzaldúa is the use of images to create theory. The
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I use the phrase theory-making art-philosophy as a way to raise up the in/betweeness of
Anzaldúa’s own theories and the ways in which she engages thresholds and ongoing moments or spheres of
nepantla.
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imaginal is an important feature to Anzaldúa’s production of a materialist theory that
should not go unnoticed. The imaginal, comprised of both images, words, and other meta
ideas mobilizes her philosophy. Herein lies another example of the double-movement that
I think is important in re-thinking Anzaldúa as a materialist philosopher.
The image of el cenote, for example, found in the Gloria Anzaldúa Reader27, is
one such example of the ways in which the imaginal is used to access a materialist
register in Anzaldúa’s philosophy. Recalling the motion and movement (becoming-being)
of Now Let Us Go / Tihueque, the image of el cenote compliments this poem by showing
another layer to the recurring features of movement and motion that are animated
throughout Anazaldúa’s theory-making-practice work. Whereas Anzaldúa adopted the
voice of an Aztec ceremonial knife in Tihueque, she, in this image, paints herself into the
imaginal movement of dreams that are becoming. Dreams, which reside in el cenote,
irrupt Anzaldúa’s reality through the process of mental and physical nepantilism28 and her
becoming a threshold being. Dreams, another contour of a fold that is becoming, is
Anzaldúa’s theory of el cenote that is far under utilized but should be framed as a
productive flow of becoming.
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“El cenote,” Gloria Anzaldúa, #8, The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, ed. by AnaLouise Keating,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 224.
28

I use this variation of nepantla to refer to thresholds and in/between space.
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Figure 1.
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The image depicts something akin to a river, which helps visualize and further
mobilize movement. There are several moving pieces to this image, contours of
becoming, as I call them. There is an image of a figure, but it remains to be known if it is
human, or not. This figure is pointing toward and across the threshold, where there is an
arch extended form one side of the flow to the other side. The flow leads to the pool of
images, el cenote. Some terms that are associated with the flow that leads to el cenote are:
“fissure, crack, aperture, gate, rajadura, agujero, hueco, and rapture.”29 These terms are
all written with a different color or firmness, allowing them to be lighter or darker. Even
in the listing of these terms, there is movement. Fissure begins at the top of the list, and
going with the flow to its left, the list moves downward toward the pool of images, and
the last term is ‘rapture.’ Interesting to this image is the fact that there are two different
arrows. One pointing in one direction and another, below the cross threshold, pointing in
the opposite direction. This is evidence of the ongoing, double movement of the flow,
similar to the ways that Anzaldúa describes the universe being flows of energy. This
intentional doubling of movement within the flow that is carved on the canvas, the flow
multiplies, or becomes, a new-fashioned reality. The emergence of such doubling is the
centrality of a becoming force, a material reality that shapes and shifts toward and away
from the pool of images. The energy forces the flows (symbolized by arrows) help further
contextualize movement.
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Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, 224.
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Noting this is important to further mobilizing a framework of generative
materiality. What is generative about this image / material is the fact that there are forces
of becoming that are central to the image. The image itself is in motion, a particularized
flow of becoming material.
The other image that I think helps create a framework of generative materiality is
that of “nepantla.” A Nauhtl word, meaning “in between,” signifying flow(s), Anzaldúa’s
image in the Reader, again, has arrows that articulate multiple flows of becoming. Also
important to this image is the text that is used to explain the image. Words of becoming,
like that of changing identities, are used to articulate the meaning of nepantla. While I do
not want to focus on the politics of identity and rather on movidas, as articulated in the
image, it is important to note that materiality might very well have an identity, one of
generativity. Similar to el cenote, Anzaldúa explicitly writes movidas below the flow that
is spliced that illustrates an in betweenness. Movidas is translated as ‘move’ in Spanish.
Nepantla, a Nauhtl term, as a term that is rooted in movement enfleshes a double
movement, that of generating a new(er) identity and also moving bodies from one point
to another. This movement is always predicated on the force of becoming. Movement is
already a flow that meets and connected with the flow of becoming. These flows are not
in competition, but that are coalescing in their becoming. Their becoming results in a
difference becoming different. Identity is different during the nepantla process.
Nepantler@s at root are ones who are becoming different, due to process and
internal/external movement. The explicitness of Anzaldúa’s mentioning movidas further
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implicates the multiplicity of movements, the doubling in becoming. The following
image is Movidas, as illustrated by Gloria Anzaldúa in the Gloria Anzaldúa Reader.30

30

Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, 220. I find it curious that both “changing identities” or movidas and
nepantla are on the same page in the image. I think it is important to note that Anzaldúa uses the god of
wind to illustrate nepantla, and for her changing identities, she uses the term ‘movidas.’
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Figure 2.
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Generativity, as illustrated even in Lucretius’ work in the chapter to come, are
moments of becoming, moments of change and process that are always a process of
difference becoming different. I use this formulate of difference becoming difference
because it implies a radical process of change, a process of change that is rooted in the
very process of change and becoming. Anzaldúa’s work, which I think is rooted in a
movement of difference becoming different, is a type of theory-becoming-practice that
privileges the imaginal and creates contours of material becoming. The imaginal, as a
medium that displaces the over-dependence of language, produces new material contours
and generates a framework of becoming. In Anzaldúa’s work, while there is movement
that is central to her theory, movement is also central to the imaginal, and this
acknowledgement further mobilizes the ways in which movement doubles and
proliferates, causing matter to become a plurality in its very becoming material.
Anzaldúa’s very definition of the universe rests in the power of plurality that is a singular
reality, a productive monism, if you will. By productive I mean to suggest that the
monism is materializing in the flows of the imaginal. The imaginal should not be
displaced as mere fragments of becoming, but should be claimed as real moments of
material becoming.
To read Anzaldúa as a generative materialist is to transgress (in some ways) the
normative frameworks that contain (new) materialism. By this, I mean that the new
materialists privilege an ontological framework that conforms to a monist perspective,
and while I do not discredit this perspective or orientation, I want to destabilize the
singularity of the monism that is privileged by the new materialists and advocate for a
monism that is becoming and generative, a monism that is part of the plurality of the
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imaginal. I think Anzaldúa’s work re-imagines monism as a plurality becoming through
the imaginal, through the flows the she privileges. These flows, while plural, should not
indicate a Cartesian dualism, but rather a monism that is productively becoming in its
singularity.
Bodies of a Generative Materiality
I will argue in this dissertation two concepts that are intimately connected and
cohere to be a singular reality: that bodies are material and material bodies are always
becoming. By analyzing the role matter and the becoming nature of matter, then also
analyze the role matter has in contributing to the discourse on bodies, bodies become
much more than a humanist project. Noting the ways in which language has shaped our
understanding of bodies, I put forward a framework of movement and doubling that is
central to matter that in turn affects bodies. I see this same frame of movement in
Anzaldúa’s work and theories. Bodies, though never outlined or contained as “material”
in Anzaldúa’s work, yet imagined and materialized in her art and theorized in her essays
as material realities, are generated by a material imagination. This material imagination,
mentioned earlier as the imaginal, is generated from contours that are material and
emerge from physical elements. The acknowledgement that matter is generated from
what is in the world is not a surprise. That I suggest this idea of matter is in movement, or
comprised of a flow, helps frame matter’s generativity. Bodies, too, emerge out of a
generative materiality and bodies take shape and form within the flow of becoming.
A generative materialism, as I see in Anzaldúa’s work, involves not only lines of
flight (the movement of matter), but also the emergence of the imaginal, connected
together to generate contours of matter becoming material, a creative evolution of bodies.
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CHAPTER THREE: LUCRETIUS, AN ANCIENT MATTER
Never can nothing become something, nor something nothing.
—Lucretius
Qualifying the ‘vital force’ of Lucretius with that of the ‘vital becoming’ found in
modern and contemporary thinkers can only be done by using a materialist framework
and the creative intuition that emerges from materialist philosophies. Whether it is force,
will, becoming, movement, or process, an event of becoming emerges throughout the
ancient, modern, and contemporary materialist philosophies. I take this to be the central
qualifying feature of an ontology of becoming that I will discuss later. Yet, as I note that
this feature is found throughout each of the thinkers I discuss, the case for a ‘vital
becoming’ may still yet be made, or readers may still be unconvinced. What is important
to note is that affirming animated material or material as becoming is that this is not
solely an external reality, or external force that stems from the void. Animated material or
the process of becoming is also both an external and internal material reality that
motivates the anticipation of a flow. Linked together with consciousness for Bergson and
Anzaldúa, it is the intersection of Deleuze and Anzaldúa who help confirm the reality of
not only a philosophy of materialism that is always becoming, but also the reality of this
philosophy being a philosophy of immanence. The distinction between organic and
inorganic matter that is always in flux, participating in the flow of life, becomes
indiscernible. What is, however, discernible is this flow or becoming that is radically
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material. I argue this flow of becoming is seen in ancient, modern, and contemporary
thinkers that helps create a new dimension to thinking materiality, bodies, and becoming.
The movement and feature of becoming that is inherent to Lucretius’ materialism
is important to identify for this project. I will argue that there is a force or an animation
that in turn translates into an ontology of becoming in the work of Anzaldúa and is
particularly noticeable when both Deleuze and Anzaldúa are in conversation with one
another. More on that in later chapters. While vitalism or animation is not the language
that is found in Lucretius and only attributed to him by later scholars, I find this language
important and helpful as I think about the element or feature of becoming that is central
to matter. For Lucretius, the movement of matter is described as the clinamen, or swerve,
which has neither a beginning nor an end. Rooted in Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius
polemically responds to three Pre-Socratic philosophers who represent three rival
physical systems. They are classified in the Aristotelian tradition as monism, finite
pluralism, and infinite pluralism.
Heraclitus, with his reduction of everything to fire, is the token monist;
Empedocles, with his four elements, represents finite pluralism; and
Anaxagoras, read through the lens of Aristotelian doxography as making
all the ‘homoeomerous’ or ‘like-parted’ stuffs the elements, is treated as
fundamentally sui generis.31
Reacting polemically to these three Pre-Socratic philosophers sets up Lucretius’
philosophy-poetry as a strategy to take over Epicurean thinking and advocate for a vital
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Quoted from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lucretius/. Accessed on 30 November 2014.
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becoming inherent in his theory of matter that is also eternal.32 Recognizing that matter
does not end, but only transforms, leaves matter as energy that is traced by material
becomings. Lucretius’ work is also an ontological vitalism of becoming because in his
polemic attack, he destabilizes traditional ideas regarding both monism and pluralism. In
his passionate arguments, Lucretius is able to fashion new contours of monism by
utilizing the language of movement, particularly in his use of clinamen, having no
beginning or end. It is perhaps in this development and critique of Pre-socratic monism
and pluralism that Lucretius can be understood as providing a nascent thought of
vitalism, ushered in by the language of movement and becoming. Noting the importance
of matter as a vital becoming from the point of departure of Lucretius, as the foundational
thinker of materialism that I interpret as being animated matter, enables this project to
develop both chronologically and thematically with a focus on the material becomings
found in Lucretius’ philosophy-poetry that then is connected to Gloria Anzaldúa.
Movement, or that which is vitally alive, is native to Lucretius’ thought. While
vitalism is a particular school of thought that emerges much later, one can see that there
is something like vitalism in On The Nature of Things that Lucretius wrote, and later, in
the poetry of Anzaldúa. I note this now, because matter as vitally becoming is what is
central to this project, and I will make the claim that something like matter as vitally
becoming is native in Lucretius’ poem. Lucretius’ framework of movement and

32

The eternality of Lucretius’ philosophy is, as cited above, sui generis. The reality of his
philosophy of materialism being an infinite pluralism is important to keep in mind as I trace the reality of
movement and becoming in his work.

54

becoming contributes to the very foundation and bedrock of how I understand
materialism to be a significant resource for understanding bodies as becoming, though
bodies here are understood as a broad construction of material becomings.
This chapter analyzes On the Nature of Things, detailing important parts of the
poem that help generate a robust conversation around materialism, but specifically, this
beginning section of the chapter addresses the language of motion and movement. I will
argue that this language of movement will help generate a new discussion around
becoming. Secondly, this chapter addresses the affirmation of the self-organization or
autopoiesis and decomposition that establishes the matter of Lucretius as self-organizing
and in motion. Third, this chapter bridges a discussion around force and motion. Finally, I
introduce Gloria Anzaldúa and cite her first published poem, “Now Let us Go.” I use this
poem as a running example throughout my chapters on materialism to show how
Anzaldúa, herself, began her published poetry with something akin to the language of a
material becoming. This chapter ends with why the study of a representative of classical
materialism is important.
Lucretius and On the Nature of Things
Lucretius, as a representative of classical materialism, establishes the framework
for thinking materially about the universe and is a thorough attempt at understanding
reality. The ancient materialism of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius continues to
thrive today in much of today’s scholarship that is written by scholars of New
Materialism. Classical materialism advocates for a view of reality as a unified whole,
stemming from one single source of existence, that is largely attributed to the existence of
the atom. In this section, I survey Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things and utilize this
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thinker as the point of departure in thinking about classical materialism. I also begin with
Lucretius to chart a sturdy material foundation that is rooted in a materialist frame. This
is important, because I will later argue that bodies are material, and a firm foundation of
the philosophy of materialism needs to be in place to then argue against the discursive
reality of bodies. As the chapter unfolds, I trace not only the existence of an ancient
theory of materialism, but Lucretius’ use of a type of animation or ‘force’ that mobilizes
his version of materialism. He uses the language of movement in his poem in all six
books. The language of movement is important to the development of an ontology of
becoming that I will develop in relationship with both materiality and bodies. Noting this
now is important to fully explain why the feature of movement is important in this
chapter and in the chapters that follow. Secondly, I connect Lucretius to the modern and
contemporary periods that develop something like vital materialism, sometimes identified
as vitalism, becoming, or autopoesis.
Lucretius is commonly called an atomist, and his poem detailing the nature of
things and the birth of physics has continued to thrive; it continues to resurface today as
New Materialists33 seek to expand their own understanding of materialism and advocate
for elements of change within their materialist accounts. On one level, readers can
interpret Lucretius as advocating for a deterministic theory. In other ways, Lucretius’
theory of the universe does not provide answers to the ways in which the material world
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is caused, or other mechanisms of causality, like a prime mover, or even a final cause. He
abandons any notion of a theistic beginning, and articulates that matter always was and is
eternal. In the first book, Lucretius outright says that matter is. In another vein, readers
can understand Lucretius’ materialism as the framework of becoming material that has
survived the enlightenment and postmodern periods. This theory is important to
establishing a materialist philosophy that imagines new dimensions for understanding the
materiality of the body (discussed later), and so I begin with On The Nature of Things
and highlight the movement and autopoiesis that is central to the atom’s becoming.
Materialism functions differently for thinkers throughout the ancient, modern, and
contemporary periods, but the central driving point on which I focus in this chapter and
the two subsequent chapters is how elements of animation of matter are deployed. I argue
that a vitality is apparent in the ancient theory of materialism and philosophy of
Lucretius, and this vitalism shapes and shifts throughout the years but is central to the
recovery of materialism as a primary framework for thinking through our own
philosophical problems.
Following Epicurus, Lucretius devised a large book of poems that illustrated his
atomic theory. The illustration of his atomic theory is done so in a poem that reads like a
didactic essay. Lucretius writes without including any people. Instead, his poem offers a
treatise on natural science and the philosophy of his day. His philosophy is a strict
materialism, denying the existence of anything magical or mysterious, and even denying
the transcendent, or a god. Interestingly, there is discussion of the soul in the first book
detailing a feature to existence that is complicated by the entanglement of materiality. It
is unclear whether Lucretius developed a non-transcendent ontology that included souls,
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or whether the discussion of souls was part of his materialism. The discussion of souls
seems to be in response to other philosophers existing at the time that remains
unresolved. This is not a theology, nor is it metaphysics in the strict sense. Lucretius’
poem is not a study of being, but rather a study of what existence is in the world at large.
As a study of existence, which is material, Lucretius revolutionizes the ways in which the
history of philosophy theorized material existence. Noting this is important for both the
material foundation that Lucretius builds and subsequent theories of materialism that
stems from Lucretius’ poem. Lucretius writes that Nature’s34 first principle is that
nothing’s brought Forth by any supernatural power of thought.35 On the Nature of
Things is the creative invention of Lucretius, outlining the first robust theory of
materialism. This poem continues to be cited by thinkers today as a substantial reworking
of Epicurus’ thought. Much of Epicurus’ work has not survived, but the work of
Lucretius in this poem has, and many scholars believe that On the Nature of Things uses
Epicurus’ philosophy to revitalize an ancient theory of materialism.
On the Nature of Things begins with matter and the void, and throughout the
poem, Lucretius highlights how the earth is pregnant with all of life. Pregnancy, as we
know, is a process, an event that corresponds to life as becoming. This is a material
process. Citing the earth as mother, which is pregnant with all life, also highlights a
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process of becoming, or a type of vital materialism that is becoming.36 Inherent in
Lucretius’ poem is what I am calling an internal “vitalism” that helps shape the
materialism of today. Central to his lengthy poem is the reality that it is a strict
materialism; it is not dependent on forms or ideas, or the structures of language.
Book I begins with the phrase “Life-stirring Venus.”37 The imagery and metaphor
utilizing the language of movement or becoming is important; to stir something is to help
it become, to help motivate the process of further materializing into a shape or form that
is visible (and perhaps also recognizable), but the stirring is native to the material; matter
stirs itself. Lucretius continues writing in the beginning of this poetic essay about how
matter, atoms, generative bodies, elements and seeds, and first-beginnings all proceed38
from this “Life-stirring” phenomenon. Book I successfully lays a foundation for us to
rethink philosophy in material terms.
Book II is titled, “Dance of the Atoms.” Again, the language of movement that
helps make up the book’s chapter title further illustrates the importance the relationship
of motion to matter. I should also note that both Book I and Book II utilize the term
clinamen. Clinamen is a Latin term meaning swerve and Lucretius argues it has no
beginning. This is important to point out, since one question that many readers have is
‘from where does the motion come?’ Movement is part of the dynamic nature of reality,
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and I argue that this motion or movement is highly contingent on the other features of
reality. Meaning, motion and the other elements of reality work in an interrelated manner
to achieve the outcome that Lucretius experienced, and also the reality we experience
today.
In the second book, Lucretius successfully illustrates and dramatizes the
dynamism of reality. It is perhaps in this book that the language of movement becomes
more sophisticated and targeted to atoms existing in the world. He even mentions bodies
at a certain point in the poem and argues that bodies of matter are also in motion. I will
detail that later.
Now by what motion atoms come together to create
Various things, or how these things once formed can dissipate,
And by what force they are compelled, and what freedom of motion
They have to meander through the vasty void, I shall explain
Just pay close attention. Clearly matter’s not compressed
Into one heap, because we notice things becoming less,
And we perceive that, over time, everything ebbs and wanes,
And old age steals them from our sight, while yet the sum remains
Undiminished. This is because the particles that go
From one shrinking object cause another thing to grow,
Making the former shrivel up, while making the latter flower,
Never lingering. Thus the Sum of Things is every hour
Renewed, and thus, in order to thrive, all mortal creatures need
Each other. While some species are ascendant, some decede,
And generations are renewed again in a brief space,
Passing on life’s torch, like relay runners in a race.39
In the above quote, Lucretius poetically illustrates that there is some type of motion that
is alive, or there is an awareness that matter has that is equivalent to being alive. This is
complicated. To suggest that something is alive (even inorganic matter) is to broaden the
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definition of life. Perhaps what is important here is to reframe the term life as that which
is entangled with the larger reality and pair it with becoming.40 Central to this quote is
that Lucretius sufficiently demonstrates the internal self-organizing reality in matter
whose cumulative effect generates a material becoming. The internal self-organizing
reality in matter is also a reality that is in motion. One important feature of this quote is
Lucretius’ insistence that matter is not a heap, but rather is animated with the force of
motion. By force, I do not think Lucretius means that there is an external force, but rather
a self-animated motion that signals a particular becoming, or aliveness. Evidence for this
self-organizing motion can be seen in Lucretius’ statement that “particles that go from
one shrinking object, cause another to grow.”41 Causing one to shrivel and another to
grow without an external force allows matter to engender a type of relational motion
fueling the becoming of a material reality. In many ways, this becoming is an organic
element that matter produces and thus causes atoms and particles to dance among the
universe.
The reality of motion is not independent to the dance of the atom. The atom
moves, too, and generates new material becomings with other atoms and particles. The
relationality and intersubjectivity of the atom is important to trace in Lucretius’ poem,
because it shows the ways in which the relatedness of atoms and particles and universe
all coalesce together all from a shared or related motion. The emergence of the physical is
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related to the void through which atoms and particles travel. Later in Book II, Lucretius
writes:
Since atoms wander through a void, then they must either go
Carried along by their own weight or by a random blog
Struck from another atom, seeing that when atoms crash
Into one another, they bounce apart after they clash
(And no surprise, since they are hard and solid, and they lack
Anything behind them to obstruct their moving back).42
The language in this translation, suggesting that atoms wonder through a void, suggest
that atoms have something akin to agential qualities, or they have some sort of internal
mechanism that propels their wandering. Again, the relationality of the atom and the
ways in which it is propelled is important to develop a framework of vitality for
Lucretius’ materialism. Following this quote, Lucretius talks about bodies being in
motion, and I think it is best to quote the poem and tie the above quote with the quote on
bodies.
All bodies of matter are in motion. To understand this best,
Remember that the atoms do not have a place to rest,
And there’s no bottom to the universe, since Space does not
Have limits, but is endless. As I have already taught
And proved with reason irrefutable, it opens wide
And far in all directions, measureless on every side.
And therefore it is obvious no respite’s ever given
To atoms through the fathomless void but, rather, they are driven
By sundry restless motions. After colliding, some will leap
Great intervals apart, while others harries by blogs will keep
In a narrow space. Those atoms that are bound together tight,
When they collide with something, their recoil is only slight
Since they are tangled up in their own intricate formation:
Such are the particles that form the sturdy roots of stone,
And make up savage iron and other substance of this kind.
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Of the other particles drifting through the vast deep, we find
A few leap far apart and bounce a long way back again,
Providing us with thin air and the shining of the sun.
And many more besides stray through the void, either out cast
From combinations, or which alliances could not hold fast
In harmonious motions.43
What this illustrates to us is a framework of entanglement with motion and matter, best
illustrated by the term bodies. For Lucretius, bodies are a dynamic reality of a collection
of matter that is in motion. This is important for my own research as I intend to develop
bodily materiality as that which is becoming. Once again, Lucretius lays a sturdy
foundation for both a philosophy of materialism and provides a way to intervene with a
productive materialist strategy in rethinking bodies with matter.
Perhaps central to Book II is the argument that “nothing physical can lift itself by
its own force,”44 further substantiating that there is an internal motion stimulating matter.
This is the point I shall establish for you in due course
That nothing physical can lift itself by its own force,
Nor can it drift up on its own, nor is it able to rise.
Do not let fire fool you into thinking otherwise!
Yes, flames start upward, and they leap up higher as they grow,
And upward rise the gleaming crops and trees too, even though
However much they weigh, that weight is always tugging down.
And when a fire pounces on the rooftops of a town
And laps up beams and timbers with its flicking tongues of flame,
Don’t think it hurls itself up on its own. It’s just the same
With blood, when it is let out of the flesh and starts to pour,
And spurts up in a throbbing fountain spattering with gore.
And haven’t you seen with what force water spits and logs and lumber?
For the deeper that we shove them and the more we push them under,
Many of us pressing down with all our might and main,
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That much more eagerly the water spews them out again,
So that the beams leap up out of the water with such strength
They jump into the open air by more than half their length.45
Here, Lucretius creates the framework of materialism in motion using different elements
(liquid and fire), all material, to illustrate the importance of motion. This connects with
Book I’s material foundation, highlighting the importance of an entangled material reality
that is dependent on internal atomic relations and movement. This does not quite answer
the question on how matter is internally self-organizing. What the above quote illustrates
is that matter is connected to an organic aliveness. Lucretius continues illustrating an
aliveness that is native to matter:
Even so, there cannot really be a doubt, I think,
That all these things – as much as it is in their power – sink
Downward through an empty void. And that is why flames rise,
Because they are squeezed up by draughts of air, though their weight vies,
As much as it can, to drag them down. Don’t you ever gaze
Up at the heavens and behold the torches there that blaze
In the night sky, and how they drag behind a fiery trail
Along whatever trajectory that Nature lets them sail?
And haven’t you seen starts and other heavenly bodies plummet
To the earth? And take the sun, broadcasting heat down from the summit
Of heaven out in all directions, sowing the fields with the light;
Thus heat as well tends towards the earth. And haven’t you
Caught sight
Of lighting flitting slantwise through the thunderheads? – a flash
Now from this part, now from that – fires run around and smash
Out of the clouds. And often blazing bolts drop to the ground.46
Finally, Lucretius illustrates the self-motivating reality of matter in the following quote
and utilizes the clinamen as the primary component that motivates boht movement and
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becoming, an internal force that changes the path of the atom in relation to other atoms.
These relational moments stimulate a new becoming for matter, because something
further materializes in the void. The recognition of a new materialization further supports
the internal workings of the clinamen with Lucretius’ materialism.
Another basic principle you need to have a sound
Understanding of: when bodies fall through empty space
Straight down, under their own weight, at a random time and place,
They swerve a little. Just enough of a swerve for you to call
It a change of course. Unless inclined to swerve, all things would fall
Right through the deep abyss like drops of rain. There would be no
Collisions, and no atom would meet atom with a blow,
And Nature thus could not have fashioned anything, full stop.47
In the above quote, Lucretius privileges the clinamen and its intentionality within atomic
relations. It is in this quote that the reader begins to imagine something other than gravity
pulling matter through the void and to an end. With the clinamen at the center of the selforganizing movement for Lucretius, he is able to describe the atomic relationality that
compels matter’s becomingness. This relationality and intersubjectivity supports the
internal movement that is native to matter, elucidated by the clinamen. With the clinamen
in mind, Lucretius continues to illustrate the ways in which movement is the central
dynamic for material becoming.
But if anyone should chance to think that heavier bodies drop
Straight down through the void with greater speed, so as they go
They catch up with, and strike, the lighter particles below,
And thus give rise to fertile motions, he has gone astray,
Wandered far form the path of reason and has lost his way.
Why? Whatever falls through water and the nature of thin air
Do not resist all objects equally, but give way faster
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To heavier objects, overcome, while on the other hand
Empty void cannot at any part or time withstand
Any object, but it must continually heed
Its nature and give way, so all things fall at equal speed,
Even though of differing weights, through the still void. And so
Heavier bodies will never strike the lighter ones below,
Nor by themselves will they initiate a blog that sets
The divers motions going out of which Nature begets
Creation. Thus, I repeart, the atoms have to swerve a little,
But only by the smallest possible degree, a tittle –
We do not want to look as though we thought things moved
Along
In sideways motion, when the Truth would come and prove us
Wrong!
For as far as you can see, weights falling from above can’t veer
Sideways – that is something that is obvious and clear.
But do weights never waver by the slightest bit and stray
Out of their vertical path by just a littler? Who can say?
Again, if every motion is connected, and we hold
New motions that arise, arise in due course from the old,
And atoms do not swerve a little and initiate
The kind of motion which in turn shatters the laws of fate,
But leave effect to follow cause inexorably forever,
Where does that freewill come from that exists in every creature
The world over? Where do we get that freewill, wrenched away
From the fates, by which we each proceed to follow pleasure’s
Sway,
So that we swerve our motions not at a designated spot
And fixed time, but the very place we will it in our thought?
Without a doubt these motions have their beginning in the whims
Of each, and from that Will these motions tickly into the limbs.48
Lucretius, in the above quote, capitalizes on movement’s becoming central to matter.
What this signals is that the self-organizing reality of material becomings cannot be
siphoned off as singular atomic moments, but rather are collective moments rooted in

48

Lurcretius 43-44.

66

atomic relationality where becoming takes a material shape, and this idea of movement
and becoming is matter’s internal rhythm.
Autopoiesis & Decomposition
Important to both Book I and II are the features of autopoiesis and deconstruction.
The fact that Lucretius argues for an internal self-organizing element to matter compels
me to further investigate his work. Outlined largely in Book I and II, both autopoiesis and
decomposition are important to a material becoming. At times, this material becoming? is
radically different than its previous instantiation. This section lays out these two features
in a way that further illustrates the self-organizing impetus of matter. While a collection
of objects (let’s say rocks, for example) appears to only be a collection of rocks that are
unmoving, there is, internal to the rocks, a feature of self-organization and
decomposition.
Autopoiesis
Autopoiesis is the theory that an object or an organ is self-organizing.49 This is an
important theory to consider in conversation with Lucretius’ poem, and helps further
articulate the ways in which matter self-organizes in Lucretius’ poem and also lays a
foundation for an internal process and language of becoming to be attributed to the
ancient theory of materialism that is found in Lucretius. Lucretius details the foundation
of reality that matter is the very building blocks of the reality that we experience. He
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writes:
“And shall reveal the building blocks all things are fashioned of, Nature’s
prime particles, from which she nourishes and grows
All things, and into which once more she makes them decompose.”50
The autopoietic reality of matter—that which is self-organizing and becoming—is central
to the poem. Matter is not an independent reality, or a collection of realities, that selforganize. The material reality is dependent and entangled with matter, which is also
always becoming autopoetically. This is important, because it unmasks another feature
(discussed in the next major section), which highlights the reality of matter being a force
of becoming. Matter as self-organizing in Lucretius helps further develop the argument
that there is an internal meter (rhythm) or feature that allows for its becoming and this is
rooted in the concept of autopoiesis. The endowment of an emergent self-organizing and
rhythmic feature compels matter into a movement of becoming. Recognizing both the
self-organizing features and its internal rhythm indicates that there is a pulse native to the
becoming. This is an important feature to what I am identifying as becoming in
Lucretius’ philosophy.
Matter, for Lucretius, is self-organizing—it gives birth to itself and also has the
properties to decompose. Important here to note is the internal movement that establishes
the autopoiesis of matter. This self-organizing feature put matter in motion, conforms to
Lucretius’ language of movement, and helps to further support the internal movement or
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motion that is native to matter. There is a movement or an animation to this material that
is primary, and he obviates any binary between life and death. Death or decomposition,
he writes, is part of the material process, and Nature contributes to this part of the
becoming material.
Decomposition
Lucretius advocates for matter becoming alive and becoming, also, decomposed,
but this does not translate into a lack of existence; death or decomposition is also a
becoming process that matter must undergo. Decomposition is supported by other
material elements that in turn help other elements become. It is clear in this part of the
poem that there is something animating material that cannot be eschewed; matter is a
becoming force in reality. An example of Lucretius’ teaching about life and death,
material composition and decomposition is found early in the poem, teaching us that
matter is never destroyed and returns to its primary form, particles:
Again, one cause would send all things wholesale to their demise
If they weren’t knit together, loosely or tightly, from the ties
Of everlasting matter. For the mere tap of a feather
Would be sufficient to destroy such things not put together
From particles of eternal substance; there would be no call
For a certain force to fray the bonds of their material.
But as it is, since elements are of eternal stuff
Linked with bonds of different strengths, unless a strong enough
Force encounter it, a thing stays safely as it was.
Therefore nothing turns to nothing. All things decompose
Back to the elemental particles from which they rose.51
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Noting that there is both a dialectic of autopoiesis and decomposition alive in the poem of
Lucretius helps further illustrate that there is an internal striving or an internal movement
that helps matter to become.
Movement or Force Inherent in Lucretius
Highlighting a type of force that motivates material to become, even in its
decomposition, is important to note. Following this portion of the poem, Lucretius
continues with his language of movement and becoming, teaching his readers that
nothing is made of nothing, something that is repeated throughout the first book. While
particles cannot be seen by the naked eye, Lucretius exhorts his readers that one must
admit to oneself that there are particles
“Which are but which cannot be seen. First, take the force of squalls
That whip up, lash the ocean, founder sea-going ships and scatter.”
In this section of the poem, Lucretius affirms some type of native force or movement that
motivates matter to become. This style of thinking dominates book one, making the case
for a vital force of some sort, not superstition, motivating matter. What is also interesting
in Book I is that matter can be interpreted as a type of flow that is becoming. While rivers
or oceans can be understood as flows, matter, too, can be understood as a flow that is
becoming due to an internal force. Matter, for Lucretius, is inherently moving and
forceful, but not due to an external force. Lucretius waxes poetically that matter is
inherently in motion, displaying a type of force in motion, or a motion as force. This
feature of Lucretius’ work/model of matter is largely illustrated by the discussion of
autopoiesis and decomposition in Book I. There is always a generative and generating
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quality to Lucretius’ philosophy of matter, and his philosophy of materialism develops as
a result of the framework of internal motion and force.
Lucretius even names in the poem that there is a vital force, which prevails. He
genders the vital force as masculine, the earth as feminine, and this vital force roams the
earth and aligns the earth in proper categories. This vital force is something that is
material for Lucretius. Yet, it is never named more than a vital force.52 This is important,
because as the philosophy of materialism develops beyond antiquity, vitalism takes a
definite shape and form to extending the foundation of materialist thinking, yet called
various things throughout the years.53 Lucretius, as the progenitor of the philosophy of
materialism, is the first to suggest that there is something like vitalism existing in this
philosophy.
On the Nature of Things details that matter has always existed; it is eternal,
having neither a beginning nor an end. Early in the poem, Lucretius teaches his readers
that matter, which is as small as particles, is analogous to Nature.54 Nature and matter
share a unique relationship in that these two stem from one another; they are not different
elements, but are in fact the same. They both share in the relationship of being the very
thing Lucretius is analyzing. The use of Nature as matter in Lucretius’ poem helps readers
see the links between existing elements. Lucretius uses the language of seed to help
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illustrate how each element of life stems from the singularity of a seed, and as a result is
tightly knit together with each other material element. Nature is a collection of atoms, or
atoms materialize as a microcosm of nature. What is important in this discussion of seed
and life is the reality of a material entanglement that is in dynamic motion, selforganizing, and materializing along a matrix of becoming; Nature is central to this
matrix.
As the poem progresses, the language that is used continues to affirm the
metaphors of movement, or of processes. I prefer the language of animation and
becoming , because this syntax not only privileges motion and movement, but also
signals organic life; and, it is clear that Lucretius has in mind that matter is vitally alive—
moving, becoming, or animated. I prefer the language of animation and becoming,
largely because I see these terms emerge in the work of Deleuze and the New
Materialists. Also, I see this term part of the internal framework of Gloria Anzaldúa.
There is a self-organizing element to matter, an autopoieis, but this language is never
used in the poem itself. I interpret Lucretius’ poem in this way, and Books I and II clearly
illustrate matter being vitally alive, and support a framework of becoming.
Lucretius expounds on elements existing in the world, born of Nature and
material, and he also discusses what is visible and invisible, differing parts of Nature that
are also material. For example, Lucretius outlines how wind is made of matter. He writes,
“And so I say, again and again, that wind is made of matter, For though invisible, it acts
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in the same way as water, Which clearly is a substance.”55 Important to this quote is that,
even for Lucretius, substance is material. In later philosophy, particularly Spinoza,
Spinoza does not name substance material. In fact, in the Rationalists’ philosophy, you
have a formula of logic that explains substance. Here, Lucretius helps today’s materialists
develop a philosophy that becomes a material reality for theory and science to deploy in
their own development of material becomings. This material framework is derived from
the nature of his philosophy as material and animated by an internal and self-organizing
feature beginning with something like substance. But, what is important, also, is that for
Lucretius, there exists the clinamen—the swerve that has no beginning—so substance
here is not the visible beginning. As the poem continues, matter becomes central to the
body, organized by the body in many ways as the senses interpret the material they smell,
see, or taste. Movement or process (becoming) remains central to the poem, and should
not be diminished from Lucretius’ work. Noting the metaphor and imagery of movement
or process helps better articulate matter as that which is becoming, a central component
to Lucretius’ poem. Though, this self-organizing autopoetic feature is not called
becoming in Lucretius’ work. I assign that term to his materialism.
Anzaldúa and “Tihueque”
In The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, AnaLouise Keating includes the first everpublished poem, titled, “Tihueque,” or “Now Let us Go.” I use this poem as a primary
example to a material becoming, striving throughout history, and I begin that
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conversation in this initial chapter to help link together the study of ancient materialist to
the contemporary materialism found in the work of Gloria Anzaldúa. While I have a
chapter dedicated to contemporary materialism, it is important to show the relationship of
Anzaldúa’s materialism throughout the ancient, modern, and contemporary periods. I
place the entirety of poem in this chapter, analyze it, and then return to it in subsequent
chapters to show how even in Anzaldúa’s work, there is a force or becoming, or animated
materialism that contributes to the rest of her poetry and philosophy. The importance of
including this poem is to show evidence of Anzaldúa as a materialist, and also to help put
Lucretius in conversation with Anzaldúa—what is included in both Lucretius and
Anzaldúa, and what Anzaldúa can show us in her version of materialism.
Tihueque56
One year in a distant century during Teoteco,
The 12th month of the solar year Five Rabbit,
in the reign of the Four-Water Sun,,
I carved 12,000 hearts in honor
of Huitziltopochtli, God of War,
who made the sun rise each morning.
In each succeeding year thereafter
ceremonial drunkenness robbed me
as many hearts embraced the furnance sacrifice.
Only the hearts of the finest Náhuatl braves
and luckiest prisoners and warriors
at the sacred flesh.
Today I lie in a musty museum
and register 5.5 on the Mohs scale.
But my origin, my volcanic obsidian,
hard as granite
comes in good stead.
In my childhood I was a mirror.

Gloria Anzaldúa, ed. AnaLouise Keating, The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, (Durham: Duke
University Press, 19) 2009.
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I threw a vitreous luster, dark-green.
But now the iron oxide running in my veins
dulls my edge
and the air bubbles trapped in me
reflect my age
Time passes.
I rest and await the flesh.
This poem, I argue, situates Anzaldúa as a materialist philosopher and also
contributes to her ontology of becoming. The beginning of the poem charts a path of
movement and becoming that I identify as material. Using language like “distant” and
“reign” in the first three lines, Anzaldúa sets up a framework of time and movement that
contributes to this poem being a foundation of her materialism. Likewise, Anzaldúa
points to the Four-Water Sun as having a particular occupation in the work. Then,
Anzaldúa writes that the object, the material, carved 12,000 hearts in honor of the God of
War. The act of using material to carve 12,000 hearts corresponds to Huitziltopochtli
making the sun rise each morning.57
One year in a distant century during Teoteco,
The 12th month of the solar year Five Rabbit,
in the reign of the Four-Water Sun,
I carved 12,000 hearts in honor
of Huitziltopochtli, God of War,
who made the sun rise each morning.
In many ways, this poem charts a path of beginning where a mystical object begins to
take shape in a distant century. It is as if Gloria Anzaldúa initiates a material time-image
that becomes materially rich throughout this poem and her other writings. I see this as
Anzaldúa’s writing-art-theory. This logic stabilizes Anzaldúa’s poetry in materialism,
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where becoming and moving in time throughout the past and the coming future further
shapes and shift the objects she describes.
The end of the poem, Anzaldúa uses creative imagery to detail how this
ceremonial knife has an inherent or native reality of becoming. Anzaldúa speaks about its
origin, the ways that it has changed, and that this object is material awaiting another
other—namely, a body of flesh to cut.
But my origin, my volcanic obsidian,
hard as granite
comes in good stead.
In my childhood I was a mirror.
I threw a vitreous luster, dark-green.
But now the iron oxide running in my veins
dulls my edge
and the air bubbles trapped in me
reflect my age
Time passes.
I rest and await the flesh.
The reality that this knife was once something else helps illustrate the becoming nature
that objects / material has for Anzaldúa. It is important to note this in her first published
poem, because doing so creates a precedence for her work to be read and understood in
the materialist register, over against other discursive oriented registers. Interpreting this
poem as materialist poetry not only situates Anzaldúa as a materialist thinker, but also
helps shape Anzaldúa’s poetry and other philosophical writing as being ontologically
rich. One cannot read and interpret this poem as minimizing the ontology that exists in
Anzaldúa’s writing; it very much is part of the material analysis and the becoming nature
of her ontological disposition.
The end of this poem suggests that the material object waits for another material
object, identified as flesh. These material objects can be understood as bodies that are
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becoming, awaiting their change that is internal to their object oriented nature. A
collection of objects or units helps make up this material; we in turn ascribe names to
them to further categorize them. Though necessary for our own practices, we cannot
underestimate the materially rich register that these object occupy. Affirming the material
register in this poem allows Anzaldúa’s philosophy-poetry to assume a new position in
the philosophy of materialism. When paired with Lucretius, Anzaldúa’s clinamen (the
never-beginning swerve) is located in the reality that this ceremonial knife was a mirror
prior and is becoming something different. When scholars are able to articulate the
internal movement found in both Lucretius and Anzaldúa, new contours of materialism
take shape. Centrally, this initiates a type of vitalism that is native to both Lucretius and
Anzaldúa, though this vitalism materializes differently in their work. For Lucretius, it is
the structure of the atom that is always in relation and moving; for Anzaldúa, it is the
mirror and knife that is becoming different to itself and materializing along a matrix of
difference. Vitalism is central to both thinkers, and ignites a new contour of force and
movement.
Connecting the “Vital Force” of Ancient Materialism (Lucretius) with the Idea of
“Vital Becoming” in Modern and Contemporary Materialism
Lucretius is an important figure to have in place as the point of departure in
thinking about materialism. Not only is he the father of modern physics, but his poem
teaches readers how to understand reality as a material one, and undermines the thinking
that language, alone, structures reality. The implications of his poem On the Nature of
Things is far reaching and continues to enhance today’s philosophies of materialism.
Noting his importance, as the first philosophy to coherently explain materialism as a
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reality, and highlight the movement or becoming that is internal to his materialism, helps
connect with the “materialism” of the modern and contemporary periods. While I locate
modern thinkers in the materialism camp, it is important to note that not everyone called
themselves a materialist, especially Spinoza. In what follows in chapters two and three, I
detail the “materialism” of Spinoza and Nietzsche who also have an internal movement
or becoming native to their philosophies. While I cannot call Spinoza a materialist in the
strict sense (like I can Lucretius), it is important to note that Spinoza is labeled as an
“original vitalist” by the New Materialists.58 Important here is that from Lucretius to
today’s materialist’s thinkers, a notion of animated material or becoming is assigned to
the philosophy that is being produced. It is called various names throughout the modern
and contemporary periods, but the unifying principle of the philosophy of materialism is
something akin to animation or becoming. I locate this, in principle, as an ontological
feature to the philosophy of materialism, and I show how the New Materialists’ ‘brand’
of Deleuzian materialism can be placed in conversation with Gloria Anzaldúa. Before I
launch into a contemporary discussion on the materialism of post-structuralists and queer
thinkers, it is important to show the connection of Lucretius to that of Spinoza, Nietzsche,
Bergson, Deleuze, and the New Materialists.
I have divided ancient materialism, modern materialism (chapter two), and
contemporary materialism (chapter three) in an effort to show the three distinct periods of
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the development of what I term becoming that is central to the philosophy of materialism.
I take the movement or internal vitality of Lucretius’ philosophy of materialism to be
central to the development of a vital becoming in both the modern and contemporary
periods. While Spinoza’s substance monism has been interpreted as a more mechanistic
and deterministic way of thinking and understanding reality, I do not focus on those
elements, per se, but rather examine the internal ‘force’ that allows for Spinoza’s
‘materialism’ to emerge as a becoming reality. Rather, what is important to me is
Spinoza’s conatus that scholars have identified as a type of force or becoming, and it
largely has been interpreted as having a teleological end. While Lucretius used language
and metaphor of movement, Spinoza used metaphor and language of causality or force,
as identified in the work of today’s scholars. While Spinoza revolutionized 17th century’s
thinking about dualism and departed from Cartesianism, his substance monism helps link
back with Lucretius’ eternal materialism. Likewise, Nietzsche develops the mechanism of
will, particularly the will to power, and creates a materialist philosophy from that
standpoint. Both of these modern philosophers are entangled with their ancient
predecessor, Lucretius, and the reality of animated material takes shape. Connecting these
three thinkers helps solidify the reality that our universal reality is material and it is being
stirred by itself, or becoming.
The contemporary period functions a bit differently in that they combine
Spinoza’s substance monism with the previous philosophy that came from Lucretius.
Doing this creates a more sustainable framework for materialism that is recognizably
material, avoiding the structuralism that seeks to order reality through a process of
language, symbols, and signs. Starting with Bergson, he links matter to memory, both
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material, and ascribes élan vital (or vital energy, but translated in the English Creative
Evolution as vital impetus) to that of materialism. This appears to be similar to Lucretius’
On the Nature of Things, but Bergson never cites him. Instead, the French debated the
reality of force or energy relative to material.
With a decidedly different focus on philosophy (that of intuition), Bergson’s
materialism develops with rapid interest. His élan vital (or vital impetus) not only links
with Lucretius, Spinoza, and Nietzsche but also projects forward to new creative new
ways in understanding evolution. A materialist framework, élan vital helps further
motivate materialist philosophies and show the entangled reality that the ancient, modern,
and contemporary periods have. This further unmasks the material relationship that each
of these periods share, though not identical to each other.
Following Bergson, Deleuze and the New Materialists take shape in both the 20th
and 21st centuries. Both Deleuze and the New Materialists borrow from ancient thinkers
and develop their own ‘brand’ of materialism. Deleuze, particularly developed his
materialist philosophy out of a post-marxian framework, but also utilized Nietzsche and
Bergson. Perhaps Deleuze’s books on Nietzsche and Bergson help solidify our
understanding on how force and becoming dominate his philosophy and his collaborative
work with Guattari. Again, the idea of force or becoming materialize as central to
thinking materially in the philosophy of Deleuze and Deleuzian followers. Sharing
together with current stands of materialism and former strands of materialism, the
philosophy of materialism is best explained as a process of becoming. Movement or the
process of becoming diffuses other arguments that suggest that reality is static or stable.
The entangled reality of the philosophy of materialism continues to be developed by the
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New Materialists: Braidotti, Bennett, Kirby, and Iris van der Tuin, among others. In fact,
new series on New Materialisms are emerging from both North American and European
publishing houses.59
Contemporary New Materialism is still too new in its development to only use
their version of the philosophy of materialism.60 As such, I rely on the tentacles from
ancient, modern, and contemporary thought to help make my argument that matter is
animated and becoming. Using a stratified chronological approach that begins with
Lucretius and traces materialism and vitality or becoming through the modern period and
into the contemporary period helps not only to fill out the gaps of materialism, but also
creates a new dimension in the New Materialist thought exercise. As such, I include one
more materialist thinker to this contemporary list: Gloria Anzaldúa.61
Connecting Anzaldúa to that of Lucretius may seem out of balance, but it is really
the materialism and feature of becoming that I see in the work of Gloria Anzaldúa that
completes this material entanglement, which is not necessarily circular but rather an
entangled web that continues to evolve. In some ways, I begin with Lucretius and end
with Anzaldúa—these two thinkers help mobilize a new dimension in New Materialist

59

Thomas Nail alerted me to this new series that will undoubtedly break open the field of New
Materialist thinking. http://www.euppublishing.com/series/nmat
60

When asked by Dr. Catherine Keller why I simply do not use the New Materialists, I argued that
they are simply too new! She agreed and thought that my return to Lucretius was wise.
61

I know of no other scholar calling Anzaldúa a materialist philosopher. Conversations with
AnaLouise Keating help me further understand how he is a materialist philosopher, but even calling
Anzaldúa a philosopher is tricky. She writes poetry, creative fiction, and creative non-fiction. How can this
be philosophy? Like Deleuze, Anzaldúa creates a new image of thought, and I find that Anzaldúa in
conversation with Deleuze is most fruitful.

81

thinking that I will later outline as an ontology of becoming. Yet, it is not only the pair of
Lucretius and Anzaldúa that I note as being important, but rather the intersection of
Deleuze and Anzaldúa that help unmask this ontology of becoming that I will develop in
chapter five.
Why This Material Cartography Is Important?
This connection for which I advocate between ancient, modern, and contemporary
materialist philosophy is important because I claim that queer and indigenous thinkers,
primarily Gloria Anzaldúa, are already articulating a philosophy of materialism that
conforms to an ontology of becoming and philosophy of immanence. I make the claim
that Anzaldúa does this through her philosophy-poetry, largely around her theory of
bodies, and issues like movement, becoming, circulation, and process or event are central
to the theoretical framework that Anzaldúa develops.
Anzaldúa’s first published poem, Tihueque, translated “now let us go,” not only
positions her as a materialist thinker, but also highlights her ontology of becoming. So,
having this material cartography in place to look back at what former materialist thinkers
developed as their vitalism pulsated throughout philosophy becomes an important link to
be able to intersect it with the work of Gloria Anzaldúa. I will argue in chapter four that
Anzaldúa’s materialist philosophy helps motivate her theory of the body, which I
understand to be thoroughly materialist. Following chapter four’s analysis of the
materiality of bodies is chapter five’s analysis on becoming. This material cartography
reaches backward and forward toward an ontology of becoming and is thus important to
have in place. Likewise, this material cartography, while detailing ancient, modern, and
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contemporary thinkers helps further contextualized the intersection of Deleuze and
Anzaldúa and the Anzaldeleuzian philosophy emerging in the gaps.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODERN MATTER AND ‘VITAL BECOMING’
IN SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE
The multiplicity of forces, connected by a common
mode of nutrition, we call “life.”
—Nietzsche
Having a foundation of materialism in the work of Lucretius and citing his
language of movement that I then translate into the language and concept of becoming, I
turn to the work of modern scholars, particularly that of Baruch de Spinoza and Friedrich
Nietzsche. This chapter will focus on one feature in each of their work. For Spinoza, I
will trace the development of conatus and the ways in which it acts as a force, and in
Nietzsche, I will trace his development of will. I understand both to be features of
movement and becoming. Though, in order to get to the doctrine of conatus in Spinoza’s
philosophy, I begin with his substance monism. I focus on one book in Spinoza’s work:
Ethics, and likewise for Nietzsche, I consider The Will To Power. Both of these texts will
help further shape the internal workings of material as having a native force or becoming
functioning on an ontological level. While materialism is a misleading category for
Spinoza, it works for my purposes as I detail the force and vital becoming that is central
to Spinoza’s framework, elucidated in his doctrine of the conatus.
Important to note here is the rationalism of Spinoza and the genealogical form of
Nietzsche. The rationalism of Spinoza is in direct opposition to some of the later
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philosophies that develop along the materialist lineage (particularly Bergson). Yet, it is
not Spinoza’s rationalism or his determinism that interest me but rather the development
of conatus that is later interpreted as force. As I have researched conatus from both
primary and secondary sources, the plumb line of force from Lucretius to Spinoza is firm,
not identical, but they share a relationship of a framework of movement or becoming that
is important for this project. I detail this in this current chapter. Likewise, Nietzsche’s
development of his genealogical method is equally important. His deployment of will in
The Will to Power shapes modern day materialism that unmasks a different type of
material force.
The works of these two scholars appear in the New Materialists, and I use these
thinkers to further illustrate the ways that this mobilizes the element of becoming in the
modern period, though often not articulated as such. I argue that movement and
becoming, elucidated in striving and will, is the central framework for materialism and
should be utilized. These two features become the descriptive process of a robust theory
of material and bodies that illumine the modern period of materialism, and utilize a
framework of movement and becoming to mobilize bodies. The centrality of this project
is the idea of matter becoming, or of a mattering becoming, and while I am tracing the
element of process and becoming through the classical, modern, and contemporary
periods, the modern period helps solidify my argument largely because contemporary
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materialist scholars refer back to the modern period as their starting point.62 The New
Materialists and philosophers of materialism root their philosophies in both of these
thinkers; hence, they are central to my project, too. I find that exploring the modern
“materialists” are not only helpful in understanding later developments in both Deleuze
and the New Materialists, but also fortifying my claim that bodies are always materially
becoming, and subject to a process of movement that extends beyond their particular
containment of materiality.
Baruch de Spinoza as a Modern “Materialist”
“How many things are there in the world? Spinoza’s answer: one. What might
seem to be other things are merely ways in which the one thing exists.”63 Spinoza, a wellversed Cartesian scholar, sought to eliminate the Cartesian thinking that perpetuated the
belief that there are multiple substances existing in the world. Monism, Spinoza’s theory
of a single substance existing, for example, helps introduce a way of reconsidering reality
stemming from the singular unity of substance, or what is later considered the univocity
of being. Monism is particularly important for the discussion of materialism, because
substance monism helps mobilize the thinking that substance is not a property or attribute
of anything else; substance is what it is in itself.64 Substance is permanently attached or
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“inheres” to nothing else.65 Another way that Spinoza imagines substance is that it is
independent; this is similar to Descartes, too. But, for Spinoza, different from Descartes,
he postulates that substance is independent in the sense that it is conceived through itself.
This also points to a later development that Spinoza articulates: conatus. A striving
through substance monism is key to articulating the movement and becoming that is
native to Spinoza’s philosophy. Likewise, he also combatted Descartes’ method of doubt
by utilizing the principle of sufficient reason. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, as
explained by Michael de Rocca is the “principle that each truth has an explanation or that
for each thing that exists there is an explanation of its existence.”66 This is important for
Spinoza, because he uses the PSR to further support his theory of conatus. The PSR is
always at play for Spinoza, and should be considered one of the most important aspects
of Spinoza’s framework. Though Spinoza was a philosopher in the tradition of
rationalism and his philosophy interpreted as determinism, his philosophy concerning
matter relative to Substance is key for this dissertation. While I cannot call Spinoza a
materialist in the way that Lucretius is a materialist, his philosophy is deployed today as a
materialist and vitalist. Though these terms are not native to Spinoza, the ways in which
they are deployed in today’s New Materialism helps root Spinoza in the conversation of
the philosophy of materialism, but only does so by highlighting a particular element of
Spinoza’s philosophy, namely his substance monism and conatus. Both of these features
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are important to consider and to link with a philosophy of contemporary materialism.
Likewise, the ways that Deleuze has used Spinoza further solidifies Spinoza as a modern
day “materialist.” New Materialists utilize this term to signify Spinoza as a materialist,
but are actually referring to Spinoza’s conatus. The internal striving and affective
relationality that is apparent in today’s materialist discourse strategically refers back to
Spinoza’s conatus.
The materiality of bodies (or mattering bodies) is my central focus in this
dissertation, and finding support and evidence for this claim is seen most clearly in the
philosophy of Spinoza, particularly his conatus, though I recognize there are limitations. I
believe Spinoza creates a way to move beyond Cartesian dualism by his creation of what
is often referred to as substance monism. In order to talk about Spinoza as a “materialist,”
I must first begin with Spinoza’s substance monism. Following substance monism, I
evaluate the doctrine of conatus as a central organizing feature of Spinoza’s “becoming.”
Substance Monism
To understand Spinoza’s ideas of a single substance, I will briefly sketch
Descartes on substance. The relationship of ideas between these two philosophers is
important. Similar to Spinoza, Descartes’ features of his metaphysics are substance,
attribute, and mode. Rooted in the conception of Aristotelian substance, Descartes defines
substance in this way:
Each thing is called a substance which something is in (inest) immediately
as a subject or by means of which we perceive anything that exists, that is,
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by means of which we perceive any property, quality, or attribute of which
a real idea is in us.67
For Descartes, finite things such as trees, tables, the human mind, human bodies are all
substances. Descartes holds that finite things are substances and thus regards substance as
not univocal. This is one of the significant differences between Spinoza and Descartes.
Spinoza affirms the univocity of being, as do his followers like Deleuze. While Descartes
argues for multiple substances, it is clear in his work that there are two fundamentally
two types of substances. This sets up a framework of duality in the metaphysics of
Descartes.
Descartes’ substances are best understood as a dualism, or duality. And, while
Descartes advocates for an independence of substance, there remains a plurality.
Descartes definition of substance, as noted above, is that each thing is a substance. So,
trees, tables, bricks are all substances and they also have multiple attributes. The
independence for which Descartes advocates is an independence that is rooted in the
notion of God. Finite things exist independently of God, like trees and tables. Carpenters
bring these finite things into existence. They remain different substances than the
substance of God. In fact, each finite substance is independent of any other finite
substance. Yet, while carpenters bring finite things, like tables, into existence, this
substance does rely on the existence of God, which is another substance. While finite
things carry a notion of independence for Descartes, these finite things cannot be
conceived without conceiving of God who brings these finite things into existence. In this
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sense, then, while the carpenter brings these finite things (tables) into existence, it is the
substance of God who enables the carpenter to bring the table into existence and also
sustains its existence. In this sense, then, because finite things are substances and there is
a dependency of such finite things as substances, Descartes argues that there is not a
univocity of being. This is a significant departure from where Spinoza takes his idea of
substance and univocal beings. In the Principles, Descartes offers the following explicitly
regarding the definition of substance as not univocal:
There is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no
other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances,
we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s occurrence.
Hence the term “substance” does not apply univocally, as they say in the
Schools, to God and to other things; that is, there is no distinctly
intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God and his
creatures.68
The issue with the univocity of being and substance is key to articulating a single-source
materialism, which can be done by considering Spinoza. Not only is this a turn to the
singularity of matter, but it also generates a perspective of movement and becoming that
is self-contained. What I mean is that in its singularity, matter is not only self-conceived,
but also autopoietic. Substance, as a singularity for Spinoza, helps initiate this perspective
concerning matter.
Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza advances a theory of metaphysics that advances
being as a singularity. Central to Spinoza’s philosophy is the notion of an absolute and
infinite substance—singular in both kind and number. The move to defining substance as
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univocal and a focus on singularity depends on Spinoza’s defining substance as the One
or God. This pure oneness mobilizes a rationalist philosophical theology that raises up
this element of singularity as a way to consider reality. While there is independence
within Spinoza’s idea of singularity, there is also a sense of radical connectedness
between mode and attribute that is interrelated with Spinoza’s understanding of
substance.
There is a conceptual barrier between the attributes that Spinoza discusses relative
to substance. Michael Della Rocca suggests that this barrier is not immediately evident.69
In preparation for discussing the conceptual barrier, I offer an explanation of attribute,
then will offer an explanation of substance and then show their relation with the theory of
conatus. An attribute is a relation to the one singular substance. Attributes enable us to
understand and talk about an extended world and a thinking world in terms of which we
understand bodies and minds. Furthermore, it is due to the relation of attributes to one
another and to the one substance that a resolution to the Cartesian mind–body problem is
possible. Attributes enable Spinoza's monism while preventing it from being an issue of a
transcendent, homogenous totality. Attributes furnish Spinoza with a sense of radical
immanence. “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.” (Ip10) The
relation of attributes to substance is important and the self-conception is also key. A
definition of substance will help further unpack the conceptual barrier that Della Rocca
mentions.
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Spinoza articulates that substance “is that which is in itself and is conceived
through itself.”70 (Id3) Substance is both self-generating and existing, and also able to
have a features relationality and intersubjectivity with attributes. Substance, as a material
reality that is self-organizing, is also generated from the force that produces material.
Important to this is the ways in which substance illustrates a particular relationality where
the force of becoming (or telos for Spinoza), creates the web of connection for attributes.
For Spinoza, x is conceived through y, only if x is explained by, or in terms of y. In this
sense, then, there are not multiple substances but rather a singularity of substances and
both x and y share a fundamental essence. There is a relationship that x and y share, for
Spinoza; this should not be undermined. Likewise, substance is infinite and nondivisible
and therefore cannot be identified with or reduced to finite substances or things.
Secondly, substance is a totality, but not a homogenous totality. It initiates and also
generates a sense of radical immanence.
For Spinoza, “substance must be conceived under one or more attributes (Ip10s),
each of which something constitutes its essence” (Id4).71 The essence of an attribute is
strategically related to the one substance and these relations are developed in a logical
manner. Spinoza further articulates that x is conceived through y if and only if x is caused
by y.72 This is important to note, in order to move toward the doctrine of conatus. While I
do not wish to get into Spinoza’s theory of causality, it is helpful to see the relationship
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that x and y share and the ways that this reinforces Spinoza’s substance monism. Given
this, we can conclude that Spinoza says that a substance is self-conceived and is also
singular. We can relate this conclusion to identifying matter as a single-source material
reality. The self-conception of substance is important to connect later with his doctrine of
conatus, the self-striving in itself toward a possible end, though I will not argue for any
possible end or even a beginning, only a horizon of becoming.73
As his substance monism develop, Spinoza introduces the concept of attributes
that are conceived in and through substance. Spinoza mentions that thought and extension
are two important attributes, but he actually goes on to mention that there are an infinite
number of attributes. It is only humans who are aware of these two attributes: thought and
extension.74
The focus of including substance monism in this chapter is to use it to help
connect Spinoza’s substance monism with his doctrine of conatus. It is the notion of
being conceived through itself, instead of the notion of being in itself, and conatus helps
further mobilize Spinoza’s “materialism” as something that is vitally becoming.75
Contrary to Descartes, finite things are not substances but rather are modes of the
one single substance. For Spinoza, there is only one substance, which is infinite, that
materializes in itself and through itself. “…that is, that whose concept does not require
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the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.”76 And, following this logic,
“By attribute, I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its
essence.”77 Quoting Elizabeth Grosz, a feminist philosopher, Spinoza’s theory of
substance that is extended as a finite mode (for example, a materialized human) as an
individual entity (human or otherwise) is not self-subsistent but is a
passing or provisional determination of the self-subsistent. Substance has
potentially infinite attributes to express its nature. Each attribute
adequately expresses substance insofar as it is infinite (the infinity of
space, for example, expresses the attribute of extension), yet each attribute
is also inadequate or incomplete insofar as it expresses substances only in
one form. Extension and thought—body and mind—are two such
attributes.78
What Grosz captures in this quote from Spinoza is the manner in which each finite mode,
extended from the infinite substance, relies on the relational tie to the one substance. The
extended mode is not independent from the infinite substance. What Grosz also captures
in this quote is that Spinoza theorized about the infinite number of possibilities an
attribute could be.
What Spinoza offers in contrast to Descartes is a way to consider that attributes
are merely different aspects of one and the same substance, inseparable from each other.
Descartes’ dualism renders two different and incompatible substances that are
irreducible.
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Spinoza’s theory of substance and matter, while much more mathematical and
logical than dynamic, is a way to resolve the dualism existing in Cartesian thought. An
example of this is found on the first page of Spinoza’s Ethics in his definitions “Of God”
and demonstrated in geometric order. He says, “By substance I understand what is in
itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the
concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.”79 Spinoza referred to the
Principle of Sufficient Reason that each fact and each thing that exists has an explanation.
This idea of singularity is a pure oneness, but later interpretations can see how
Spinoza’s substance monism is a network of singularity, implying a multiplicity.80 This
does not undermine monism; there is but one substance for Spinoza. Yet, this singular
substance materializes as a network of multiplicities. Deleuze’s rhizome is an example of
this.81
Though logic and mechanics dominate Spinoza’s “materialism,” I find his
doctrine of conatus to be the defining characteristic that helps mobilize Spinoza’s
“materialism” into something that is vitally becoming. Logically unfolding in geometric
order, Spinoza’s theory of substance is not energized with the evolving reality of nature,
something that I think New Materialists read into Spinoza’s work and is even developed
in Herder’s work. It is Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus that helps mobilize his substance
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monism as something that is dynamic, or striving toward an end, though, the feature of
teleology is debated among Spinozist scholars. Conatus allows a type of affection or
affect theory to take root in Spinoza’s thought and creates an element of movement that is
native in Spinoza’s theories; I call it becoming. Some even consider conatus to be related
to psychology. While I prefer the terms affection and affect theory, what is important to
Spinoza’s development of conatus is the self-generating movement or becoming; I detail
this as part of Spinoza’s ‘vital becoming’ in the next section. The important work of
conatus is that Spinoza contributes a universal and singular self-preservation model that
universally is applied to all things and, in turn, establishes a type of material movement
or material becoming.
Because Spinoza attributes a self-striving or self-preservation to all things, both
organic and inorganic things, it not only creates a new contour of natural science, but also
provides his theory of natural science with a teleological explanation. The affection or
theory of desire that is native to Spinoza’s theory of conatus provides a unified source of
motivational power, or self-generative power. Affection and desire should not be
confused with colloquial understandings of affection and desire. These terms are
technical terms that initiate a way of understanding Spinoza’s theories in a psychic or
psychological manner that is related to the theory of the mind. What conatus also
establishes is the language of movement in Spinoza’s ‘materialism.’ This activity,
universal for Spinoza, outlines the natural rights for things and also contributes to a
universal interconnectedness and interrelatedness between simple and complex bodies.
This is the beginning of Spinoza’s political theory, too, which should be noted. Spinoza’s
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doctrine of conatus begins in the Ethics with 3p4d, which establishes a framework that
“nothing can be destroyed except by external cause.”
That nothing can be destroyed expect by an external cause, found in 3p4d, 3p6 is
the impetus for Spinoza’s development of his conatus: “Each thing, insofar as it is in
itself, strives to persevere in its being.”82 Taking both of these together (3p4 and 3p6),
Spinoza creates a theory that is in process for itself and persevering itself. Take a
complex body, for example. A complex body for Spinoza is a collection of independently
functioning organs that are all related to each other, or dependent on one another. The
pancreas functions because the kidneys are also functioning, along with the liver and
stomach. The complex body, in this case, the human body, has identifiable parts that are
independent of one another but dependent on one another. They strive together to
preserve the body. This is the matter of life and death, for Spinoza. Conatus manages to
not only mobilize a theory of movement in Spinoza’s philosophy, but it also changes the
ways in which these multiple relationships happen. They are persevered in themselves for
themselves, avoiding the destruction of internal calamity. Only external forces/causes can
eliminate an interrelated complex body.
While conatus is an important element to this project in that it gives Spinoza’s
‘materialism’ legs to become, it is also important to note that later interpreters of Spinoza
have contributed to this style of utilizing Spinoza’s conatus as central to a theory of
becoming and movement. Likewise, later interpretations of Spinoza suggest that the
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infinite aspect of substance is an expression of matter as active in its becoming, and
bodies (broadly construed) are material realities as a result of matter’s becomingness.83
While later interpreters of Spinoza’s work, especially feminists, read Spinoza’s
“matter” as active, they do not discuss his doctrine of conatus. While Spinoza’s substance
monism is mechanistically deployed, what intrigues me about Spinoza’s work is his
development of the doctrine of conatus and the ways in which this doctrine can be
deployed in this project as a significant factor in dynamizing Spinoza’s logical
mechanistic philosophy. This is what allows Spinoza’s “materialism” to be read and
understood as a dynamic flow of matter, a never-ending folding of the fold of matter. It is
the internal striving of his doctrine of conatus that gives his “matter” dynamic “legs.”
Spinoza’s Modern “Vital Materialism” in the Doctrine of Conatus
The limitation I see in Spinoza’s thought regarding a philosophy of materialism is
that matter is mechanistic in his philosophy, not existing as dynamic. Important to point
out is both efficient mechanical causality is similar to that of efficient causality and the
Principle of Sufficient Reason is more rationalistic, which is Spinoza’s classifications as
a philosopher. Spinoza is a rationalist philosopher, which should not be undermined. I
walk a think line in developing Spinoza as a “materialist.” Central to my project is an
attempt to faithfully interpret and understand Spinoza, while also overdetermining him as
an empiricist/materialist a la Deleuze and the New Materialists. One can say that matter
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in Spinoza unfolds logically, seen most clearly in the geometric order of his Ethics. This
is important for my research as it allows bodies to be a unified reality, not existing as
separate and unequal parts, but does not capture the dynamism of the materiality of
bodies that later materialist philosophers, such as Deleuze and Anzaldúa, among the New
Materialists, imbue in their analyses on bodies. Though Spinoza’s philosophy does not
exist along a dynamic matrix, I find value in his monism and philosophical thinking.
Later philosophers and critical theorists take up Spinoza as an important figure for their
philosophical practice. Among these are Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz, Gilles Deleuze,
and others.
While I cannot call Spinoza a materialist in the same way that Lucretius and
Nietzsche are materialists, there is a way to interpret his rationalist philosophy as a type
of materialism that is vitally becoming. Though this is not language native to Spinoza, I
read this dynamism into his philosophy by using his doctrine of conatus. The following
section lays a foundation to better understand Spinoza’s philosophy as vitally becoming,
but only through conatus.
Like substance monism, the doctrine of conatus is another central element to
Spinoza’s philosophy. “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being
is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”84 Conatus suggests there to be an internal
striving that becomes central to the rest of Spinoza’s work, influencing his political
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thought.85 Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus as that which is related to striving and selfpreservation, generating from internal relational qualities.86 Conatus is found in the later
part of the Ethics and gains significant traction in that book that then connects to
Spinoza’s political work.
Spinoza articulates his doctrine of conatus in the Ethics in 3p6: “Each thing,
insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.”87 The preceding propositions
helps give greater context to conatus, particularly 3p4: “No thing can be destroyed except
through an external cause.” For Spinoza, there is no appeal to previous definitions or
propositions; Spinoza considers this an axiomatic, self-evident truth. Though this doctrine
does not emerge from nowhere (little of Spinoza’s thought does), it is sufficient to say
that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is at play. Della Rocca claims that 3p4 is the “most
simplest and most powerful expression of Spinoza’s rationalism.”88 Bridging together the
importance of 3p4 and 3p5, I transition to 3p6 and Spinoza’s conatus.
There are several examples that Spinoza uses to legitimate 3p6. I will list two
examples here, then use a more nuanced example to prove that Spinoza’s conatus is a
significant aspect to rethinking materiality as vitally becoming. An example of the
burning candle is used in the Ethics. If “nothing can be destroyed except through an
external cause,” then the candle burns until there is no more wick or wax. But, both the
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wax and wick are internal to the burning of the candle, and therefore the candle destroys
itself; there is no external cause that extinguishes the candle flame. An external cause
would be if water extinguished the candle flame. The example of the candle helps readers
further understand the doctrine of conatus and the centralizing feature of striving and
persevering. If the candle strives to burn until it cannot burn, then it is perseveres until it
is destroyed by itself by the internality of the candle. However, if an external cause
extinguishes the candle, then the external cause disrupts the candles internalizing drive
and preserving and the flame is extinguished.
Another example that Spinoza uses is that of suicide. In some cases, some, due to
externally caused duress, are compelled to kill themselves. So, suicide is not internal to
one’s essence, but rather externally motivated and caused. Another example that is more
nuanced is that of the time bomb, which Della Rocca discusses.89 I find this example
particularly compelling, because it further solidifies Spinoza’s claim that nothing can be
destroyed except by an external cause. In the case of the time-bomb, which will destroy
itself and things outside of itself, it requires an external ignition or an external cause to be
ignited. The axiom of Part IV in the Ethics might help clarify this example. “There is no
singular thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger.
Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the first can be
destroyed.”90
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Della Rocca suggests that this axiom is grounded in the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. Finite things have a certain degree of limited power; Spinoza affirms this in
1p36. Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason solidifies the legitimacy of the timebomb’s destruction by underwriting the existence of an external destroyer. Given that
finite things have a limited amount of power, there can be things that possess a greater
amount of power. The essence of the time bomb cannot be destroyed by itself. Rather, the
time bomb and its essence are destroyed because there is the absence of an external
sustainer.
Following 3p4, Spinoza says in 3p5 that “Things are of a contrary nature, that is,
cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other.”91 This is important
because insofar that something cannot destroy another thing, these two things cannot be
in the same thing. If that is the case, then 3p6 becomes the central proposition in the
development of Spinoza’s conatus. Della Rocca suggests that 3p6 is problematic, even if
3p4 and 3p5 are granted. I suggest, however, that Spinoza’s introducing striving becomes
the linchpin in developing Spinoza a modern day “materialist.”
One question that is important to answer is what does Spinoza mean by strive
(conatur)? Della Rocca suggests that Spinoza’s notion of striving derives from Descartes
use of the same word.92 But, Spinoza transforms this notion of striving in a rationalistic
way. Noting that an external cause is always at play in Spinoza’s philosophy, a thing
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strives unless or until an external cause prevents it from striving. In this sense, a thing is
always striving, always becoming. While I suggest that conatus is the exact feature that
enables Spinoza to be read as a vitally becoming “materialist,” dynamic in its own
becoming, one should note, too, that a thing can strive for its own destruction. But, a
thing cannot strive for self-destruction, insofar as the essence is concerned.
Spinoza uses bodies to talk about persistence and striving. Each body strives to
persist, in Spinoza’s writing. They strive to remain in motion. Here we can substitute
matter for bodies (they assume a certain identity in my project) and suggest that matter is
always in motion; it is always striving. The internal striving native to matter, as
developed by Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus, helps mobilize Spinoza as a “materialist”
who puts in motion a theory of matter. It is a matter of essence for Spinoza that striving is
deployed. The essence of matter strives toward self-preservation. It is unclear that there is
an end, other than an end to avoid destruction. Given this, we can understand Spinoza’s
conatus as putting in motion the essence of matter, striving toward a present future. This
is a designation that I find in Deleuze and it is helpful in thinking about a becoming
future that is materializing along a plane of immanence.
In the next section, I discuss Nietzsche’s develop of ‘will’ in his Will to Power.
Will, as developed by Nietzsche completes my chapter of modern day ‘materialists,’ and
further solidifies a notion of becoming or that which is vitally becoming existing from
Lucretius to Nietzsche. Both classical and modern thinkers become of important value to
the 20th century’s development of matter as a force and becoming, and particularly
important to show the connection between Anzaldúa (who has her own theory of
materialism), the New Materialists, and Deleuze.
103

Friedrich Nietzsche & The Will to Power
Published in the early 1900s, The Will To Power provides a compilation of
Nietzsche’s notebooks—work that he had been theorizing for some time. With help from
his sister who managed his literary estate, following his mental break, The Will To Power
develops as a significant publication that addresses aspects of metaphysics and religion,
among other important issues that were affecting Nietzsche’s day. I take this book of
notes as important to both modern philosophies of materialism and contemporary
philosophies of materialism. Read in close proximity with Spinoza, these two thinkers
share a dynamism that is fruitful for re-thinking the relationship of bodily materiality and
becoming. What is significant to exploring Nietzsche’s will in the same chapter as that of
Spinoza, is the shared momentum that both of these thinkers develop in relation to force.
This shared momentum of force or of that which is vitally becoming shapes this project
and further strengthens the foundation of my claim that matter is always becoming. Also,
these two thinkers help create a new paradigm in thinking about “matter” that is not
atomistic.
The Will to Power is not an atomistic philosophy, and should not be read as
inserting atomism into the philosophy of the will. Will is a concept that materializes as a
result of relations with other wills, and it is always, according to Nietzsche a will to
power. The relationship of wills to each other and the conditions under which they
materialize helps create a framework of becoming, I argue. While the struggle between
different / multiple wills is the struggle for power, power becomes the activating force in
Nietzsche’s work. Foucault and others pick this up. Power then is intimately connected
with other powers, or wills, and will is always battling in its force of becoming to achieve
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another will, or power. In the same way that freedom is a false problem (there is no thing
as (a) free will), will is always connected to the external and internal forces of becoming.
The Philosophy of the ‘Will’ as a Force Becoming
The philosophy of the will is part of the genealogical method that Nietzsche
develops, largely because genealogy also evaluates. In The Will To Power, there is a large
component of the book that develops along the basis of evaluation. Will participates in
this evaluation and it also develops as a force within a thing. In The Will To Power, the
object that is evaluated develops as a force, or an expression of a force.93 The relationship
between force and object are important, because the object continues to develop in
relation to the force, or the multiplicity of forces. By object, I mean phenomenon, and the
phenomenon develops as having a particular affinity with the forces. Nietzsche uses the
language of object, so I retain it here but with explanation. There are multiple forces,
related to other forces. The essence of being of force is plural; we cannot think about
force in the singular, but this plurality does not indicate a plurality of substances, only
forces.
Regarding mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming remains
constant; regarded economically, it rises to a high point and sinks down
again in an eternal circle. This “will to power” expresses itself in the
interpretation, in the man in which force is used up; transformation of
energy into life, and “life at its highest potency,” thus appears as the goal.
The same quantum of energy means different things at different stages of
evolution.94
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The principle of Nietzsche’s philosophy of nature is affirming the multiple forces
existing and in relations with both force and object.
The multiplicity of forces, connected by a common mode of nutrition, we
call “life.” To this mode of nutrition, as a means of making it possible,
belong all so-called feelings, ideas, thoughts; i.e., (1) a resistance to all
other forces; (2) an adjustment of the same according to form and rhythm;
(3) an estimate in regard to assimilation or excretion.95
This becomes important when thinking about how materiality is always active, a
phenomenon that is in motion due to force. We cannot build on the atomistic philosophy
or theory of materialism that is developed by Lucretius and Democritus, because atoms
are their own unique reality and they can only relate to themselves; they cannot impart to
matter an essential plurality, only force is able to do this, according to Deleuze’s
interpretation of Nietzsche.96 What allows for an essential plurality in the nature of
atomism is when we think of force, instead of the singularity of atoms. Deleuze argues
that the atom cannot contain in itself the difference necessary for affirming the relation of
force and matter. Only force and the plurality of relations of force are able to do this.
Recalling Spinoza, there is a type of striving (albeit a plurality of striving) that Nietzsche
develops; he calls it force. Atomism cannot be the starting point for thinking about
relationality and becoming relative to matter; atomism is but a “mask for an incipient
dynamism.”97
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Noting this above, Nietzsche’s concept of force is related to other forces and is
thus rendered as ‘will’ (the will to power). The will for Nietzsche is a differential element
of force that pluralizes as it relates to other forces. Will connects with other concepts of
will, not to matter in general, like muscles or nerves. Will only operates on other concepts
of will, not on matter, but the ways in which matter is affected is that will acts as a force
that motivates matter’s becoming. The element of relationality is an important
development that appears in contemporary theories of matter, particularly Deleuze and
the New Materialists.
“The sensation of force cannot proceed from motion: sensation in general
connot proceed from motion.”98 That will relates with will and force with force is
an important distinction from the movement or process of atomism. Force should
not be understood synonymously with atomism. Will functions by willing
obedience—only will can obey commands. Deleuze says that because of this,
then, pluralism finds “its immediate corroboration and its chosen ground in the
philosophy of the will.”99 For Nietzsche, the pluralism that he affirms is rooted in
the concept of multiple wills, not in multiple substances, like Descartes. This
pluralism motivates materialist thinkers, like Deleuze, to theorize concepts of
multiplicity because there is no unitary concept of the will, for will will have to be
necessarily repudiated if there was.
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The inextricability of forces as relations in turn develops will as a network of
possible wills, a pluralism that is rooted in a singularity, similar to a rhizome. When
applied to matter, then, it is easy to see that matter has the potential to be vitally
becoming due to force or a networked relation of will. Will is not a human will, but rather
Nietzsche refers to the will to power as a vast, interlocking struggle of indefinite “power
quanta” preserving and enhancing constantly changing power constellations.100 This
inextricability, then, of forces as relations of will becomes the foundation from which we
understand matter as vitally becoming.
Will, or the multiplicity of forces, become a sort of power center to which matter
adheres. The dynamism that motivates matter’s becoming is this “power quanta” that is
both preserving its energy or force and also extending its force in reality. In turn, this
mobilizes matter’s becoming reality. This structure of will penetrates all of existence, all
reality, and puts in motion a material reality that is supported by the multiple
potentialities of force and will.
There are different types of wills that Nietzsche explores. The primal will equals
becoming. This is the dominant will that I believe is located in the center of the “power
quanta.” This will allows for there to be a second will. The wills are interrelated,
connected by the forces internal to them. Second, the will in the theory of Will To Power
equals the dynamic unfolding of quantities of power under the conditions of preservation
and enhancement. It is this will with which I am most interested. The dynamism that is
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native to Nietzsche’s will helps the philosophy of materialism develop as an unfolding
fold of matter, multiple in its becoming, but nonetheless singular in its essence.
Conclusion: The Making of ‘Modern Matter’
Both Spinoza and Nietzsche provide a way to rethink materiality in the making of
what I call ‘modern matter’ that is vitally becoming. Important to this project is the
notion of becoming—not just a notion of cohesion, but of differential material becoming
that is motivated by the internal striving of matter. Though both conatus and will function
differently for Spinoza and Nietzsche, what is important is that these two thinkers, in
particular, help mobilize a new wave of materialist theories that in turn shape the
philosophy of materialism. While Lucretius is important to note, namely his theory of
materialism and movement or process, Spinoza and Nietzsche reframe this theory of
movement and allow for a more robust theory of process to develop. Spinoza ties his
conatus to theories of causality and Nietzsche to notions of power, and both of these
thinkers mobilize today’s philosophy of materialism in a way that creates new contours
and dimensions for the becoming of materiality.
In the next chapter, I will trace significant contributors of contemporary strands of
materialism. I start with Bergson, then pick up the materialism of Deleuze, and then end
with the New Materialist. Central to the following chapter, however, is the addition of
Gloria Anzaldúa who I believe can be counted among the New Materialists. Her
philosophy is strangely material, though this is only confirmed by visiting the archives to
see the scholars she cited. Putting Gloria Anzaldúa in conversation with those who I call
contemporary materialists re-imagines Anzaldúan scholarship beyond the horizon of
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identity politics and helps new dimensions of materialism take root at the intersection of
ontology, epistemology, and ethics.
Gloria Anzaldúa’s Tihueque and Modern Matter
When reading Spinoza, the reader can identify the simple body as the ceremonial
knife that is poetically constructed in Anzaldúa’s poem, Tihueque. But, when thinking
about the ceremonial knife through the lens of Anzaldúa, it is akin to a complex body,
enfleshing both a will and part of a process. The last stanza of the poem illustrates the
possibility of a materialist perspective on conatus and will, combining both Spinoza and
Nietzsche with a standpoint on Anzaldúan materiality:
Today I lie in a musty museum
and register 5.5 on the Mohs scale.
But my origin, my volcanic obsidian,
hard as granite
comes in good stead.101
The self-preservation inherent in this poem relates to both conatus and will (Spinoza and
Nietzsche, respectively). Considering the ceremonial knife as vitally becoming (alive in
some sense) is key to understanding that the knife competes with itself to become and
persevered because of the fight of many wills, and the process under which it went
throughout its life. The competition of every will in the ceremonial knife is the fight for
power, the fight to become, change, and process. The freedom of any will is never found
in the will, because freedom is a false problem. What makes this last stanza important for
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this project and tracing becoming is that it is not freedom after which the knife struggles;
it is the multiplicity of wills that encumber the knife, or mirror, however you consider it.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONTEMPORARY MATTER
The material universe is not made up of things—it is only energy and lines
of force continuing to produce temporary forms that are in a state of
continuous flow.
—Gloria Anzaldúa (Box 102, folder 2) 1999
This chapter surveys contemporary field of materialism, which builds on the two
previous chapters, outlining a particular trajectory of movement and becoming, or
animated lines of flight. While this chapter explores contemporary matter, this chapter
also pays careful attention to the ways that modern matter (illustrated in the previous
chapter) has influenced the contemporary contours of materialism and the schools of
thought, namely the New Materialists. As such, this chapter will detail the materialism of
the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, Deleuze, and the New Materialists. The
development of contemporary matter continues today with scholars, such as Jane Bennett
and Karen Barad, Vicky Kirby, among others.
In terms of development, I chart Bergson’s élan vital and his emerging vitalism
that is important for materialism. Likewise, I chart Deleuze’s materialism by addressing
his use of his theory of the fold that stems from Leibniz and is also used by Foucault to
address the nature and contours of power. For Deleuze, matter is an unfolding folding
that is always becoming; the pli is the enfolding of a material reality. I should note that
unfolding is not the opposite of folding; rather, unfolding follows the fold up to another
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fold. While I will explore this later, it is important to note that the issue or idea of folding
is the very force of becoming that is central to Deleuze’s materialism. Deleuze has also
been called a vitalist by some, but this is controversial.102 Deleuze does recover
Bergson’s élan vital, though it is unclear whether this recovery ‘makes’ Deleuze a
vitalist, or whether it is Deleuze’s recovery of Spinoza’s conatus. I mention it here,
because Deleuze has become a central figure for the New Materialists and many New
Materialists are also invested in vitalism. I focus on his use of Bergson and of matterenergy, and the fold. This then fuels my analysis of the New Materialists later, which
highlight the recovery of Spinoza, a creative use of Deleuze, and the foreshadowing of an
ontology of becoming, which is also material. Finally, I revisit Anzaldúa poem, “Now
Let Us Go,” and help illustrate her animated lines of flight and the emergence of a
physiomateriality.
Overviewing the contemporary field of materialism and highlighting the ways in
which New Materialism reaches back to earlier versions of materialism, not only shows
that materialism is still very much alive today in the discourse concerning epistemology
and ontology, but it also opens up doors for thinkers like Gloria Anzaldúa to be read
alongside the New Materialists. Doing this helps mobilize my thinking about the ways
which bodies are constructed as material reality and the intersection of epistemology and
ontology. Noting the inherent vitalism that is found in Anzaldúa’s theory of the universe
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helps mobilize what I have come to call a physiomateriality that foreshadows an ontology
of becoming that is particular to material bodies.103
Henri Bergson (élan vital)
Henri Bergson is an important voice to the discussion of contemporary matter,
and his work in both Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory serve as my primary
point of departure. Examining these two texts helps elucidate the emerging materialism
found in his élan vital and the materialism that emerges on the French scene. Bergson is
important because not only does Deleuze pick up Bergsonian threads, but the New
Materialists do, too, to illustrate a vitalist materialism by combining Bergson, Deleuze,
and Spinoza. The vital impulse that Bergson theorizes in Creative Evolution is the key to
understanding his version of materialism, and is important to put into conversation with
the movement and becoming found in Lucretius, Spinoza, and Nietzsche. There remains
an internal movement in Bergson’s work, and noting this is important to show continuity
with the other frameworks of materialism.
In Bergson’s thought, the notion of life mixes together two opposite senses
(mechanism and teleology), which must be differentiated and then led into a genuine
unity. On the one hand, it is clear from Bergson’s earlier works that life is the absolute
temporal movement informed by duration and retained in memory; on the other hand, life
(a vital awareness that Bergson calls life) becomes the mechanism by which difference,
multiplicity, unity, and duration, along with memory, become the point of departure for
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making sense of his materialism. Each of these parts, together, forms a unity in rethinking
materialism.
In the first chapter of Creative Evolution, Bergson theorizes the evolution of life.
He compares and contrasts both mechanism and teleology, and he accomplishes this by
utilizing a theory of change, which is located in the simple acts of nature. It is
exemplified in his creation of élan vital. “Change is far more radical than we are at first
inclined to suppose.”104 The reality is that change is the constant in Bergson’s work, and
the element of change will fuel Bergson’s becoming, though it is called a “vital impulse”
in his work. “The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is
nothing but change.”105 Whereas Lucretius’ materialism revolved around movement and
becoming, and Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s was a particular style of becoming, Bergson’s
“becoming” is located in the element of change and its constancy. This is different in that
Bergson held onto the feature of multiplicity, despite affirming monism. Life, for
Bergson, is a dynamic feature to the element of becoming different and the process of
differentiation. While Bergson theorized about “life,” it is important to note that this is
his theory of materialism that emerged through the discourse of evolution, and in many
ways, Bergson tackled Darwinian evolutionary theory in ways that have allowed for a
different, albeit creative, evolution to emerge. This creative evolutionary theory has
shaped the discourse concerning materialism in important ways. While Bergson’s theory
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of life was in part a response to that of Darwin’s theories, it is clear that new contours of
materialism emerge on the French scene with that of an internal impulse and the
constancy of change.
The vital impulse, or élan vital, is one of Bergson’s most lasting ideas, but élan
vital cannot be separated from that of duration, memory, difference, and multiplicity,
which, of course is picked up by scholars like Deleuze, among other feminist New
Materialists. Several contemporary scholars utilize this theory in their own remapping
and recasting of materialism, and by doing this, they show the lasting promise of
contemporary materialism and its connection with philosophers, such as Lucretius and
Spinoza. For Bergson, élan vital is the creativity that springs forth from matter’s pulse, or
its rhythm. Common impetuses or harmonies in matter do not exist; there are only
differences in matter that coalesce to become one (Bergson is a monist, despite his
advocating for difference and multiplicity in biology and matter).106 In many ways,
Bergson’s monism is illustrated best in Deleuze’s claim that monism = plurality.107
With commonality being central to Bergson’s thinking about creativity, it is
important to show how commonality and difference, along with monism, interact with
Bergson’s theories that in turn help us acknowledge the creative impulse that is ‘life’ or
material. “Thus the wind at a street-corner divides into diverging currents which are all
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one and the same gust. Harmony, or rather “complementarity,” is revealed only in the
mass, in the tendencies rather than in states.”108 Like Lucretius’ clinamen, “the tendency
to change, therefore, is not accidental.”109 The wind, a dynamic feature of the world
around us, divides, multiplies, and diverges from the single source of the gust. It does not
become different in kind; it remains part of the same gust. This divergence, though part
of a single source, participates in the process of multiplicity and becoming different while
remaining one and the same gust.
Similar to the wind, Bergson also theorizes the ways that division happens in
nature. This is important to affirming his single source reality (or material), while also
recognizing the process of differentiation. Nature is one such process of differentiation in
that
Nature’s simple act has divided itself automatically into an infinity of
elements which are then found to be coordinated to one idea, just as the
movement of my hand has dropped an infinity of points which are then
found to satisfy one equation.110
Recognizing the act of nature is to also separate the reality of organization and
manufacturing. Bergson says “manufacturing is peculiar to man,”111 and
It consists in assembling parts of matter which we have cut out in such
manner that we can fit them together and obtain from them a common
action. The parts are arranged, so to speak, around the action as an ideal
centre. To manufacture, therefore, is to work from the periphery to the
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centre, or, as the philosophers say, from the many to the one.
Organization, on the contrary works from the centre to the periphery. It
begins in a point that is almost a mathematical point, and spreads around
this point by concentric waves which go on enlarging. The work of
manufacturing is the more effective, the greater quality of matter dealt
with. It proceeds by the concentration and compression. The organizing
act, on the contrary, has something explosive about it: it needs at the
beginning the smallest possible place, a minimum of matter, as if the
organizing forces only entered space reluctantly. The spermatozoon,
which sets in motion the evolutionary process of the embryonic life, is one
of the smallest cells of the organism; and it is only a small part of the
spermatozoon which really takes part in the operation.112
Bergson’s ability to delineate the differences between organization and manufacturing are
important in nature and applying his concept of differentiation for the organism to further
materialize. From the spermatozoon, Bergson transitions to the eye as a way to further
illustrate the vital impulse of matter.
Bergson utilizes the structure of the eye and the development of the eye to show
patterns of his creative impulse, and vision then functions as a virtuality that is being
actualized, though also participating in the process of differentiation. He says it best in
the following quote that Deleuze picks up from and adapts:
It is always a case of virtuality in the process of being actualized, a
simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of
diving up: Proceeding “by dissociation and division,” by “dichotomy,” is
the essence of life.113
Bergson creates a material flow in analyzing the development of the eye. In place of
matter, the eye becomes the focal point in discussing materiality and the ways in which
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materiality is subject to a common force, or impetus, and is dichotomized, but never
becomes a duality. Bergson’s monism is one that not only addresses the day’s
Darwinism, but also the work of both biology and teleology. There is no radical finalist
or mechanism in Bergson’s materialism; it is a material flow that is differentiating
through the process of duration and memory, a material process whereby the creative
impulse sustains an impression of the past that helps shape the future present.
Gilles Deleuze (pli)
The fold (pli) in Deleuze’s work can be seen throughout his writing, and should
be considered central to his vitalism that is also his materialism; it is illustrated in his
image of thought, becoming, nomadic war machine, plane of immanence, and rhizome.
The fold is a particular type of force of becoming that is developed later in Deleuze’s The
Fold. The fold is equally an unfolding as it is an enfolding. The fold creates pleats and
doubles, or multiplies; it becomes by and through the material force of the infinite
streams of matter and material becomings.
It comes down to folds. Wave folding into particle, breath into body, hand
into hand, melody into ear, seed into dirt, earth into human, violence into
trauma, carbon into atmosphere, climate into climatology. Word into
world, world into word. Outside in, inside out, the edge turns to layer, to
tissue, complicating, pleating. The folding shapes, it limits, it may pleat
sharply. We select, decided, make some cut between possibles, decisare;
or else we dissolve into the manifold that we already are and “I” don’t
happen. But the cut is never clean. It only exposes more folds. All the way
down and out. And the vertical axis is itself twisting, bending, into spirals
diffractice by everything they transverse. The complication extends,
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explicates. Each one of its folds does the world of the world. In word or
body.114
Keller reads Deleuze with Whitehead to explicate the eternal material fold that is
also in process, always pleating and always becoming, always becoming different in its
repetitious folds. Keller’s cloud becomes an infinite piece of integrated material for her
planetary entanglement, one that is rooted in the relational ontology of her process
oriented theology and a material reality that is always intra-acting, to utilize Barad’s
language.
Folds are also cuts, which create new pleats, new folds, multiplying doublings, as
Deleuze theorizes. The material entanglement that is the fold and the enfolding helps
further illustrate the reality of the force of becoming in Deleuze’s work. Maintaining the
plumb line of becoming, even in the fold (pli) of Deleuze’s work, continues to push
contemporary materialism into a conceptual register that destabilizes the linearity of
traditional discourses of becoming and allows for becoming to be a (re)creation of
difference and repetition whose relational contours further root its ontological folds.115
Deleuze’s theory of the fold, illustrated below, is an important piece to the
development of contemporary matter. Utilizing Foucault, Leibniz, and Bergson, Deleuze
crafts a compelling feature to his materialism, that of the pli, a never-ending, enfolded,
unfolded, fold. In the section below, I help illustrate the fold, the folding, and the
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enfolded to discuss Deleuze’s materialism. While Deleuze advocates for a monism that is
a plurality in his other writings, his Leibniz book picks up the feature of the fold that then
is later deployed by Foucault to rethink power. I use the Möbius strip as my metaphor to
detail the material emergence of the fold, which is always becoming. Combined with
Lucretius, Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleuze creates a mosaic of compelling features to
rethink materialism with his use of pli. I suggest this helps mobilize the New
Materialists’ thinking about their own version of materiality that is motivating very
compelling discussions concerning race, class, gender, and sexuality within that
movement. While Deleuze does not pick up Leibniz’s theory of the fold entirely (and
adheres to a creative monism, instead), the pli becomes the axis point on which we
understand Deleuzian materialism. What Deleuze’s theory of the fold allows us to
reimagine is the way material force emerges in the work of Deleuze, which should be
partnered with Foucault’s insistence that power is productive. It is an irruption.
Reimagining materialism that has a material force that is akin to power remaps force as
that which is not only internal and native to matter, itself, but also something that is being
produced by the very folds of other beings. All material (subjects) become part of the
topological surface that is becoming.
We must conceive of the world topologically—as a pure surface. This surface has
only a single side, but is structured like a Möbius strip, where a torsion produces the
optical effect of two or more heterogeneous and autonomous sides, thereby giving rise to
multiple illusions. The single side is the outside; it is on this outside, and through its
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torsions, that power relations play out their differential distributions; it is under the
conditions of this outside that power relations undergo the integrations of knowledge.116
Deleuze claims that the “profound Nietzscheanism” of Michel Foucault lies in the fact
that, in Foucault’s thought, power exists on, or is the immanent effect of, the topology of
this surface. Power is not, therefore, repressive, but rather productive; power “is practiced
before it is possessed,” and it “passes through the hands of the mastered no less than
through the hands of the masters.”117 Power is a relation between forces; it is not a form
of exteriority or of interiority; it does not lie between forms (of knowledge), but rather,
force “exists in relation with other forces, such that any force is already a relation, that is
to say power: force has no other object or subject than force.”118 Power appears in various
guises in Foucault— as a ‘microphysics,’ and as affectivity (“the power to be affected is
like a matter of force, and the power to affect is like a function of force.”119); but most
profoundly, the power manifests in the ‘diagram,’ of which the infamous Panopticon is
perhaps the example par excellence. But the diagram is itself a pure, unformalized
function that “must be ‘detached from any specific use,’ as from any specific
substance.”120 The diagram is not universal, since it is itself produced by the
contingencies of the forces of the outside, but it is nevertheless co-extensive with the
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social field; it traverses and determines all of the forms of exteriority/knowledge. Hence,
the heterogeneity of power and knowledge: whereas the latter concerns, and is constituted
as, strata (substances and formalized functions, forms of exteriority, i.e. sayability and
visibility), power is, on the other hand, diagrammatic and distributive; power relations are
non-localizable and constitute “anonymous strategies” which, though they differ in kind
from stratifications of knowledge, are primary in relation to the latter and constitute the
latter, effecting thereby the general organization of the social field in which the forms of
knowledge are located.121 This logical primacy of power over knowledge is crucial: “No
doubt power, if we consider it in the abstract, neither sees nor speaks...But precisely
because it does not itself speak and see, it makes us see and speak.”122 A ventriloquism of
power. Or, as Deleuze suggests, a question of truth:
If power is not simply violence, this is not only because it passes in itself
through categories that express the relation between two forces...but also
because, in relation to knowledge, it produces truth, in so far as it makes
us see and speak. It produces truth as a problem.123
It is crucial to understand that when power is said to come from the ‘outside,’ this
does not imply a beyond or a transcendent plane upon which power struggles play out,
and of which our own knowledge and struggles are mere reflections or representations.
Power is the formless form of the outside: “The relations between forces, which are
mobile, faint and diffuse, do not lie outside strata but form the outside of strata...it is each
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stratified historical formation which refers back to a diagram of forces as though it were
its outside.”124 Deleuze insists on this dimension of Foucault’s thought: force refers to an
irreducible outside, “an outside which is farther away than any external world.” The two
forms of exteriority (sayability and visibility) are external to one another and
heterogeneous, which is to say that seeing and speaking do not converge on a given
object (this is Foucault’s transformation of phenomenology into epistemology). There is
necessarily a disjunction between speaking and seeing. Seeing and speaking are forms of
knowledge, but “thinking addresses itself to an outside that has no form.”125
Seeing is thinking, and speaking is thinking, but thinking occurs in the
interstice, or the disjunction between seeing and speaking...thinking
belongs to the outside in so far as the latter, an ‘abstract storm,’ is
swallowed up by the interstice between seeing and speaking...thinking is
not the innate exercise of a faculty, but must become thought. Thinking
does not depend on a beautiful interiority that would reunite the visible
and articulable elements, but is carried under the intrusion of an outside
that eats into the interval and forces or dismembers the internal.126
Thought always operates in relation to the outside, but the thought of the outside is
doubly genitive: the thought of the outside. The thought of the outside is the unthought.
The question arises: there is an outside, there is power, there are sets of forces that
act upon one another—but is there, therefore, an inside? An inside “deeper than any
internal world, just as the outside is farther away than any external world?” Deleuze’s
reply: “The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic
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movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something
other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside.”127 This inside of the
outside is the subject: the subject is an effect of the folding of the outside. The subject is
constituted as the ‘double’ of the outside, or rather the subject is the doubled-over-ness of
the outside, as if a living torsion, or a vortex possessed by a duration. Deleuze notes that
the theme or the concept that haunted Foucault was, in fact, the idea of the double. The
passage is so profound that it is worth quoting Deleuze at length:
[T]he double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an
interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a
redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a
repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an ‘I,’ but something
that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self. It is never the
other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as
the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the
other in me.128
Foucault’s brilliance lay in discovering a subjectivity that is derived from power and
knowledge, but which is irreducible to them, which does not depend on them.129 On the
contrary, everything depends on the fold.130 To think is to fold, “to double the outside
with a coextensive inside,”131 but it is never the subject that folds; rather it is thought that
folds—a fold is a differential relation of force to force.
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Force is what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation
between other forces: it is inseparable in itself from the power to affect
other forces (spontaneity) and to be affected by others (receptivity). But
what comes about as a result [of the fold] is a relation which force has
with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of self on self.132
The subject is not the founding, intentional subject of phenomenology; neither is the
subject merely given as such, as if pre-determined by a transcendent power. The subject
is constituted within the given:133 subjectivity is a struggle, a psycho-bio-cosmic battle of
forces, what Foucault calls “a politics of truth.”134 “The struggle for subjectivity presents
itself,” writes Deleuze, “as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.”135
Foucault himself asked the crucial question: “At what price can subjects speak the truth
about themselves?”136 What are the sets of forces that allow a truth to be produced? What
or where is the fold from which one can speak truthfully about oneself? More profoundly:
to what extent can such a ‘speaking truthfully about oneself’ be considered a form or a
mode of resistance to power? A fold of the outside, folded back against itself—against
power?
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Thinking topologically about the world as a pure surface and integrating the
poetic rhythm of Deleuze into this project necessarily points to the proliferation of forces
that are at play: reaching back to Lucretius, Spinoza, to then Nietzsche, Bergson,
Foucault, and beyond. Folding the fold back against itself is necessarily folding against
the multiplicity of forces that are at play, identified as power, in Deleuze and Foucault.
The force of matter materializes in the language of power for Deleuze and Foucault, but
should not be reduced to power that is merely imaginative; it is both productive and
material. There are material forces, visible and invisible, that should be accounted for and
woven into the discussion of a material duration. This braids together the vital impulse of
Bergson with Deleuze and Foucault and captures a new theory of force, contained but not
solidified in the fold.
Using the fold as not only an expression of force but also as the real material
becoming in time helps further mobilize materiality in distinct ways. I think this is
particularly important for my own work with bodies—they are material folds that are
becoming and the force of the folding is precisely the material becoming that Deleuze
excavates when speaking about the unfolding of reality, which is rooted in the fold of
material becomings.
“New Materialists”
The New Materialists utilize such thinkers as those discussed above, in addition to
the ones discussed in chapters one and two. While the New Materialist movement has
been an important theoretical enterprise (and has provided the resources for this
dissertation), it is important to note that there was scholarship penned prior to this
‘school’s’ thinking and we should be critical to interrogate the modifier ‘new’ relative to
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New Materialism. The scholarship that is now part of the New Materialists is a recovery
of materialism that seeks to address race, class, gender, sexuality, and the overwhelming
reality of the anthropocene. In many ways, New Materialism has taken the overwhelming
humanist and science studies work and theorized the posthumanist orientation relative to
matter. It is not a denial of the human, but an intentional decentering of the human (the
Man) and a consideration that matter is vitally alive and enchanted. I have positioned my
own thinking and analysis of Gloria Anzaldúa as part of the New Materialist enterprise,
addressing similar issues that scholars as that of Rosi Braidotti and others. Rosi Braidotti
and other feminists have charted a new contour of the new materialist enterprise. It has
been coined ‘feminist new materialism.’ Feminist new materialism advocates for a new
turn in the concepts of agency and biology that further entangles ontology, epistemology,
and ethics. Taken from her article, “The Implications of the New Materialisms for
Feminist Epistemology,” Samantha Frost writes the following
Feminists drawing on the physical and biological sciences increasingly
repudiate the notion that biology and matter are passive or inert and
instead recognize the agency of biology or matter in worldly phenomena
and social and political behavior. Such ‘new materialist’ work challenges
the linear models of causation that underlie constructivist analyses of the
ways power shapes the subjects and objects of knowledge. It provokes
feminist epistemologists to develop models of causation and explanation
that can account for the complex interactions through which the social, the
biological, and the physical emerge, persist, and transform.137
New Materialism refers to the material turn, a theoretical and pragmatic turn away
from language and the overwhelming linguistic turn that is advanced by post-
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structuralism, post-modernisms and the deconstruction of French theory. New
Materialism is a category of theories that were generated as a response to the linguistic
turn that seeks to destabilize language as the priority for what constructs reality. Infused
with commitments to specific knowledge-becoming practices and a history linked to
feminisms, new materialism attempts to offer a different perspective to signification,
materiality, and methodologies of crafting knowledge.
Knowledge-becoming practices refers to the way that new materialists think about
things in the world and what we know about them. Historically, with theories attached to
the Enlightenment, ontology (what is in the world) and epistemology (what we know
about what is in the world) were considered to be separate and not affecting one another.
What new materialists point out is that what is in the world and what we know about
things in the world cannot be considered as different things. What is in the world and
what we know about things in the world are constantly shaping one another. While poststructuralists explain that words are fluid (focusing on language), new materialists point
out that materiality, too, is not stable, and also not passive. For some, it could be argued
that new materialism is also an expression of poststructuralism.
When describing the term new materialisms in their now published book, New
Materialism, Iris van der Tuin and Rick Dolphijn explain,
New materialism is then “new” in the sense that it is an attempt to ‘leap
into the future without adequate preparation in the present, through
becoming, a movement of becoming-more and becoming-other, which
involves the orientation to the creation of the new, to an unknown future,
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what is no longer recognizable in terms of the present.’ In art this analysis
could be the study of matter and meaning.138
Similar to poststructuralism, new materialism considers the future as open to countless
possibilities that promises no salvation.
Rosi Braidotti
Rosi Braidotti coined the term ‘New Materialism.’139 In Braidotti’s contribution
to Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook’s Deleuze and Feminist Theory she coined the
term “neo-materialism” and provided a genealogy of it. Focusing on theories of the
subject, one of the red threads running through her work, her genealogy “Descartes’
nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favorite
fantasy”140 is followed by a definition of the subject, the “I think” as the body of which it
is an idea, which we see as the emblem of the new materialism:
A piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by the
unfolding of genetic encoding. Neither a sacralised inner sanctum, nor a
pure socially shaped entity, the enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an
‘in-between’: it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous
unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of
memory that repeats and is capable of lasting through sets of
discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. The Deleuzian
body is ultimately an embodied memory.141
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In this text Braidotti remains close to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze when developing
the new materialism. The term, however, can already be found in Patterns of Dissonance,
where she states
a general direction of thought is emerging in feminist theory that situates
the embodied nature of the subject, and consequently the question of
alternatively sexual difference or gender, at the heart of matter. […] This
leads to a radical re-reading of materialism, away from its strictly Marxist
definition. […] The neo-materialism of Foucault, the new materiality
proposed by Deleuze are […] a point of no return for feminist theory,142
and in Nomadic Subjects where it is stated that “What emerges in poststructuralist
feminist reaffirmations of difference is […] a new materialist theory of the text and of
textual practice.”143 Braidotti writes about the importance of “genealogy,” and how is it
that the full-fledged conceptualization of the new materialism came about in a text that
focused on the philosophy of Deleuze.
Particular to Braidotti’s materialism is not only a close affiliation with Deleuzian
philosophy but also a commitment to feminism. Braidotti’s theories become a dominant
voice in European feminist theorizing, and her theories are rooted in the materialism of
Deleuze and Althusser. Rosi Braidotti examines genealogy and the conceptualizing of
new materialism in the following interview:
You’re right in pointing out the progressive development of and
identification with the label “neo-materialism” within the corpus of my
nomadic thought. Patterns of Dissonance announces my general project
outline in theoretical terms, which are expressed in the mainstream
language that is typical of book versions of former PhD dissertations.
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Then there follows a trilogy, composed by Nomadic Subjects,
Metamorphoses and Transpositions. Nomadic Subjects—which
incidentally has just been re-issued by Columbia University Press in a
totally revised second edition seventeen years after its original publication
(Braidotti 2011b)—already has a more controversial message and a more
upbeat style. Metamorphoses and Transpositions pursue the experiment in
a conceptual structure that has grown more complex and rhizomatic and a
style that attempts to do justice to this complexity, while not losing touch
with the readers altogether.
More theoretically, I would argue that, throughout the 1980’s, a text such
as Althusser’s “Pour un materialisme aléatoire” had established a
consensus across the whole spectrum of his students—Foucault, Deleuze,
Balibar. It was clear that contemporary materialism had to be redefined in
the light of recent scientific insights, notably psychoanalysis, but also in
terms of the critical enquiry into the mutations of advanced capitalism. It
was understood that the post-‘68 thinkers had to be simultaneously loyal
to the Marxist legacy, but also critical and creative in adapting it to the
fast-changing conditions of their historicity. That theoretico-political
consensus made the term “materialist” both a necessity and a banality for
some poststructuralists. Leading figures in the linguistic turn, such as
Barthes and Lacan, wrote extensively and frequently about “the
materiality of the sign.” In a way there was no real need to add the prefix
“neo-” to the new materialist consensus at that point in time. That,
however, will change.144
Here, it is clear that today’s “New Materialism” is mobilized because of ancient
philosophy, post-structuralism, and leading feminist and gender/sex theories. There are
also different ‘strands’ in today’s New Materialism that takes science and technology
seriously, the study of post-humanism, queer materiality, assemblages, and authors
seeking to establish a more robust theory concerning race and materialism. In the same
interview, Braidotti continues:
What is clear is that by the mid-1990’s the differences among the various
strands and branches of the post-structuralist project were becoming more
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explicit. The hegemonic position acquired by the linguistic branch—
developed via psychoanalysis and semiotics into a fully-fledged
deconstructive project that simply conquered intellectually the United
States—intensified the need for clearer terms of demarcation and of
theoretical definition. Thus “neo-materialism” emerges as a method, a
conceptual frame and a political stand, which refuses the linguistic
paradigm, stressing instead the concrete yet complex materiality of bodies
immersed in social relations of power.
At that point, it became clear to me that the genealogical line that
connected me to Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze also marked a
distinctive tradition of thought on issues of embodiment and political
subjectivity. The terminological differences between this branch and the
deconstructive one also became sharper, as did the political priorities.
Accordingly, “nomadic subjects” is neither about representation nor about
recognition but rather about expression and actualization of practical
alternatives. Gilles Deleuze—from his (smoky) seminar room at
Vincennes—provided lucid and illuminating guidance to those involved in
the project of redefining what exactly is the “matter” that neo-materialism
is made of. Things get more conceptually rigorous from that moment
on.145
New Materialism grew from the catacombs of Althusser and Deleuze (and Foucault) to
be a full-fledged discourse that takes feminist theorizing to new, profound levels, queer
theory beyond identity politics, and theories of being and humanity that transcend
stabilized notions of ontology. It is here in New Materialist discourse that a different
ontology emerges, that of becoming. Important to the New Materialist discourse is the
ways in which they utilize varying components of force and matter to make their own
distinction regarding materiality. In many ways, it is a recovery of both Deleuze and
Althusser, which utilize Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Foucault. The force of materiality for
New Materialists lie in the careful negotiation of the insistence on language in post-
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structuralist’s thought and a move to a more material orientation of all things. In this
sense, then, their ontology is loaded with contours of becoming, and can only be analyzed
through the lenses of becoming different, which is the acknowledgement of the positivity
of difference becoming material.
Notable New Materialist thinkers that recover Lucretius, Spinoza, Nietzsche,
Bergson, Deleuze, among others, are Rosi Braidotti, Jane Bennett, Vicky Kirby, Karen
Barad, and Mel Chen. I mention these thinkers, because I believe they are making
important contributions to the discourse of New Materialism. They are, in many ways, in
line with the quality and kind of thinking that I am attempting to produce around
materiality and bodies.
Rosi Braidotti’s work has been a leading feature in New Materialism. It is how I
came to the discourse, myself. Braidotti’s work, as a New Materialist, started with
Patterns of Dissonance. As a reworked dissertation, this book pulls together issues of
gender with philosophy in material ways. The trilogy, which followed, expanded upon
her material philosophy and developed a substantive methodology, that of nomadism,
which directly points to her own life and also the work of Gilles Deleuze. Braidotti has
continued to write and publish in the field of New Materialism, and she is a leading
figuring now with those thinkers who are using New Materialism to think and analyze
post-humanism. I continue to follow her work, but am aware that she is deeply Eurocentric and attention to indigeneity and other differences are not central to her work.
While she has written on issues of cosmopolitanism, I think she does not adequately
underscore the radical differences that irrupt the cosmos.
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Braidotti’s materialism is a materialism that privileges matter over language.146 Material
is prior to language for Braidotti, which makes Braidotti an interesting post-structuralist.
Yet, we see in Braidotti’s work a new style and grammar of materialism that brings
bodies into the fore, and her theorizing matter and bodies foregrounds the work that I am
attempting in this dissertation by addressing the materiality of bodies. Braidotti, also,
should be read in contrast to Judith Butler’s work, who places language prior to matter,
though seeks to develop a co-constitutive framework where matter and bodies co-exist.
Jane Bennett
Another thinker central to New Material debates is Jane Bennett. In Bennett’s
2001 text, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics, she
develops her own account of materialism with the emphasis on enchantment.147 In this
book, Bennett begins to generate a new materialist account and does so by placing
philosophy in conversation with ethical practices.148 Believing that theory matters,
Bennett fashions a text out of complex philosophical ideas, materializing them into
creative attachments (with other theories and between theories) and then finds the place
of enchantment, the place where matter emerges as alive and living, or is in a “state of
wonder, and one of the distinctions of this state is the temporary suspension of
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chronological time and bodily movement.”149 The rehabilitation of enchantment does not
spiritualize matter, but rather challenges this view, and establishes a theory where matter
can be full of genuine wonder, and this wonder is crucial to motivating ethical behaviors.
I find Bennett important to mention, because in many ways Anzaldúa develops her
understanding of the world/universe in similar ways. The difference between the two is
that in many ways Bennett’s materiality is spirit phobic, and Anzaldúa generates a
materialism that is certainly alive and animated, but is also likely alive with spirits.
In her other materialist book, Bennett, for example, writes an entire manuscript on
material entanglements and considers everything from trash to bacteria and analyzes the
ways in which these features of our material world are in fact, material. In Vibrant
Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, she details issues of the force of matter and lifts up
Bergson as the philosopher to whom we should pay careful attention, spending a
significant time on the history of vital materialism: from Spinoza, Nietzsche, Thoreau,
Darwin, Adorno, and Deleuze, along with Bergson. In Vibrant Matter, Bennett shifts her
focus on people and humanity’s experience of things to an analysis of things themselves
and discusses the materiality of things as having a particular force of life, or vitalism.
This book is a book in political theory and is an attempt to reshape political theory for it
to do a better job of recognizing and evaluating the active participating of nonhuman
forces in events. Things have a material force, argues Bennett, and recognizing this force
is important to developing a robust political theory.
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Bennett’s materialism from her Enchantment book to Vibrant Matter details not
only the material turn but also the radical aliveness that matter embodies. Also, the
aliveness central to Bennett’s work mobilizes a grammar of becoming for materialism
that brings together biology, politics, philosophy, and other social theories. The New
Materialists continue the effort in illustrating the force of becoming as something central
in materialism. I find Bennett’s work important to mention as I discern the becoming
reality of the materiality of bodies, something Bennett alludes to in Vibrant Matter.
Important, too, is Bennett’s language of attachment, which highlights the reality
of an entanglement of matter and material reality. Her materialism is one that is radically
connected throughout time and history—a vibrancy that has cosmic implications. The
material attachments of Bennett’s work reinvigorates new contours of becoming and
allow for new folds, new pleats, that embody the cosmic vibrations of materialism.
Vicki Kirby
Kirby, in Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal,150 develops a theory of
corporeality by analyzing several feminist theorists: Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell.
This book is an analysis of post-structuralist feminism that seeks to establish a new ‘turn’
in analyzing bodies, specifically corporeality. This analysis of representation is
recognition of the power of representation and the politics of representation and the ways
in which matter is mutually imbricated in the politics of representation. This book is also
a critique of the culture that stems from feminist theory that focuses on the politics of
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language, instead of matter. Telling Flesh is an important text when thinking about the
matter of bodies and corporeality, ways that the politics and philosophies of
representation cannot solidify material bodies. In a later book, Quantum Anthropologies:
Life at Large,151 this text illustrates an engagement with aspects of deconstruction that
have yet to be explored by feminist theory. Particularly, Kirby illustrates that
deconstruction’s implications have been curtailed by the assumption that issues of
textuality and representation are specific to the domain of culture. While Kirby
recognizes the importance of Derrida’s claim “there is no outside of text,” she argues that
theories of cultural construction developed since the linguistic turn have inadvertently
reproduced the very binaries they intended to question, such as those between nature and
culture, matter and ideation, and fact and value. What this book accomplishes is
reconceptualizing deconstruction and deconstructive terms by looking into cybernetics,
biology, forensics, mathematics, and physics. Doing this, Kirby fundamentally rethinks
deconstruction and its relevance to nature, embodiment, materialism, and science.
Karen Barad
Karen Barad’s work, stemming from theoretical physics, seeks to make matter
(opposed to language) matter again. She does this by using Niels Bohr’s experiments and
the quantum cuts to show how materiality performs a particular style of mattering in the
world.
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In Meeting the Universe Half-way: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning, Barad establishes herself as part of the New Materialism
movement. Though several of the chapters were published as articles, this book (at nearly
600 pages) has become an important resource for New Materialists.152 Using Niels
Bohr’s philosophy-physics, she proposes an account of material-discursive practices. She
argues that every entity is an entity that is becoming, intra-actively. Material,
observations, and agencies are not independent of one another; they are all intra-actively
becoming material-discursive. This book also focuses on ethical practices and details the
ways that ethical practices and consequences are intrinsic to the web of becoming.
In one of the more important chapters (and article that was published several
years before the book was published), Barad discusses how matter comes to matter. In the
essay, Barad begins by illustrating the ways in which language has been given too much
power, which I think is important in rethinking why materialism is so acutely important
today:
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the
semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at
every turn lately every “thing”—even materiality—is turned into a matter
of language or some other form of cultural representation. The ubiquitous
puns on “matter” do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the key concepts
(materiality and signification) and the relationship between them. Rather,
it seems to be symptomatic of the extent to which matters of “fact” (so to
speak) have been replaced with matters of signification (no scare quotes
here). Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an
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important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to matter
anymore is matter.
What compels the belief that we have a direct access to cultural
representations and their content that we lack toward the things
represented? How did language come to be more trustworthy than matter?
Why are language and culture granted their own agency and historicity
while matter is figured as passive and immutable, or at best inherits a
potential for change derivatively from language and culture? How does
one even go about inquiring after the material conditions that have led us
to such a brute reversal of naturalist beliefs when materiality itself is
always already figured within a linguistic domain as its condition of
possibility?153
Here, Barad criticizes the ways that language has been elevated in indicting poststructuralists and post-modernists that we’ve given it far too great a power. What Barad
offers is a performative standpoint or positionally that is different from that of Butler’s
theory of performativity. She says:
A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the
representationalist belief in the power of words to represent preexisting
things. Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn
everything (including material bodies) into words; on the contrary,
performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to
language to determine what is real. Hence, in ironic contrast to the
misconception that would equate performativity with a form of linguistic
monism that takes language to be the stuff of reality, performativity is
actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant
language and other forms of representation more power in determining our
ontologies than they deserve.154
Here, Barad offers us a way of moving through the tradition of the linguistic turn
to something more material by recognizing the representationalism of language, the
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power we have endowed language, and a chance to reposition ourselves relative to the
power that has been given to disciplines like ontology and epistemology. Doing this and
re-imagining a new material performativity that in effect moves,
toward performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus
from questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g.,
do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/ doings/actions. I
would argue that these approaches also bring to the forefront important
questions of ontology, materiality, and agency, while social constructivist
approaches get caught up in the geometrical optics of reflection where,
much like the infinite play of images between two facing mirrors, the
epistemological gets bounced back and forth, but nothing more is seen.
Moving away from the representationalist trap of geometrical optics, I
shift the focus to physical optics, to questions of diffraction rather than
reflection. Diffractively reading the insights of feminist and queer theory
and science studies approaches through one another entails thinking the
“social” and the “scientific” together in an illuminating way. What often
appears as separate entities (and separate sets of concerns) with sharp
edges does not actually entail a relation of absolute exteriority at all. Like
the diffraction patterns illuminating the indefinite nature of boundaries—
displaying shadows in “light” regions and bright spots in “dark” regions—
the relation of the social and the scientific is a relation of “exteriority
within.” This is not a static relationality but a doing—the en- actment of
boundaries—that always entails constitutive exclusions and there- fore
requisite questions of accountability. My aim is to contribute to efforts to
sharpen the theoretical tool of performativity for science studies and
feminist and queer theory endeavors alike, and to promote their mutual
consideration. In this article, I offer an elaboration of performativity—a
materialist, naturalist, and posthumanist elaboration—that allows matter
its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing
“intra-activity.” It is vitally important that we understand how matter
matters.155
The materiality that Barad develops in this essay is important and brings together ancient,
modern, and contemporary forms of understanding matter. It is an important move in
destabilizing the solidity of language in favor of the becoming nature of matter. What this
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does is position politics as an effort to destabilize the representationalism of language and
in turn privileges a reality that is materially becoming that also impacts our production of
knowledge making practices and our actions in the world. Herein lies Barad’s ethicoonto-epistemological frame.
Mel Chen
The last New Materialist that I want to mention is Mel Chen because of Chen’s
ability to bridge together queer theory, racial mattering, and affect. In their156 book,
Animacies, Chen draws on recent debates about sexuality, race, and affect to examine
how matter that is considered insensate, immobile, or deathly animates cultural lives.
Chen investigates the blurry division between the living and the dead, or that which is
beyond the human or animal, a binary that Chen disrupts throughout the book. Within the
field of linguistics, animacy has been described variously as a quality of agency,
awareness, mobility, sentience, or aliveness. Chen turns to cognitive linguistics to stress
how language habitually differentiates the animate and the inanimate. Expanding this
construct, Chen argues that animacy undergirds much that is pressing and indeed volatile
in contemporary culture, from animal rights debates to biosecurity concerns.
Despite Chen’s use of cognitive linguistics, Chen does not modify their arguments
in the discursivity of language, but rather focuses on the materiality of language and what
stems from material cultural to help further disrupt the habits of animation and inanimate
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realities. One of the few books that uses race, queer theory, and affect in the discussion of
materialism, Chen’s book is an important one to name in this project.
It is part of the New Materialist account in that Chen seeks to theorize the space
between animation and in-animation—between organic and inorganic. There is still a
material reality in the gap, and it is the gap where the force of becoming settles and
irrupts. I do not suggest that the gap is stable, no; it is a site of radical becoming, an
animacy that brings together both language and material in critical ways that disrupts the
privileging of language over matter and instead allows for matter to become.
Anzaldúa as a Materialist
Addressing Gloria Anzaldúa as a materialist, as I do in this dissertation, is to
situate her materialism as something that is inherent to her work; I do not read
materialism into her work, but rather recognize the material contours within her theorywriting-art. In this project, Anzaldúan materiality resides at the intersection of Deleuze
and New Materialisms, to expose her animated lines of flight, and to further illustrate the
emergence of a queer materialism that takes all forms of matter seriously to include the
feature of her ontology of becoming. Anzaldúa defines the universe in this way, which
she identifies as material: “The material universe is not made up of things—it is only
energy and lines of force continuing to produce temporary forms that are in a state of
continuous flow.”157 Contained within Anzaldúa’s very definition is the element of force
or becoming, something that I have traced through each of the periods of matter
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discussed previously. What is different in Anzaldúa’s definition of materiality, or new, is
the language of ‘animated lines of flight.’ To the Deleuzian reader, they will recognize
this phrase as being part of his work. It is unclear whether Anzaldúa read Gilles Deleuze;
I was unable to unearth any evidence at the Archives when I visited in 2012. However,
Anzaldúa did read Bergson, and made this claim:
Henri Bergson proposed the idea of panpsychism, attributing
'consciousness-like properties to all entities from atoms to microorganisms
to animals.' Panpsychism means mind everywhere, what indigenous
people believed—that everything is full of spirits. David Chalmers
believes that consciousness is an irreducible thing-in-itself, along with
matter, energy, space and time.158
Anzaldúa, however, incorporated Bergson into her thinking and posited the above remark
leading readers to believe that she did believe this element of animation is related to all
living things—is full of spirits and is materializing. In this sense, then, one could argue
that Anzaldúa’s materiality is a spirited materialism, animating all that is living in the
world. In my study, I would like to call this physiomateriality,159 an intersection of the
radical vitalism of life with the animated lines of flight that is materialism. “Radical
vitalism” in the sense that Anzaldúa’s animated lines of flight are rooted in a generative
becoming. Physiomateriality brings together the strands of contemporary matter with the
materialism that Anzaldúa advocates.
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Physiomateriality is my attempt to privilege the reality of movement and becoming that is
central to matter, and this language of physicality points to what I am referring to as a generative
materiality.
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The intersection of the philosophy-poetry of Gloria Anzaldúa and the new
metaphysics of Henri Bergson is found also in Anzaldúa’s claim concerning David
Chalmers who “believes that consciousness is an irreducible thing-in-itself, along with
matter, energy, space and time.”160 The convergence of mind and matter in the work of
Anzaldúa intersects with Bergson’s theories, which privilege elements of memory.
Memory lies at the intersection of matter and mind. A recurring theme in the work of
Anzaldúa is the issue of becoming, which I interpret in ontological terms, and tied
specifically to time, not space. The themes which reoccur in Anzaldúa must not be
analyzed in a linear fashion or interpreted within a stable matrix of linearity; time for
Anzaldúa is the materialization of differentiation that is imbued with a form of aliveness,
an ever-widening reality of potential, but this acknowledgement should not undermine
Anzaldúa’s own commitment to a Taoist / mystical sense of time. This is the creatively
vital impulse (élan vital) that Anzaldúa deploys that is yoked with a spirit of indigeneity,
and there is also a physical material reality to Anzaldúa’s vitalism.
Noting the aliveness that is part of both Bergson and Anzaldúa, it is important to
connect Anzaldúa’s philosophy of materiality with Bergson’s vitalism to illustrate the
ways in which Anzaldúa’s writing-theory-art materiality is also framed by a vital
becoming. Again in the archives, Anzaldúa notes the following: “The material universe is
not made up of things—it is only energy and lines of force continuing to produce
temporary forms that are in a state of continuous flow.” (Box 102, folder 2) 1999. The
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flows that are central to both Bergson and Anzaldúa’s thinking are forms of vitality that
spark an internal movement of differentiation. This is seen in the poetry of Anzaldúa,
especially in the early writing of her poem, Tihueque. Using Anzaldúa’s first publication,
Tihueque, I draw connections to the Anzaldúa rhythms of material vitalism that recur
throughout her writing, and intersect with Bergson’s development of vitalism that is seen
in Creative Evolution. The recurrence of vitalistic themes in Anzaldúa’s philosophypoetry create new contours for Anzaldúa to be read and interpreted as a significant
contributor to today’s social and political philosophy, and especially New Materialism.
Noting the ontology, epistemology, and ethics that motivate Anzaldúa’s theories and
pairing her with Bergson, not only helps buttress Anzaldúa as a metaphysical
philosopher, but also mobilizes Anzaldúa’s philosophy-poetry as part of the queer
philosophical enterprise.
Not only do I think that physiomateriality is an important term to frame
Anzaldúa’s materiality, but it also captures the queer contours that are apparent in
Anzaldúa’s work. By this I mean that the emergence of something akin to “queer matter”
is inherent to my thinking and framing of physiomateriality. The excess of movement and
becoming is one such way that queerness destabilizes the already active material reality.
In this sense, then, one can characterize Anzaldúa’s materiality as a queer materiality that
sits at the intersection of theorists like Deleuze, Braidotti, Bennett, Barad, and Chen. The
queer contours of Anzaldúa’s materiality cut across stable human experience and
incorporate a planetary opening that becomes in my thinking a physiomateriality. The
excess of movement and becoming further destabilizes matter. The reality of becoming
that is central to the agential movement of matter helps further illustrate queer contours of
146

becoming different. The acknowledgement of ‘becoming different’ is a process, a
becoming, a change of the internal networking and self-organizing reality of matter. The
acknowledgement that matter is changing, active in its nature of becoming, signals the
potential to recognize this becoming different as a queer moment of materialization. To
suggest that queer matter is simply the acknowledgement of active matter, in opposition
to passive matter, is not enough for this project. I suggest queer matter as the process of
becoming different, an ever-repeating cycle of difference and repetition that materializes
outside of a norm existing. Anzaldúa’s animated lines of flight that are material become a
queer materialism.
Tihueque161
One year in a distant century during Teoteco,
The 12th month of the solar year Five Rabbit,
in the reign of the Four-Water Sun,,
I carved 12,000 hearts in honor
of Huitziltopochtli, God of War,
who made the sun rise each morning.
In each succeeding year thereafter
ceremonial drunkenness robbed me
as many hearts embraced the furnance sacrifice.
Only the hearts of the finest Náhuatl braves
and luckiest prisoners and warriors
at the sacred flesh.
Today I lie in a musty museum
and register 5.5 on the Mohs scale.
But my origin, my volcanic obsidian,
hard as granite
comes in good stead.
In my childhood I was a mirror.
I threw a vitreous luster, dark-green.
But now the iron oxide running in my veins
dulls my edge
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and the air bubbles trapped in me
reflect my age
Time passes.
I rest and await the flesh.
Noting that Anzaldúa advocated for a material universe that was alive or
motivated by a generative force and animated lines of flight, a physiomateriality, it is
sufficient to argue that her materialism can be seen in this poem. Though I’ve analyzed
this poem in the first two chapters, I have focused on the element of becoming, or force,
that is inherent in this poem. An important thought in this chapter is the recognition of
utilizing the tools of contemporary matter, and the integrated analysis that a stone knife is
a deterritorialized boulder, rough strata sharpened to a cutting edge. That is the
physiomateriality that is becoming in this poem, whose queer contours shape and shift
throughout Anzaldúa’s work, and is present when thinking about the ways in which this
recognition of materialism is a becoming materiality.
While Anzaldúa theorizes a type of flow of becoming, situated in time, not space,
Anzaldúa’s poem also points toward a never-ending fold (pli) that is both material and
discursive. While there is an internal movement native to Anzaldúa’s poetry, the pli and
flow become another kind of force that ushers in new contours of becoming. I utilize
Barad’s ‘material-discursive’ formula to accentuate the physiomateriality emerging in
Anzaldúa’s poetry. It is a material corporeality of becoming that then gives shape to the
bodily contours of epistemology and ontology in her later work. Here, in this first
published poem, there is a material shape of a body, deterritorialized as a knife, but
always becoming. It is here that we begin to have an awareness of the nature of becoming
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for Anzaldúa’s work and the ways that her thought is aligned with New Materialists. It is
not a co-constitutive network of language and material, it is matter becoming bodily.
Also central to this poem and the native materialism of it is that the knife, a
material body, reshapes our thinking concerning bodies. This poem resituates bodies as
having a robust materiality that is prior to language, something that Butler will contest.
Framing the force of becoming in material as a central element in a materialist
philosophy also helps foreground the terms under which bodies will emerge. In the
following two chapters, I outline bodies as they have emerged throughout philosophy and
feminist theory. I utilize these two chapters to help reshape and recast our thinking
around bodies, and uprooting bodies from the particularity of human bodies. This is a
move beyond the anthropocene and an attempt to show the becoming nature of the
materiality of bodies. I believe Anzaldúa’s work does this for us and when paired with
the philosophy of materialism and other thinkers, a new robust framework concerning
bodies irrupts the landscape. In many ways, this irruption is the interrelatedness of
ontology-epistemology-ethics, and we begin to see traces of an ethics of interrelatedness
when we cast bodies in material terms. There is a sense of radical interconnection (or a
physics of non-reparability) that is central to these material contours. Becoming is central
to this ethics of interrelatedness and its particular force, though a non-locality, is material
in nature.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE LOGIC OF THE BODY:
A GENEALOGY OF A MATERIAL SOCIO-SENSORY REALITY
We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that
challenges all models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to
undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through which we pass.
Arrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = MONISIM—via
all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the
furniture we are forever arranging.
—Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus162
The account of matter and bodies in the 17th century does not render materiality or
bodies as dynamic becoming features in the world. I take up the issue of materiality and
bodies, and the 17th-century thinkers I utilize (DesCartes and Spinoza) provide for me a
way to invigorate bodies with a type of dynamism, and I do this by looking at the work of
Gilles Deleuze and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on bodies. Having laid the foundation of
force or becoming in previous chapters helps frame the discussion of dynamism in matter
and bodies for this chapter. The plumb line throughout this dissertation is the philosophypoetry of Gloria Anzaldúa, her theory of a vibrant materiality and speculative approach to
theorizing. I utilize the term “speculative” as a way to suggest that Anzaldúa’s work takes
up the issue of correlationalism in that she theorizes beyond the bounds of human finitude
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by initiating the posthumanist turn before it was popular.163 I mention this to suggest that
both matter and bodies in Anzaldúa should not be stabilized as human matter,
necessarily, nor should bodies be solidified as human bodies. Arguably, her move in
opposition to Spinoza’s principle of sufficient reason and Kantian correlationalism is
seen throughout her work, but especially in her definition of things and matter.
Anzaldúa’s vibrancy locates materiality along the matrix of becoming, and here there are
traces of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in Anzaldúa’s work, I suggest.
As a point of departure, this chapter functions as a history or genealogy of the
body that traces four philosophers’ understanding of the body: René Descartes, Baruch
Spinoza, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. I begin with these four thinkers,
because each of them details the body in specific ways that are useful signposts for my
own research as I build upon the materiality of the body that is developed in the New
Materialisms tradition and intersects with the work of Gloria Anzaldúa. I also suggest
there are traces of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy that function as more than an
additive to Anzaldúa’s philosophy-poetry. Tracing Descartes, Spinoza, Deleuze, and
Merleau-Ponty will lay a key foundation on which I can then introduce the thought and
theory of Gloria Anzaldúa and how I think her understanding of the body is a type of
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relational material and fiercely networked body, that I ague borrows from the
philosophical tradition.164
In this chapter, I argue that bodies are spirited material; they are ‘called’ into
being/becoming both by their material reality and their material relational processes,
networked across multiple differences (bear with me, I will address this later on), but
before I can detail ‘this’ kind of body, I must survey the body that is found throughout the
particular history of philosophy of four specific thinkers.165 Bodies are complicated, and a
turn to Descartes, Spinoza, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze helps elucidate these
complications and further helps mobilize my thinking toward a more material body that I
see in the work of Anzaldúa. Prior to discussing Anzaldúan materiality and borderland
bodies, I provide a brief, but detailed section on Cartesian dualism and Spinoza’s Ethics
and his attention to materiality. Further, I look to Maurice Merleau-Ponty to help give
form and shape to the materialization of the body in queer phenomenological terms,
along with scholars who deal with corporeality, like Elizabeth Grosz and Vicky Kirby.166
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Then, the Deleuzian body is that last theoretical stop fortifying my later move to
Anzaldúan bodies that are fiercely networked in a relational becoming process.167
René Descartes
Philosophy and the Western world have continued to eclipse the mattering168
body, or what is often cited as the materiality of the body. In fact, the somatophobic
lineage of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes continues to shape philosophical positions
concerning the body.169 This somataphobia, as Grosz names it, privileges reason and the
production of mind, over against the production of the body. Not even the twenty-first
century can overcome the mind/body problem, or what is commonly referred to as
(Cartesian) dualism. Feminist theory and feminist philosophy have both set out to
challenge the existing dualism of the mind/body split, and the exclusion of bodies as a
legitimate site of the production of knowledge.
What emerges with Descartes’s dualism is the perpetuation of the conclusion that
the nature of the mind (that is, a thinking, non-extended thing) is completely different
from that of the body (that is, an extended, non-thinking thing). Therefore, it is possible
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for one to exist without the other. The mind is not material and is radically separate from
the body. Descartes unassailable axiom was “cogito ergo sum,” which pointed toward an
ontology having a particular telos. That, because the mind and body were two distinct
substances and not one unified ‘thing’ or ‘object,’ the act of thinking does not interact
with the substance that is a body, this reality points to multiple substances existing.
Evident in the work of Descartes is the separation of the mind and the body, the strict
dichotomy of mind and extension.170 The body as a form of materiality for dualism is
perhaps denigrated as being associated with the female, whereas the mind is male and
rational.171 It has been, in many ways, a continuation of Plato’s soma: “that man (sic), a
non-corporeal being, is trapped in the body, which is a dungeon (sēma).”172 The
continuation of the mind/body split maps other binaries that proliferate throughout
history: “mother (woman) and father (man), matter and form, mortal and immortal.”173
These dualisms correspond to the body/mind split in that the second part of the binary (in
this case, mind) is positive and the first part of the binary (body, for example) is negative.
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The body for Descartes was not an expression of substance, or material. In his
second meditation concerning the nature of the human mind, Descartes theorizes the
body as a chimera.174 “Body, shape, extension, movement, and place are all chimeras.”175
The body, cited as a chimera, suggests that it is a mythical creature, and a useless
theoretical concept that helped unify matter and things. The self or man was not finite
material for Descartes, only a thinking thing.
The first is that, from the fact that the human mind, when turned in on
itself, does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it
does not follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a
thinking thing, such that the word only excludes everything else that also
could perhaps be said to belong to the nature of the soul.176
The mind, as a thinking thing, was the only certainty that Descartes was able to resolve,
along with the certainty that God exists as a supremely good being. The thinking thing
does not point toward the materiality of the thinking thing. Descartes omission that
thought is also material and contributes to the cosmic vibrations of the material body that
is becoming is what also perpetuates the body/mind split. Descartes denies that humans
are an essential vibrant material body, elevating the mind and his ability to put thought in
motion (or imagine), and resolves himself to be at least a “something.”177
Am I not at least a something? But I have already denied that I have any
senses and any body. Still I hesitate; for what follows from this? Am I so
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tied to a body and to senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have
persuaded myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world: no sky, no
earth, no minds, no bodies.178
Dualism, as the separation of the mind and body from the world (or nature)
further established a scientific discourse that perpetuated the terms of objectivity. This
has further implications for epistemology in that objective knowing practices were not
connected to the material body and therefore cannot emerge as material knowledge or
bodily knowledge. Cartesianism displaced the material body as incompossible
substances, separate, distinct, and not equal, for Descartes. Following Descartes
immaterial thought is the reality that dualism creates a hierarchy. Our world today has
followed this hierarchy where the mind is ‘higher’ than the body, most commonly
understood today as the brain.179 Cartesianism and its heirs do not deal adequately with
the material body, and continually displace corporeality.180 This is important to highlight
because a mattering body as I theorize it and construct it provides the basis for becoming
bodily. A mattering body reinscribes a corporeality that is thoroughly material, having the
capacity to produce knowledge in its force of becoming bodily. Dualists can never
produce this quality or kind of body. A mattering body is not only part of a relational
ontology but also knit together with epistemic qualities that affirm the becoming reality
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of becoming bodily. Anzaldúa’s epistemology and ontology both support the material
becoming bodily that displaces the binarism of dualism.
Descartes epistemology defines knowledge by using a method of doubt. In his
Meditations on First Philosophy,181 Descartes theorizes about knowledge, existence,
God, the body, and mind. This text frames his rationalist epistemology in terms of what
can be known in reality and by certainty. Descartes insisted that we should doubt all that
can be doubted, to find only that which is certain (knowledge should be built with/on a
firm foundation). With a focus on certainty, Descartes mentions what forms of
knowledge can come from senses. He writes how senses can deceive us, but perhaps
some sensory knowledge is certain? In dreams there are clearly no senses that are certain.
Everything is possible except math, because math is both predictable and certain. Even in
dreams, math is certain, because there are no five-sided squares. Descartes’ epistemology
hinges on the value-form of certainty and rationalist foundationalism.182
As Elizabeth Grosz explains, Cartesian dualism “establishes a gulf between mind
and matter.”183 She further indicates that reductionism can disavow the gulf, though
problematically. Reducing either the mind to the body or the body to the mind is to in
effect leave the dualism or interaction unexplained.184 The body, as a complex system, is
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reduced to the sum of its parts. As a symptom of dualism, reductionism leaves the binary
intact by denying any interaction between the mind and the body. The binary remains
unexplained and therefore impossible to relate any sort of interaction between mind and
body. What results in following dualism is the trajectory that reduces the connection to
the evolving reality of nature.
Rationalism and idealism are the results of the attempt to explain the body
and matter in terms of mind, ideas, or reason; empiricism and materialism
are the results of attempts to explain the mind in terms of bodily
experiences or matter.185
Evident here is the rejection of reductionism as a sufficient means at solving the dualism
dilemma. This, perhaps, is the limitation I see in all forms of dualism: that dualism ends
in reductionism. This further displaces the material body and elevates the mind as the
exemplary modality of being in the world. Spinoza responds to Cartesian dualism in his
creation of a monist framework. Seen most clearly in the refusal to perpetuate the
mind/body split and advocating for the mind being an object of the body, Spinoza’s
theory unifies the mind and body as compatible modes of being in the world. What I also
find helpful about Spinoza is his turn to unifying Nature and finite extensions where
humans enflesh parts of Spinoza’s infinite Substance, or God. It is to his theory I now
turn.
Benedict de Spinoza
Spinoza, a well-versed Cartesian scholar, argued against the scholarship that
perpetuating the belief that there are multiple substances existing in the world; he also

185

Ibid., 7.

158

combatted Descartes’ method of doubt by utilizing the principle of sufficient reason.
Though Spinoza was a determinist, it is his philosophy concerning matter relative to
Substance that is key for this dissertation. Combatting the Cartesian dualism, which was
hugely influential for many years, Spinoza questioned the terms within which
Cartesianism is framed. The materiality of the body is my central focus in this
dissertation, and finding support and evidence for this focus is seen most clearly in the
philosophy of Spinoza, though I recognize there are limitations. I believe Spinoza creates
a way to move beyond Cartesian dualism by his creation of what is often referred to as
substance monism. Central to Spinoza’s philosophy is the notion of an absolute and
infinite substance—singular in both kind and number. Substance is infinite and
nondivisible and therefore cannot be identified with or reduced to finite substances or
things. Finite things are not substances but rather are modes of the one single substance.
Elizabeth Grosz enumerates Spinoza’s theory of substance that is extended as a finite
mode (materialized human) is an individual entity (human or otherwise) and
is not self-subsistent but is a passing or provisional determination of the
self-subsistent. Substance has potentially infinite attributes to express its
nature. Each attribute adequately expresses substance insofar as it is
infinite (the infinity of space, for example, expresses the attribute of
extension), yet each attribute is also inadequate or incomplete insofar as it
expresses substances only in one form. Extension and thought—body and
mind—are two such attributes.186
What Grosz captures in this quote from Spinoza is the manner in which each finite mode,
extended from the infinite substance, relies on the relationality and intersubjectivity to the
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one substance. The extended mode is not independent from the infinite substance. What
Grosz also captures in this quote is that Spinoza theorized about the infinite number of
possibilities an attribute could be.
What Spinoza offers in contrast to Descartes is a way to consider that attributes
are merely different aspects of one and the same substance, inseparable from each other.
Descartes’ dualism renders two different and incompatible substances that are
irreducible.
Matter and form are important for Spinoza, as is material and immaterial. For
Spinoza, bodies are extensions of being or a finite expression, and any finite thing is
matter. Bodies are finite material in Spinoza’s reasoning.187 The second part of Spinoza’s
Ethics, “Of Nature and Origin of the Mind,” Spinoza details his the body in this way:
(D1) “By body I understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses
God’s essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing” (See IP25C).188 This
definition of the body, formulated in the language of materiality as an ‘extended thing’
unifies the Cartesian split of mind/body dualism. Spinoza’s definition of the body
suggests that a part of God’s essence is in the extended thing he calls a body. This mode
for Spinoza is a material extension of God’s essence.
His first axiom in the second part of his Ethics states that “The essence of man
does not involve necessary existence, that is, from the order of Nature it can happen
187
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equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist.”189 Noting this and
recalling the quote from Grosz, human existence relies on the relationship with substance.
This is important later as I detail that there is a radical interconnectedness to all things.
Noting this interrelatedness runs throughout the dissertation, and while Anzaldúa does
not call this interrelatedness to all persons and things, “God,” she does invoke the
language of Spirits. I believe this might point to a type of Animist thinking in Anzaldúa.
Important here is noting the radical interconnectedness.
Following the relationship between the finite modes and the one substance,
Spinoza continues with “P10: The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of
man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.”190 Man, according to Spinoza, is
a finite ‘thing’ and an extension of the one substance.
Dem.: For the being of substance involves necessary existence (by IP7).
Therefore, if the being of substance pertained to the essence of man, then
substance being given, man would necessarily be given (by D2), and
consequently man would exist necessarily, which (by A1) is absurd.191
Spinoza theorized about extended substance. There is just one extended substance, “not
the totality of matter, but the totality of everything that is extended.”192 If what lies
beyond the edges of the material world is something, then it is part of extended
substance. Space is an example of this.
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Spinoza’s theory of substance and matter is much more mathematical and logical
than dynamic. An example of this is found on the first page of Spinoza’s Ethics in his
definitions “Of God” and demonstrated in geometric order. He says, “By substance I
understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept
does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.”193 Spinoza
referred to the Principle of Sufficient Reason that each fact and each thing that exists has
an explanation.194 Logically unfolding in geometric order, Spinoza’s theory of substance
is not energized with the evolving reality of nature, something that I think New
Materialists read into Spinoza’s work. Later interpretations of Spinoza suggest that the
infinite aspect of substance is an expression of matter as active in its becoming, and
bodies are material reality as a result of matter’s becomingness.195
Spinoza uses the term “man” to build his theory of the body; this should not be
confused with the more modernized “self” or “selfhood.” “Man” for Spinoza is both mind
and body, and is an extension of Spinoza’s indeterminate being, and part of the sum; man
or body is material. A body is similar in material quality as a pebble, for example, in that
pebbles and bodies are comprised of the same material. “Matter is everywhere the same,
and parts are distinguishable in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be qualitatively
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various, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, not really.”196 Furthermore,
expressions or attributes exist in substance as “particulars in the universe,” and are
conceived or constituted through the substance. Axiom number seven illustrates this.
“A7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve
existence.”197 Substance for Spinoza is God (or an indeterminate being), because
substance is conceived through itself and should not be considered an expression. “One
substance cannot be produced by another substance.”198
The limitation I see in Spinozist thought is that matter is mechanistic in his
philosophy, not existing as dynamic. Matter in Spinoza unfolds logically and
mechanically, seen most clearly in the geometric order of his Ethics. This is important for
my research as it allows the body to be a unified reality, not existing as separate and
unequal parts. Though Spinoza’s philosophy does not exist along a dynamic matrix, I
find value in his monism and philosophical thinking. Later philosophers and critical
theorists take up Spinoza as an important figure for their philosophical practice. Among
these are Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz, Gilles Deleuze, and others.
The dynamism that is important to me allows for the animated reality of matter,
which is always becoming. Spinoza’s mechanistic philosophy does not incorporate the
vital becoming of conatus that is discussed earlier. Though conatus has a particular telos
for Spinoza, conatus allows for a dynamic reality of becoming. If we can insert
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dynamism into Spinoza’s thought by way of feminist theory or queer theory, though
thoroughly material, the body that then is seen is a dynamic body existing along a matrix
of becomingness.
With the body in Spinozist thought being an important element to understanding
materiality, I now wish to attend to a more phenomenological account of the body that
gives weight to my intuition of Anzaldúa’s work being the work of material
phenomenology; hence, I turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work in Phenomenology of
Perception199 and The Visible and the Invisible.200
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Husserl and Heidegger largely influenced Mauric Merleau-Ponty, a 20th-century
phenomenologist. The discipline of phenomenology is most often defined as the study of
the structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of
“phenomena” (in opposition to the Kantian noumena). These phenomena are appearances
of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things,
thus the meanings things have in our experience; another way to say this is that the
phenomena are the perceptions we have of things/objects. Phenomenology studies
conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view,
and this is highlighted in Merleau-Ponty’s work. This field of philosophy distinguished
from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy, which are important to this
199
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dissertation: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of
knowledge), and ethics (the study of actions in the world).
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre,
among others, launched the historical movement of phenomenology as a philosophical
tradition in the first half of the 20th century. In that movement, the discipline of
phenomenology was well respected as the “proper foundation of all philosophy.”201 In
this study of phenomenology, I take Merleau-Ponty’s work to be the overwhelming
example of a phenomenological accounting of the body. His work skillfully combines
ontology, epistemology, and ethical frameworks; this solidifies his phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty is important to understanding the body in materially
phenomenological terms. In his work, he neither seeks to privilege a body over mind, nor
theorizes either of them into a unified theory, as is seen in Spinoza. Instead, it is evident
that he “exploits the concepts of experience and perception in order to illustrate that the
body is never either a subject or an object, mind or body, transcendental or immanent.”202
Furthermore, the production of knowledge that is located in the body and experienced
through the world is accessed through the relational forces that could be called the
accumulation of material (body) for Merleau-Ponty. He seeks to address the experience
of the body and the way that the body shapes experience. In The Visible and the Invisible,
Merleau-Ponty writes about a unique relationship that body shares with the world and
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other things by using the language of perception and appearance. When the body, which
is decidedly singular for Merleau-Ponty, looks out to the world, there is an awakening to
the world, where the body and the world congeal in perception.
We can effect the passage by looking, by awakening to the world; we
cannot witness it as spectators. It is not a synthesis; it is a metamorposhis
by which the appearances are instantaneously stripped of a value they
owed merely to the absence of a true perception. Thus in perception we
witness the miracle of a totality that surpasses what one thinks to be its
conditions or its parts, that from afar holds them under its power, as if they
existed only on its threshold and were destined to lose themselves in it.
But if it is to displace them as it does, it is necessary that perception
maintain in its depth all their corporeal ties: it is by looking, it is still with
my eyes that I arrive at the true things, with these same eyes that a
moment ago gave me nonocular images—now they simply function
together and as though for good. Thus the relation between the things and
my body is decidedly singular: it is what makes me sometimes remain in
appearances, and it is also what sometimes brings me to the things
themselves; it is what produces the buzzing of appearances, it is also what
silences them and casts me fully into the world.203
For Merleau-Ponty, flesh becomes the category by which a phenomenological
account of the body emerges. I suggest that flesh is tied to the ontological category of
Being and is decidedly relational. I pick up this ontological thread later, but I mention it
here to establish the inter-weaving categories of epistemology and ontology that are
central for Merleau-Ponty. Meleau-Ponty’s theory of the body suggests that the body is
the primary site of knowing the world, which is a corrective to the philosophical tradition
of placing consciousness as the source of knowledge. Merleau-Ponty situates the body as
the primary site of knowledge that is connected to the body’s ‘being’ in the world. This is
important to note, since the idea of bodily knowing is primary for Anzaldúa, and her
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epistemology privileges the body as both a site for knowledge production and an
epistemic mode. Merleau-Ponty furthermore writes that the body and that which it
perceives cannot be disentangled from each other. In this way, both flesh and body
(connective materials) become a type of ‘indirect’ ontology for Merleau-Ponty that is tied
to the category of Being. The body becomes the flesh of the world for Merleau-Ponty.204
I argue that this entanglement elucidates a type of stratified relationality between bodies,
materiality, and the world. As such, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
account of the body creates an opening for a “material phenomenology.” The creative
opening that I see in Merleau-Ponty’s work is that he does not pursue the body as an
object like other things, but rather the body is the condition through which it is possible
to have relations with objects, which Merleau-Ponty indicates is the world.205 While
medical anatomy exists for the training of future doctors, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is
not a potential object for the study of science, but rather a permanent condition of
experience, a constituent of perpetual openness to the world. This changes the way in
which we understand the world. The world is no longer a collection of determinate
things; the world is a ‘horizon’ that is “latent in all of our experiences.”206 The body’s
relation(s) with the world is not the result of cause and effect, but rather the result of
meaning(s). This cannot be adequately explained by either psychology or physiology.
This apparent relationship of body with world further unmasks the inherent relationality
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in Merleau-Ponty’s writing that cannot be paired with brute matter, but rather with the
becomingness of a material reality that is both body and world. What this translates into
is that the body’s relations is not the result of cause and effect, but is the result of
meanings—meanings that cannot be explained by either psychology or physiology.207 A
key implication is that the individual body cannot be conceived in terms of atomistic and
bounded entity, meaning that Merleau-Ponty’s body may be more than a corporeal being,
an objective thing existing in the world. Merleau-Ponty’s body is not neatly divided off
from the world. One cannot stand outside of one’s body; the body is the vehicle through
which one’s experiences come into being. “Our relationships with objects, and with our
own bodies, are always partial; we cannot know them absolutely.”208
Merleau-Ponty’s work, though unfinished due to his sudden death, provides for
scholars a creative opening to consider the body, particularly its materiality, from a
phenomenological perspective. I make this claim, because the body for Merleau-Ponty is
a material becoming, perceiving and perceived. It is not an object that perceives, but
rather it is a perceiving perception in opposition to a thing or object that perceives. While
materiality studies focuses primarily on the thing-ness of matter and things, a MerleauPontian strategy concerning materiality, on one level, transcends this perspective and
offers us a ‘different’ way to engage materiality—by considering the phenomena of
relationality. It is important to quickly mention Deleuze to help illustrate difference. I
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suggest Merleau-Ponty’s difference is in this sense a reference to Deleuze’s use of
difference, which is not diversity:
Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by
which the given is given…. Difference is not phenomenon but the
noumenon closest to the phenomenon...Every phenomenon refers to an
inequality by which it is conditioned….Everything which happens and
everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences:
differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of
intensity.209
This quote shows that far from focusing on the phenomena, the appearances given in
human experience, Deleuze creates an ontology that reaches out to the mind-independent
processes (nuomena), giving rise to these appearances in the first place. This concept of
difference being associated with Phenomenology is important as my argument develops
along the lines of an expressed difference at the intersection of Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze,
and Anzaldúa. I reference the word difference here to bring attention to the complexity of
the ways materiality can be interpreted and understood.210 What Merleau-Ponty’s theory
of the body/phenomenology of the body does is create a network-like organ that is
fundamentally relational.
A phenomenological account of the body, as I understand it, is the ability to
recognize the relational networks (or inherent inter-relatedness) that help constitute the
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body, or what I am calling “an enfleshed reality.”211 It is also the ability to recognize the
depth of one’s experience that is relative to the body as a material thing in and of itself.
The body, constitutive of material, is not an object, but rather is the condition by which it
is able to perceive and a subject that is perceived; the body creates the context for a
relationship with other objects, visible and invisible. Said differently, this
phenomenological accounting of (a) body is both immanent and transcendent, visible and
invisible, and is networked within a relational context. Immanence in Merleau-Ponty
refers to the reality that the body exists in every part of the universe but is also different
(not detached) from the universe. Likewise, visible and invisible are synonyms for
transcendence and immance, sometimes intertwining at the same time. At the end of the
chapter on “The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility” in the Primacy of
Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes,
Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning,
which is not the work of a universal-constituting consciousness, a meaning
which clings to certain contents. My body is the meaningful core which
behaves like a general function, and which, nevertheless, exists and is
susceptible to disease.212
The body is not substance material; it is material and inter-related with all ‘things,’ and a
material becoming. Spinoza would liken this to the difference between a pebble and a
body; they are comprised of the same substance, but different finite modes of the same
single-matter substance. The body is different from the ground on which it stands, while
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it is of this composite material of the ground. Being different from the ground on which it
stands does not negate the relationship the body has with the ground; it simply indicates
that the body is a different composite material than what the ground’s composite material
is, while also derived from the same single matter substance. This is not to suggest that
the human body transcends the ground; rather, the point here is that the body enfleshes a
particular experience that is relative to relational networking over against a body being
consumed by the language and discourse that supports it.. The body is connected to the
ground’s composite material, since the body and the ground come from the same single
matter substance. It is in this sense that the body is a subject that connects to and with the
ground on which it stands and experiences knowledge by living in one’s body.
An example of this is when Merleau-Ponty writes about a hand being touched and
touching. The hand is simultaneously touching and being touched. He writes,
My left hand is always on the verge of touching my hand touching the
things, but I never reach coincident; the coincidence eclipses at the
moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my
right hand really passes over tho the rank of touched, but then its hold on
the world is interrupted: or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do
not really touch it—my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand
only its outer covering.213
This, I think, serves as an example of how the body is both subject and object, perceiver
and that which is perceived. The act of being touched and touching exists on the same
axis of being, relying on the relationship of both subject and object and the material body
that is both perceiving and is perceived by itself or an other. This example elucidates the
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phenomenon of materiality in Merleau-Ponty. He continues to show what I think is a
materially inflected body by writing about his voice and his hand, all in relationship with
one another, including the world. He writes,
Likewise, I do not hear myself as I hear the others, the sonorous existence
of my voice is for me as it were poorly exhibited; I have rather an echo of
its articulated existence, it vibrates through my head rather than outside. I
am always on the same side of my body; it presents itself to me in one
invariable perspective. But this incessant escaping, this impotency to
superpose exactly upon one another the touching of the things by my right
hand and the touching of this same right hand by my left hand, or to
superpose, in the exploratory movements of the hand, the tactile
experience of a point and that of the “same” point a moment later, or the
auditory experience of my own voice and that of other voices—this is not
a failure. For if these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away
at the very moment they are about to rejoin, if there is always a “shift,” a
“spread,” between them, this is precisely because my two hands are part of
the same body, because it moves itself in the world, because I hear myself
both from within and from without.214
Merleau-Ponty does not develop an immaterial body; it is a lived body and one
that I consider enfleshed (or corporeal in his language). I utilize the language of
enfleshment as a way to talk about the relationality that is inherent with the material
body, knowledge production, and nature.
The perceiving mind is an incarnated body. I have tried….to re-establish
the roots of the mind in its body and in its world, going against the
doctrine which treats perception as a simple result of the action of external
things on our body as well as against those which insist on the autonomy
of consciousness. These philosophies commonly forget—in favor of a
pure exteriority or of a pure interiority—the insertion of the mind in
corporeality, the ambiguous relation with our body, and correlatively, with
perceived things….And it is equally clear that one does not account for the
facts by superimposing a pure contemplative consciousness on a thing-like
body….Perceptual behavior emerges….from relations to a situation and to
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an environment which are not merely the working of a pure, knowing
subject….215
While Merleau-Ponty develops a phenomenology of the body as something that is
not merely object or subject, but rather an object to others and a subject in relation to
other objects, this body is
my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all
information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated. It is
through the body that the world of objects appears to me; it is in virtue of
having/being a body that there are objects for me.216
Merleau-Ponty reflects from classical psychology an accounting of the body as
something distinct from what is defined as an object—an argument that supports his
negative claim that the body is not an object:
Classical Psychology stated that my body is distinguishable from the table
or the lamp in that I can turn away from the latter whereas my body is
constantly perceived. It is therefore an object which does not leave me.
But in this case is it still an object?….An object is an object only insofar
as it can be moved away from me, and ultimately disappear from my field
of vision. Its presence is such that it entails a possible absence. Now the
permanence of my body is entirely different in kind….It defies exploration
and is always presented to me from the same angle. Its permanence is not
the permanence in the world, but a permanence from my point of
view….Insofar as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be
neither seen nor touched. What prevents it ever being an object, ever being
“completely constituted,” is that it is that by which there are objects. It is
neither tangible nor visible insofar as it is that which sees and touches.217
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Merleau-Ponty distinctly situates the body in time and space, but outside objective
elements in stating that the body is “distinguishable” from objects. In situating the body
in time and space, Merleau-Ponty elucidates the ways in which the body has relations in
time and space and makes the case for the way in which the body has relations with
objects, but is, in fact, not an object:
Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. It applies
itself to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move
about we do not move the body as we move an object. We transport it
without instruments as if by magic, since it is ours and because, through it,
we have access to space. For us the body is much more than an instrument
or a means; it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our
intentions218
What this tells us is that we inherit or engage (perhaps grasp and touch) other things, like
space, through our enfleshed reality, or ‘bodily situation.’219 What a relationship to space
does for our enfleshed situation/reality is highlight the interconnectedness of a bodily
perception, our experience of the world. This experience or phenomenon is, for MerleauPonty, strictly located in the body.220 It could be said that the body is an expansive space.
Not in the sense of space being something that is neutral or the flattening out of relations,
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but an ever expanding and contracting bodily reality, that is fleshy, visible and invisible
in and through the world, that which is both (a) perception and perceived.
What Merleau-Ponty provides us in Phenomenology of Perception, The Primacy
of Perception, and then also in The Visible and the Invisible is a detailed analysis of the
body in phenomenological terms. A strength I see in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body
is how tightly related the body is with the horizon of the world, an experience that is
latent in each body. This experience, latent in each body, is also a material reality that
finds alliances with material elements: bodies and other material things. A possible
limitation with Merleau-Ponty’s body is not material enough and reduced to perception—
that to have a body is to perceive and to experience, not to materially become
simultaneously with materiality. With the body being materially rich in
phenomenological terms, it is important to consider one more philosophical
understanding of bodies, and I do that by considering the work of Gilles Deleuze.
Gilles Deleuze
Deleuze’s body is an accounting of the body as different-in-itself, and he invokes
the speciated divide—that bodies are not limited to the humanist orientation or definition
of body. He talks about animal bodies on the same plane as human bodies. I suggest that
Deleuze ascribes the body as difference-in-itself. “Difference in itself” is the difference
freed from identities seen as metaphysically primary. Throughout philosophy, difference
is conceived of as an empirical relation between two terms each of which has a prior
identity of its own (an example of this is “x is different from y”). This Deleuzian
designation (difference-in-itself) helps further locate the body in a materially rich
phenomenology without reducing it to mere perception, a limitation I see in the work of
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Merleau-Ponty. The Deleuzian interrogation of the separation of form and matter (a
critique of Plato and Platonic ideals) casts a particular light onto the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty; it necessarily portrays a body that is rooted in its own visibility of
difference. It is this body—a body enfleshed in difference-in-itself—that connects with
what I reference as Anzaldeleuzian bodies (to be discussed later).
Deleuze challenges all that has been mentioned previously, and especially
challenges any notion of the body as a bounded corporeality “endowed with an origin,
interiority and death,”221 which is often how feminist philosophy refers to bodies.
Deleuze also challenges Merleau-Ponty’s theory that the body is reduced to mere
perception. The body, for Deleuze, is not a unified entity, nor is it organized around a
central governor. The body is not simply a Cartesian ‘thinking thing’ nor is it simply a
brain. It is not defined by intentionality, biology or by a psyche. With regard to the ways
in which the body is theorized and especially in contrast to Merleau-Ponty who wrote that
the world is the perception of the body, he also indicates that the world is a collection of
meaning; however, the body for Deleuze,
is not a property of the subject, nor is it an expression of subjectivity. It is
not a locus of meaning. Indeed, a body is not to be deciphered or
interpreted at all. Instead, the convergences between bodies (whether they
be human or non-human, organic or not, natural or artificial) are there to
be made and surveyed: mapped. For Deleuze is a cartographer, who
situates all bodies on the same, flat, ontological plane (the plane of
immanence), and defines them by what he calls longitude and latitude.222
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Deleuze draws on Spinoza but recalculates Spinoza’s understanding of the body by using
Henri Bergson and his reformulation of time and duration. Deleuze and argues that a
body must be understood not in terms of a form or function, but with reference instead to
its relations of speed and slowness (longitude), and to what it can do, by its capacity to
affect and to be affected (latitude).
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate
substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it
fulfills. On the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by a longitude
and a latitude: in other words the sub total of the material elements
belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and
slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of
at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and
local movements, differential speeds. The credit goes to Spinoza for
calling attention to these two dimensions of the Body, and for having
defined the plane of Nature as pure longitude and latitude. Latitude and
longitude are the two elements of a cartography.223
The body for Deleuze, is determined by the longitudinal and latitude, only. The
relationship of move and rest, speed and slowness and its affective capability make up the
body for Deleuze. Furthermore, the body becomes on a plan of Nature for Deleuze; it is a
cartography. Deleuze understands bodies in terms of process, and the body’s process of
materialization is not highly constrained by language, as it is in Butler’s work (to be
discussed in the next chapter). “A body is not a ‘thing,’ but a becoming, a series of
processes, movements, intensities and flows. It is a mobile assemblage224 of connections
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which might be extended, but which might equally be severed.”225 I find this to be an
exciting aspect of Deleuze’s ethology.226 I borrow the term “ethology” from Deleuze to
highlight the speciated divine inherent in Deleuze’s thinking about bodies and their
materialization. Noting this as important and exciting, identifiable in this posthumanist
sense, Deleuze’s use of ethology recalculates our norms regarding bodies. In Deleuze’s
thinking, using Spinoza, ethology also defines bodies by their longitude: the total sum of
extensive qualities or molecular kinetics, relations of motion and rest, speed and
slowness. Because to define a body by it affective capacities means that ‘you do not
know beforehand of what good or bad you are capable; you do not know beforehand
what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter.’227 The phrase “in a given
encounter” is important here in understanding Deleuze’s body, because what the body

strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification.
Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the
contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds constitutes an assemblage. A
book is an assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable. It is a multiplicity—but we don't know yet
what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the status of the
substantive. On side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless make it a kind of organism,
or signifying totality, or determination attributable to a subject; it also has a side facing a body without
organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities or
circulate, and attributing to itself subjects what it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an
intensity... Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never
has been,” (3-4). The book, as described above, is a jumbling together of discrete parts or pieces that is
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does not prevent it from containing assemblages within itself or entering into new assemblages with
readers, libraries, bonfires, bookstores, etc.” Taken from http://www.rhizomes.net/issue5/poke
/glossary.html, accessed on February 13, 2014.
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does and when the body acts will always depend upon its relations with the world, which
means the interactions with other boundaries of bodies. These actions and encounters are
necessarily contingent.228 A key understanding of Deleuze’s body that differs from
Merleau-Ponty is the language of boundaries relative to bodies. Boundaries (here, I
understand boundary to be part of a deterritorialized material body) are part of the ways
in which bodies continue to materialize along an axis or plane of consistency.
What these thinkers help do is illustrate the body as a material reality, and it is
Anzaldúa who creates the path for these bodies to be dynamic and exist along a matrix of
becominingness. The materiality of bodies is central to reframing bodies in an age of
machines and technology. We must work to reclaim the materiality of bodies and their
dynamism to help ensure new modes of theorizing and ethical practices, those modes of
being and becoming, become part of our commitments.
The Body as Material Reality
The body, as I understand it, is composite material, an amalgamation of material
and relations that allow it to become. From a scientific perspective, combining two or
more materials, often ones that have very different properties, makes a composite
material. The two materials work together to give the composite unique properties.
However, within the composite you can easily tell the different materials apart as they do
not dissolve or blend into each other; relations of materials exist and evolve into a new
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material being or reality. Natural composites exist in both animals and plants. Wood is a
composite and is made from long cellulose fibers (a polymer) held together by a much
weaker substance called lignin, though I do not suggest that there are two substances that
are weak and strong. The classification of “weaker substance” is part of the Cartesian
influence in the natural sciences. Another example is that cellulose is also found in
cotton, but without the lignin to bind it together it is much weaker—a different type of
material. The two weak “substances” – lignin and cellulose – together form a much
stronger one, perhaps unifying the two “weaker substances” into one unified and single
matter substance. The bone in the human body is also a composite. It is made from a hard
but brittle material called hydroxyapatite (which is mainly calcium phosphate) and a soft
and flexible material called collagen (which is a protein). Collagen is also found in hair
and fingernails. On its own it would not be much use in the skeleton but it can combine
with hydroxyapatite to give bone the properties that are needed to support the body.229 I
suggest the body is composite material by reflecting on Spinoza at with the
pheonomenology of Merleau-Ponty. This composite material is visible to the body, itself,
and also invisible because of the relationship of transcendence and immanence the body
shares with Nature. The visibility of the body and the innate or inherent capacity for
experience helps further materiality in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body.
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The body, comprised of matter, is a relational composite becoming material, an
amalgamation of “lines of forces” interacting with energy and matter all becoming parts
of relational processes. The body is situated as a very peculiar type of relationally
composite material in a world where there are many expressions of either one substance
or expressions of multiple substances. For the purposes of this project, I will take a
modified monist approach, influenced largely by Rosi Braidotti, a feminist Deleuzian
scholar. The reclamation of Spinoza to think of the mind-body parallelism in
contradistinction to the overwhelming influence of Cartesian dualism is the trajectory of
this project. The materiality of the body as seen in what I name as the spirit-inflected
materiality of Gloria Anzaldúa is the body as material reality.
The body as a material reality is a becoming relationality that is a becoming
material reality. It is a particular phenomenon that resides along a plane of becomingness.
A relational material phenomenological accounting of the body corresponds to
Anzaldúa’s theory of the body, and particularly its mestizaje-ness and the new mestiza
consciousness. A material phenomenology is located primarily in the body, an enfleshed
human subject who perceives and is perceived, and whose condition of possibility is her
networked-ness or inter-relatedness to and with other objects. This body, understood in
an Anzaldúan framework, is a body that is connected to the multiple locations within el
fronterizo, a landscape that continuously alters her subjectivity and connections.
Anzaldúan bodies are materially networked within the borderlands as a result of these
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bodies’ struggles, and meet in the juncture of nepantla.230 I identify these bodily
experiences as being akin to nepantlism. This nepantlism231 conforms to ever challenging
and changing essence of one’s subjectivity, identified as the new mestiza, for Anzaldúa.
The relational networks or borderlands are linked to the body’s composite material; the
body transcends these borderlands, but the body is also linked to and with these
borderlands in a materially phenomenological manner.232
Conclusion: Bodies that Matter233
The four thinkers that were explored in this chapter have laid the foundation for
bodies to be thought of in terms of materiality, but not the dead matter that they often
ascribed to their understanding of materiality. Noting Anzaldúa’s definition of the
material universe as “not made up of things—it is only energy and lines of force
continuing to produce temporary forms that are in a state of continuous flow.” This form
of materiality energizes matter with a type of vibrancy and spirited life. Anzaldúa’s
materiality is what I term spirit-inflected materialism that exists along lines of force. This
is similar to Deleuze’s form of the body and the phenomenological imprint of Merleua230
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Ponty. As a way of further explaining bodies that matter in Anzaldúan terms and showing
the inherent relationship of the materiality of the body and interrelatedness of all things, I
quote, at length, part of a 2001 interview with Irene Lara in EntreMundos, a book
exploring new trajectories of the thought of Gloria Anzaldúa. This interview is pertinent
to this study of bodies and materiality, because it provides greater insight into Anzaldúa’s
interrelated thinking that exists as lines of forces throughout the world, and this also
speaks to Anzaldúa’s later thought. In the following quote, Irene Lara interviews
Anzaldúa, and asks her the following question:
How is the story where Prietita has an orgasm on the horse connected to
the spiritual?
GEA: It’s connected to energy, and energy is spiritual.
IL: How do you connect spirituality and sexuality with health? You also
talk about remembering Coyolxauqui in terms of health and holism. Do
you connect all of these?
Anzaldúa continues in the interview:
To me sexuality is creativity, symbolized by the kundalini serpent, when
energy rises through your energetic body in terms of the chakras and you
get this rush of feeling, eroticism, sexuality. For me, this is connected to
creativity, writing, making art, and also to sexuality, the needs of your
body, in terms of release. With an orgasm you release energy, you enable
energy to flow through your body rather than being blocked, and creativity
does that when you write a story or a book or whatever. It releases that
energy to flow; it flows out to your life. Spirituality does the same thing.
When I meditate, go for a walk, I can feel that energy. Creativity,
sexuality, and spirituality are all rooted in the body, so it comes down to
the body. The body grounds us to the earth. Everything goes through the
body–ideas, feelings, energy. I don’t know why people always separate
them out, but to me, they’re together. It’s part of nagualismo where, when
you dream, have an out-of-body experience, or your soul leaves your
body, your physical body se queda but then this other body pulls up
through the skin. In both the Prieta stories and the conocimiento essay I
talk about out-of-body or near-death experiences. The body is not just
minerals, chemicals, bones, and skin; you also have the dream body. My
concept of consciousness, my sense of myself, no se para at my skin; it
extends outward, and if it extends then it also mingles with your
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consciousness, las de las flores, la del mar, la de los animales . . .
Consciousness is not local.
This is not just my idea although I’ve had this idea for a long time.
Modern science is only beginning to investigate consciousness, hope,
prayer, intention, y todas esas cosas. Consciousness is in everything even
though the level of consciousness varies. The consciousness of a flower is
not like my consciousness or the consciousness of a dog, yet chimpanzees,
monkeys, dogs, have a personal consciousness, an autobiographical
consciousness. I took this term from Antonio Damasio’s discussions of
“core consciousness,” “autobiographical consciousness,” and “extended
consciousness.” To me, extended consciousness is conocimiento, but I
didn’t know these guys were working on the same ideas.234
I insert part of this interview as a way to show the overwhelming connectedness of
materiality with bodies, for Anzaldúa. In many ways, this quote elucidates the manner in
which the body bodies itself, and ways that matter matters itself. This, I think is part of a
material phenomenological accounting of the body at the intersection of Deleuze,
Anzaldúa, and Merleau-Ponty. Each of these theories help negotiate the ongoing dialectic
of transcendence and immanence, fortifying a decidedly relationally material body whose
becoming is dependent on the ever-evolving reality of Nature.
In the next chapter I devote attention to three feminist thinkers’ accounting of the
body. I detail these thinkers’ theories in conversation with Anzaldúa and the New
Materialisms movement, a theory that has provided a substantial paradigm to think about
the materiality of bodies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECONFIGURING & REIMAGINING BODIES:
MATERIAL, DISCURSIVE, & DREAMBODIES
[A]ny identity is always riven with forces, with processes, connections,
movements that exceed and transform identity and that connect
individuals (human and nonhuman) to each other and to worlds, in ways
unforeseen by consciousness and unconnected to identity.
—Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside235
An integration. And the body is the bridge. That’s what I haven’t seen.
People don’t deal with the body, and yet they don’t deal with the spirit.
They deal with the head. The mind. [...] What I’d like to do is talk from the
body and also from these other realms.
—Interviews / Entrevistas236
The body has been theorized by many different feminist poststructuralist theorists
as a discursive reality. I wish to interrupt these theories and interpretations by rethinking
the body in material terms. In thinking about the materiality of the body and mattering
bodies (both of which I develop in this project and are interchangeable), the four thinkers
discussed in chapter five generate new theoretical openings to further consider the work
of the feminist theorists that are also a part of the New Materialist movement in some
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way. 237 Not each of the thinkers I mention in this chapter is part of the New Materialist
movement, but I bridge together the feminism that has charted the path for feminist new
materialists and their movement, while also pointing beyond the New Materialist
movement to bodies that materialize in Anzaldúa.
I begin this chapter by situating a discussion on the body and the way that the
body has been theorized in the work of various feminists; namely, Judith Butler, Susan
Bordo, and Rosi Braidotti. I end with a section on Anzaldúan bodies as a move to reclaim
that bodies matter and mattering bodies that are becoming. As a way through the varying
ways that materiality has been deployed, I bridge together Anzaldúa and Bennett’s
vibrant matter. Noting the theoretical framework of the New Materialists, I mention,
again, the work of Jane Bennett.238 While Bennett might very well be spirit-phobic and
her materiality something akin to entelechy or élan vital,239 Anzaldúa was an animist
emphasizing the plurality of realities; her materiality is spirit-inflected. This becomes
important as the dissertation develops around the idea of Anzaldúan materiality and
interrelatedness that recalculates the ways in which knowledge is produced and accessed
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within a materially rich register, such as the body. A spirit-inflected materiality is also
important, because the bodily materiality for which I advocate matters, has meaning;
hence, bodies that matter are engaged in the entanglement of bodily knowing and bodily
mattering in this world. Spirit relative to matter, as it applies to Anzaldúa, helps illustrate
the plurality of life that is generated and generating with matter in its becoming material.
This should signal a turn away from the body being an apparatus for scientific knowledge
only or reducing bodies to discursive norms, only.
Noting the use of certain terms and theoretical ‘camps’ I follow, I draw a deeper
attention to the New Materialism movement as the source of my thinking about both
materiality and bodies. Certainly, Lucretius and Spinoza are important interlocutors, but
the New Materialist thinkers provide an opening to re-enter the discussion of feminism
that supersedes the theory that has proliferated among white feminists. Sure, the New
Materialists engage the question of race explicitly, but their discourse has included
people of color from the start of the movement, so this discourse is not, as I see it, a
particularly whitening of matter or materiality studies, but an ever-widening attempt to
de-biologize race in material terms. To tie together the philosophy and history from the
previous chapter to this chapter, I start with Bennett as a way to keep materialism at the
fore and bodies in close proximity to the material becoming that is bodily.
Where Spinoza details a theory that elucidates a purposeful being (or God) as the
“force” of the substance, Bennett uses the term entelechy to account or “name a force or
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an agency that is naturalistic but never fully spatialized, actualized, or calculable.”240 I
mention this now because the materialism that Bennett seeks, which “eschews the lifematter binary and does not believe in God or spiritual forces, nevertheless also
acknowledges the presences of an indeterminate vitality.”241 While important in my own
formation, this intentional obfuscation of a spiritual reality is not parallel with Anzaldúan
bodies. This entelechy is an animated force for Bennett, but Anzaldúa prefers a much
more spirit-inflected materiality, which ties together her being in the world, knowing in
the world, and acting in the world to and with material bodies that are on a planetary
scale. This fiercely networked system of bodies and becoming create a path of
understanding the body akin to Karen Barad’s terms of ‘intra-active’ and becoming. It is
because of this fiercely networked relational and spirit-inflected materiality that bodies
matter in the world, create meaning, and are interrelated with all matter and things. A
fiercely networked system of bodies is the proliferation of matter becoming different in
the world, a becoming that is transformative.242 Take, for example, the human body. The
human body contains many other bodies inside of it, matter that is woven together to
make different systems, all networked together to create the human body. I suggest
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matter and bodies are networked together in a relationality that illustrates a network of
togetherness, a becoming.
The materiality of the body, following the pattern that was explored in the
previous chapter, creates a framework for considering the ways in which relationality and
material bodies exist, and are intertwined with one another. This entanglement of bodily
relational material creates a larger framework for bodies to contribute meaning in the
world, not be reduced to mere perception of the world. The relationality that is inherent in
the work of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty gives greater support for my own impulse to
read a type of dynamism into the work of Spinoza. I recognize this is a later interpretation
of Spinoza’s work, but it nonetheless is present, especially in the work of the New
Materialists, particularly in Braidotti’s work, among others. I believe Deleuze follows a
certain reading of Spinoza that may reach back to Herder.243
Given that I support a type of material reality that is motivated by a relational
composite framework, I think it is important to note that this “body” becomes a body
through its relational processes, which are networked with the “lines of forces” existing
within and on an axis of becoming. The material reality of the body, comprised of a
single matter substance, further becomes a material reality due to the connections with
other bodies residing on the plane of Nature.
This chapter details feminist theorists’ use of the body. In a similar way to the
previous chapter, I trace three feminist thinkers in order to show the resonances and
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disconnections of material bodies. I conclude by critically and constructively moving
beyond these feminists toward a more plural reality seen in Anzaldúa’s work. To recap,
the first three chapters seek to fortify my position on materialism, then I bridge together
the materiality of the body by showing the historical philosophy from which
contemporary philosophers borrow and ways that this history points to the monism that is
under-recognized in Anzaldúa. These chapters also provide a path of understanding that
materiality is dynamic, not embedded with language, or co-constituted with language, as
we will see in Butler. The fifth chapter provides a genealogy of the body through the
lenses of philosophy, in particular that complicated work of Spinoza’s deterministic and
mechanistic philosophy and the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I make an
additional move to include Deleuze, though I recognize the baggage of phenomenology
that he and his followers discuss and the complications of these intersections, but I think
these intersections are rich with a dynamic expression of bodies that later influence
feminist writing. This present chapter shows the failed materiality of Judith Butler and
her reliance on a type of performative materiality that is discursively constituted from
iterative practices through / by privileging language over materiality.
An accounting of the body through the previous four thinkers clarifies bodies as
material, relationally intertwined, and material that perpetually is in process with other
material realities.244 I suggest working in the intersection of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze
to arrive at borderland bodies, an account that points toward Anzaldúan bodies as plural
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material subjects, animated by material “lines of forces.” A Deleuzian material
phenomenological accounting of the body corresponds to Anzaldúa’s theory of the body,
and particularly its mestizaje-ness and the new mestiza consciousness. Anzaldúa defines
matter in this way in her notes from 1999: “The material universe is not made up of
things—it is only energy and lines of force continuing to produce temporary forms that
are in a state of continuous flow.”245 Noting this definition of Anzaldúa’s materiality
fortifies my own impulses to bridge together Deleuze with Anzaldúa, a rhizomatic
becoming where their differences create a new material reality. I see Merleau-Ponty as
being particularly important, too, since his body is not an object in the world, but rather a
perspectival experience that materially negotiates other lines of forces. I see this as an
Anzaldeleuzian246 material phenomenology.
An Anzaldeleuzian material phenomenology elucidates247 an understanding of the
body, an enfleshed plural mobile subject who perceives and is perceived, and whose
condition of possibility is her networked-ness or inter-relatedness to and with other
subjects and objects,248 residing on flat ontological terrain that is always becoming.249
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The idea of becoming for both Anzaldúa and Deleuze is a turn to the futurity of an
interrelated universe. Instead of a focus on the static ontological idea of being,
Anzaldúa’s idea of becoming is an ontological turn and connected with bodies as that
which are becoming. This body, understood in this modified phenomenological
framework, is a body that is connected to the multiple locations within el fronterizo, a
mosaic horizon that continuously alters her subjectivity and connections, and does so
relationally. Anzaldeleuzian bodies are fiercely networked within the borderlands as a
result of these bodies’ struggles, and meet in the juncture of nepantla.250 I mention
nepantla as a way to illustrate the space of becoming, which I will outline in my
conclusion. But, nepantla is the space of neither/nor and both/and, and the space of
always shifting and becoming, simultaneously. This is a material space of becoming
which is transformative. I identify these bodily experiences as being akin to material
nepantlism. This material nepantlism251 conforms to ever challenging and changing
essence of one’s subjectivity, identified as the new mestiza, for Anzaldúa. This form of
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subjectivity holds the tolerance for ambiguity and compensates for the cycle of difference
and repetition that is inherent to nepantla. The relational networks or borderlands are
linked to the body’s composite material; the body transcends these borderlands, but the
body is also linked to and with these borderlands in a materially phenomenological
manner.252 The Anzaldúan body is an entanglement of materiality that spans ontology,
epistemology, and ethics negotiating ‘lines of forces’ in its own relational networked
becoming.253
Understanding the Body
As noted in the previous chapter, there are several other ways one can understand
the body stemming from philosophy. Psychoanalysis is yet another example of the ways
that the body is constituted by language and consciousness. For example, in the Mirror
Stage of Jacques Lacan, the body is in bits, until one looks at his/her image in the mirror.
At this moment, the body comes together becoming a unified mattering reality, affected
by relational processes. The body’s affect is its capacity to relate and change. The
postmodern epoch purported the body as (a) fragmented reality, and has rendered this
body unstable. This might be entirely the case that the body is unstable material and only
bits and pieces, but I shall argue for a mattering reality that is not a unified self, per se,
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but a self-organizing and self-transformative material reality that is dynamic in its
becoming. This argument has looked to Spinoza and Deleuze for a way to consider
materiality and also at Merleau-Ponty for a way in which a phenomenological approach
can be valuable. I have also leveraged the material relationality that I argue is seen in the
work of Gloria Anzaldúa, and when these four thinkers are braided together a different
contour of materiality emerges, and bodies literally become and become different in the
borderlands of thinking and thought. These bodies are becoming (an ontophenomenological turn), as this dissertation is comprised of the method of diffractive
thinking that resides along a “moving horizon, always from a decentered center, & from
an always displaced periphery.”254 Together, these thinkers help elucidate Anzaldúan
bodies that are plural, multiple, and different. I use Anzaldúa’s own body as a way to
illustrate this.
Moving through the above information helps further situate this chapter as the one
chapter where I bring together a materialist framework with varying theories of bodies.
This chapter holds the materiality of the body as primary point of departure and looks at
three feminist thinkers using philosophy in a manner that has constructed popular theories
of the body, though I will argue that two of these thinkers’ attempt to use materiality is
actually a failed materiality. The three thinkers are: Judith Butler, Susan Bordo, and Rosi
Braidotti.
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It is important to note that Butler is influenced by Foucault’s work, particularly
from The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) to The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1976).
It is namely Foucault’s work on the relationship between knowledge, discourse, and
power that has influenced Butler, but Butler ignores central features of the Foucaultian
project, such as genealogy, concepts of technology, and strategy.255 Foucault’s project
helps solidify Butler’s own work on performativity and analyzing the body through terms
of social norms and repression; I believe this is how she is able to construct a discursive
body against the more material body that is seen in feminist theory of sexual difference.
Furthermore, Butler utilizes a Hegelian framework to do this work and draws on a
particular definition of becoming that is not associated with the definition of becoming in
feminist theory of sexual difference or Deleuzian feminism. This definition of becoming
(German: Werden), as described in Mikko Tuhkanen’s essay “Queer Hybridity,”256 is the
term on which her theory of performativity is built. This, he says, is “perhaps the single
most important concept for the institutional recognition of queer thinking.”257 Her later
work is a turn to what I term metaethics that engages the intersection of religion and
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politics in compelling ways. Butler’s work has dominated some segments of the fields of
feminist and queer theory for years, instituting performativity as the primary means
through which bodies become.
The work of Bordo, likewise, has significantly dominated some of field within
feminist theory, and with Butler, has made a considerable impact on the ways in which
bodies relate with food.258 Bordo’s work, however, displaces materiality for the more
popular linguistic turn in feminist studies, and her materiality is only materiality in name.
I think these two theorists elucidate a failed materiality relative to feminism and bodies.
As a way of showing a more productive materiality that is activated along an ontological
plane, I introduce Rosi Braidotti’s work. I find her feminist commitments and
philosophical expertise helpful when thinking about transcontextual and transdiscipinary
ways of doing scholarship. It is her materiality to which I pay careful attention, because
she reimagines Deleuze from a nomadic feminist standpoint. I also recognize there are
limitations in using Braidotti’s work. Namely, she writes from the Eurocentric center and
does not pay attention to issues of race (or other women of color who have theorized in a
similar manner). Though I recognize these limitations, I include Braidotti, nevertheless,
because of her insightful and skillful way of weaving together multiple disciplines with
strategic philosophical importance. I end with a section on Gloria Anzaldúa. Her theories,
which masterfully create plural realities recalculate both margin and center, and likewise
reimagine bodies along a moving horizon where “lines of forces” constitute their being
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and becoming. She poetically and philosophically writes from the displaced center, or
borderlands. As my primary interlocutor, Anzaldúa creates a way for her readers to
further engage the entanglement of ontology, epistemology, and ethics. I see this in her
last published essay, “Now Let Us Shift,” and argue that Anzaldúan materiality is the
entanglement of these three philosophical domains.259 Following the section detailing
feminist theory, I investigate difference at the intersection of Gilles Deleuze and Gloria
Anzaldúa. I utilize this thread of thinking to further push Anzaldúa’s thought and theory
regarding bodies and materiality beyond its logical end that helps further illustrate the
plurality and difference inherent in Anzaldúan bodies.
Sexual Difference as a Critique of Essentialism & Social Constructionism
The human body is comprised of material that indeed matters.260 Large segments
of feminist theory have battled this line of thinking throughout its history when it comes
to making sense of the body.261 Recently, some white feminist theorists have managed to
bring a mattering body to the fore, but women of color feminism have privileged bodies
in their analytic frameworks and theories since, some might argue, the beginning of their
development. With feminism theorizing against the overwhelming realities of misogyny
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and the oppressions of patriarchy, feminist theory (in some ways) lost the material body
as a doing and becoming in the world. The material body that feminist theory created was
a body that was an object in the world, inactive and largely discursively constituted. To
consider the mattering body in feminist theory, I suggest the theory of sexual difference
that is popular among European feminists. The feminist theory that is found in the
theories of sexual difference is an important theoretical move in the scope of burgeoning
feminist theory. There are several ‘feminist’ theorists one can consider when exploring
sexual difference: Luce Irigaray, Claire Colebrook, Rosi Braidotti, among others.262 I
suggest Rosi Braidotti as an important figure to consider when thinking about sexual
difference and the body. This ‘camp’ largely came from feminist theory influenced by
French Social Thought after May 1968.263 Braidotti’s work on sexual difference stems
from a Deleuzian sensibility of feminist theory. What this means is that feminist theory is
a theory of difference that is influenced by Deleuze’s recovery of Spinoza that includes a
notion of single matter substance.264
Sexual difference departs from both essentialism and social constructionism by
positively highlighting ‘difference’ as a way to reimage the materiality of the body, and
to be part of the feminist theorizing. For those who follow both sexual difference and
262
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Deleuzian feminism, this project argues, “that the political ontology of monism, which
Deleuze adapts from Spinoza, offers some relevant opportunities for feminist theory.”265
What the feminist theory of sexual difference focuses upon is not the Cartesian dualism,
but the mind-body parallelism, and an interrogation of the one substance: “an intelligent
flesh-mind-matter compound.”266 What this ‘one substance’ reveals is the process of
differentiation, in Deleuzian terms. Differentiation is the inevitable force and elaboration
of difference. Another way to say this is that the ‘one substance’ reveals the process of
becoming. Difference, the concept theorized by Henri Bergson and later picked up by
Gilles Deleuze, should be understood as having four primary facets:
1. difference presents itself as differences of nature; as such it is the object of
empirical intuition, the investigation of specific and irreducible differences,
natural articulations of the real, the ways in which the real divides itself (rather
than is divided by us) in its elaboration;
2. it functions through a force of internal difference; as such it in the internal
dynamic of open-endedness, ensuring that not only does it differ from itself, or
become, it also differs from everything ‘like’ it, everything with which it shares a
species or category, a resemblance. Thus species, or categories, modes of
resemblance, have their own inner dynamic, or ‘tendency’, a difference in nature;
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3. it operates or acts through degrees of difference; which entails that not only are
terms differentiated, but they are also linked through their different degrees of
actualization to tendencies and processes that are present everywhere but
expressed or actualized only in particular degrees (of contraction/dilation);
4. and its movement must always be understood as a process of differentiation,
division or bifurcation.267
The last of this list elucidates a movement that is always a process of differentiation,
division, or bifurcation.268 “Bodily differences are both a banality and a cornerstone in
the process of differentiation of variation.”269 This project highlights Spinoza’s idea of
the body, and its focus on the body as “intelligent matter.” The mind for Spinoza is
“embodied sensibility” and an object of the body. These are understood as mind-body
parallelism, and the feminist project of sexual difference bypasses the hazards of
essentialism altogether.270
The relational materiality of Spinoza-Deleuze-Merleau-Ponty creates a plane of
consistency when detailing the body as material reality, and one that matters. What is
oftentimes articulated in white feminist theory projects is not a material body, but a
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discursive body. I believe many feminist theorists draw on the discursive strategies of
poststructuralist thinking, in particular Foucault and Butler, when theorizing the
discursive body. Defining discourse in this way suggests that discourse is a way
of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of
subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and
relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and
producing meaning. They constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious
and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to
govern.271
And secondly, discourse is “... a form of power that circulates in the social field and can
attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance.”272 Recognizing these
definitions, it should be noted that discourse is a rather slippery notion in Foucault’s work
but at the most basic level he uses the term to refer to the material verbal traces left by
history. These traces that are left by history are not only discursive or reduced to
language, or linguistic patterns. These traces embody a level of materiality that has the
power to effect history. He also uses it to describe ‘a certain “way of speaking.”’273
Discourse in the Foucauldian sense dominated feminist theory, and a discursive
body emerged as the overwhelming understanding of bodies. In Butler’s 1993 Bodies
That Matter, she advances the discursive construction of the social field as a process of
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materialization of social norms through processes of repetitive citation of performative
actions; the reality that the repression and iteration of social norms constructed Butler’s
body (or materialized in her language). Here, the use of discourse is different from
Foucault’s historical composition, but nonetheless important to showing Butler’s focus
on the discursive construction of bodies, delimiting the active materiality and ongoing
materialization that foreground the linguistic turn.
Discursive strategies may be reduced to mere language, or discursive strategies
may, in fact, be the traces of history that affect the material bodies through relational
processes. I consider this latter way of reading Foucault as a material-discursive thinker
who contributes to the thinking that bodies matter in their historical composition. I
consider Foucault’s work on prisons and the ways that power shapes and forms the
material body by not only the power of language but also the institutionalized power of
policies, laws, and governmentality, to be important to his material-discursive work.
What has been significant for research on the body in feminist and queer circles is
the discursive turn, and its inadequacy; this style of research has dominated theories and
philosophies of the body which privilege language over bodily materiality and active
materialization.
To describe the materiality of the body as a construction in Butler's
theorizing, then, is not to resort to linguistic determinism or cultural
constructivism. We take it for granted, she notes, that somebody, or in
more recent formulations, something, (e.g. Culture, Discourse or Power),
does the act of constructing.274
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This is a perfect example of the ways in which the discursive body emerges in Butler’s
work; I call this a failed materiality. This author suggests that a ‘something’ formulates
the body, but these ‘somethings’ (culture, discourse, or power) are all rooted in language.
I wish to reimagine bodies in material terms and do this by showing the raw material that
is seen and developed by a variety of scholars (Barad, Braidotti, the new Materialism
movement, and Bennett).275 I argue that Gloria Anzaldúa advocates for a return to radical
material bodies, bodies that are human and more than human, materially connected in the
world, plural, and otherwise, and this ‘turn’ to materiality and bodies provides a
significant resource in analyzing bodies.276
As a way of illustrating the discursive turn, I begin by articulating bodies as seen
in the work of Susan Bordo and Judith Butler. I then detail bodies as seen in the work of
Rosi Braidotti, a Deleuzian feminist who incorporates the work of Gilles Deleuze and
Spinoza’s materiality into her work; this ‘turn’ yields a new material ‘turn’ in studies of
bodies. I believe there are parallels to Spinoza’s single substance monism and the radical
materiality that is seen in Anzaldúa, and therefore I situate Deleuze and Anzaldúa in
conversation with one another to expose the difference and differentiation in the dynamic
becoming material bodies that explores radical self-organizing and self-transformation as
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a result of becoming nepantler@.277 Anzaldúa has largely been understood as a literary
scholar, and her books are categorized as creative fiction in big box stores, like Barnes
and Noble.278 I believe that we should rethink our understanding of Anzaldúa as
mobilizing a particular style of philosophy whose roots are material. Exposing materiality
in this manner helps illustrate the deep philosophical commitments that Anzaldúa had
that have thus far been ignored in scholarly writing.279 I am hoping to reclaim the
philosophy of Anzaldúa in a way to further mobilize her thought and theory for enacting
radical social change and also to help develop the language of becoming and
interrelatedness that is already native to her work, which I believe is central to the task of
becoming as transformation.
Bodies in Bordo, Bulter, & Braidotti
There is an obvious split when one considers how the body is interpreted. That
“split,” though perhaps more apparent when engaging in the theories of Susan Bordo and
Judith Butler, is one that I want to mention as a way to navigate my interest in the
‘mattering’ body. In short, the split, which is highlighted in Bordo’s book Unbearable
Weight and Butler’s book Bodies that Matter, hinges on the ways in which these two
theorists understand women and the body, and their theories perpetuate their differences,
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and the differences are seen throughout feminist theory and feminist philosophy. This
well-known split has influenced the ways in which feminist theory has theorized about
bodies and has managed to avoid materializing bodies in their theories.280 Materiality has
functioned in particular ways in the theories of Bordo and Butler. Materiality has been
not an agential force of materialization but rather materiality has stemmed from Foucault
and Althusser, functioning as a historical composition where language and materiality are
embedded with one another. In this latter interpretation of materiality, bodies are fixed
categories where inscriptions of power and discourse are embedded; language and
materiality are intertwined, therefore not allowing materiality to be a dynamic relational
process. While I will detail this split to help move toward bodies as material reality, an
important addition must be noted: Gloria Anzaldúa. Following the short analysis detailing
Bordo and Butler’s differences and exploring the body relative to Rosi Braidotti, I will
point out the ways in which the body is materialized in Anzaldúa’s work, and how
Anzaldúa, herself, theorizes a material body, especially notable in her early work.281
I argue that Butler and Bordo purport to use a materially rich philosophy, but its
materialization is highly constrained by poststructualist thought and language, and both
of these thinkers’ point of departure relative to materiality is the interdependence of
materiality and language; I think this highlights a failed materiality in both thinkers that
in turn fortifies discursive bodies. Braidotti brings together Spinozist single matter
280
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substance and a theory of sexual difference that bridges together a type of dynamic
materialization that results in a body that is dynamically becoming where matter precedes
language; she roots her theory of becoming in a life that she calls Zoe.282 The dynamism
of Zoe privileges a theory of materiality as an active reality or active force in the world. It
is important to note that for Braidotti, materiality precedes language, but not in the same
way that materiality and language are embedded for Butler. I see materiality privileged in
the work of Braidotti, because this New Materialism is tied to ontology, whereas
materiality and language for Butler is part of the social construction of reality, not an
ontological reality. The work of Gloria Anzaldúa in conversation with Braidotti and
Deleuze bridges a type of assemblage thinking together on bodies and difference, a
materially structured ‘juncture’ or intersection that puts difference-in-action together with
material bodies.
Judith Butler
Perhaps it is Judith Butler who is famous for the phrase “bodies that matter.” She
did write an entire book on the “discursive limits of sex.” What is important in noting
Butler is her positioning the body as a ‘thing.’ She also seeks to show her readers that the
lived human body is comprised of material or matter, and she does this by deploying a
complex notion of bodies that are performatively constituted as matter. She argues bodies
matter, or count, for something, but her theory of materiality is highly constrained by her
use of language and poststructuralism (and the centering of the Subject). I argue that
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bodies do indeed matter in a decidedly materialistic way motivated by ongoingnetworked relational processes. I further suggest that bodies are texturized by discursive
markings, or moments when the body is ‘visited’ by discursivity. This might be similar to
Michel Foucault’s positing bodily inscriptions.283
Judith Butler writes in a decidedly poststructuralist and critical theory genre as a
feminist philosopher, and contributes to the burgeoning of feminist theory and feminist
philosophy. Butler’s work, like Bordo’s, is a cornerstone in feminist theory. What Butler
theorizes relative to bodies is focus on the construction of power relations and ways that
bodies (particularly, women’s bodies) have been exposed to relations that have been
detrimental to their flourishing. Butler’s work combines the critical analysis of
philosophy, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, and critical theory. She is often cited as an
initial contributor to the ever-evolving anti-disciplinary discipline of queer theory.284
Butler works at these critical intersections to contribute to the discourse concerning
women, largely conceived. Her theories of the body, however, yield a much more
discursive reality, than that of Bordo’s more “materialist” turn. Unlike Bordo’s use of
food relative to women’s bodies, Butler does not use any tangible elements when
theorizing the body. For example, Bodies that Matter suggests that there is nothing
outside language, and the hierarchy of materiality and language is a false hierarchy,
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because it is language that only exists. Judith Butler has shown the materiality of the
body is a construction that emerges out of a field of power that shapes its contours,
marking it with sex and gender, but this ‘marking’ or bodily texturizing is discursive,
which ultimately yields the body a passive site of materiality. She says,
the process of that sedimentation or what we might call materialization
will be a kind of citationality, the acquisition of being through the citing of
power, a citing that establishes an originary complicity with power in the
formation of the “I.”285
Butler points out that we need to rethink the very meaning of construction and the
grammatical structures that we use when we talk about construction. For her, it is “neither
a single act nor a causal process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed
effects. Construction takes place not only in time, but is itself a temporal process which
operates through the reiteration of norms.”286 To describe the materiality of the body as a
construction in Butler's theorizing, then, is not to resort to linguistic determinism or
cultural constructivism, or even essentialism or social constructivism. We take it for
granted, she notes, that somebody, or in more recent formulations, something, (culture,
discourse, or power), does the act of constructing. This illustrates what I consider to be
Butler’s failed materiality, hinging on a discursive construction of the body that is
constituted by outside affects (culture, discourse, or power), instead of finite materiality
extending from single matter substance.
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This radical difference between referent and signified is the site where the
materiality of language and that of the world which it seeks to signify are
perpetually negotiated. This might usefully be compared with MerleauPonty’s notion of the flesh of the world. Although the referent cannot be
said to exist a part from the signified, it nevertheless cannot be reduced to
it. That referent, that abiding function of the world, is to persist as the
horizon and the “that which” which makes its demand in and to language.
Language and materiality are fully embedded in each other, chiasmic in
their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another, i.e.,
reduced to one another, and yet neither fully ever exceeds the other.
Always already implicated in each other, always already exceeding one
another, language and materiality are never fully identical nor fully
different.287
This is again part of her failed materiality. It is failed because Butler constructs a
framework where language and matter are co-constitutive with one another and in this
framework, language precedes matter. Language is always before what is in the world;
this solidifies a failed materiality in my thinking. This is the case because I do not think
that Butler advocates for language as material, but rather that language precedes matter.
If language is material, then language is everything and this would conform to a monist
reality. While Butler ostensibly wrote a book concerning the material body in Bodies
That Matter, what is often reported about this text is that bodies are eclipsed by the
discursivity of her own work and her emphasis on the performative turn that is her
reformulation of Hegel’s Werden.288 To highlight yet another example of Butler’s failed
materiality that is found in Bodies That Matter is when she writes of the quality of
materiality. She writes about materiality as a particular type of quality and kind, but this
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qualitative statement concerning matter elucidates her emphasis on language and
linguistic dynamics that call matter into being.
But what then do we make of the kind of materiality that is associated with
the body, its physicality as well as its location, including its social and
political locatedness, and that materiality that characterizes language? Do
we mean “materiality” in a common sense, or are these usages examples
of what Althusser refers to as modalities of matter?289
It is clear in this quote and the above quote that Butler does not theorize around a
materiality with agential force, but rather a performative becoming that is rooted in the
intersection of language and materiality, an interdependence that subordinates materiality
and privileges language.
Susan Bordo
Close to the same time that Gender Trouble was published, Susan Bordo
published Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body.290 In this text,
Bordo seeks to formulate a theory concerning bodies and does so from the perspective of
feminist theory and Western thought, all relative to women and what she considers to be
contemporary issues, namely eating disorders. This text gives readers an opportunity to
articulate a theory of the body; in fact, the body is a fleshy material reality, argues Bordo.
The book conforms to the subtitle of the book: Feminism, Western Culture, and
the Body. What interests me most in this text is the way that Bordo deals with ‘real,’ not
imagined, bodies. From asking the question “Whose body is this?” to exploring whether
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hunger is ideology, the body that is unmasked and interrogated is a real body relative to
women (an unambiguous category for Bordo) and the issues or stereotypes of Western
culture.
Aside from the ways in which Bordo’s text deals with women and bodies, it also
functions on a theoretical level within the field of feminist philosophy and feminist
critical methodologies. It seems that portions of this text are written as a response to
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble.291 In Unbearable Weight, Bordo includes a chapter that
was previously published in Feminist Studies292 that reads like a response or critique of
Gender Trouble. Perhaps what Bordo’s text gives us is a way to deal with the impeding
postmodern reality that is ever fragmenting real bodies and perpetuating the imagined
body, which is largely discursive. While the critique or response is valuable, what is
important is the visibility of bodies, fleshy bodies, in Bordo’s work.
In Bordo’s Unbearable Weight, she theorizes the activity, passivity, and gender of
women and the ways that “The Heavy Bear” perpetuates the reality of women’s bodies
being passive material.
In “The Heavy Bear” the body is presented as hunting us with its passive
materiality, its lack of agency, art, or even consciousness. Insofar as the
“spirit’s motive” is the guiding force, clarity and will dominate; the body,
by contrast, simply receives and darkly, dumbly responds to impressions,
emotions, passions. This duality of active spirit/passive body is also
gendered, and it has been one of the most historically powerful of the
dualities that inform Western ideologies of gender. First philosophically
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articulated by Aristotle (although embodied in many creation myths and
associative schemes before him), it still informs contemporary images and
ideology concerning reproduction. According to the Aristotelian version,
the conception of a living being involves the vitalization of the purely
material contribution of the female by the “effective and active” element,
the male sperm.293
This paragraph reminds us that the dualism of gender pairs with bodies and locates (or
stabilizes) women’s bodies as passive material. What is missing, however, is an active
materiality for women. Bordo refuses the passivity of dualism, but does not lift up an
active alternative for women’s bodies being actively material or mattering. I call this
another failed attempt at claiming bodies material. The other importance of the above
lengthy quote is that Bordo situates the active and passive materiality with biology, the
sperm and fertilization, to be precise. I think this limits my own attempt to privilege a
robust theory of materialism that is active, becoming, and transformative. For this reason,
I claim that Bordo’s materialism is a failed materialism.
Rosi Braidotti
While Bordo and Butler are helpful in identifying differences within US feminist
theory, especially with regard to the ways in which they construct their body, it is Rosi
Braidotti, a transnational feminist resource, who speaks of a materialist theory of
becoming, and whose work on bodies and subjectivity has revolutionized feminist theory,
especially theories of difference. Rosi Braidotti, a feminist Deleuzian scholar, has been
committed to the intersection of feminist philosophy and critical social theory. Given this,
her work for me meets at critical intersections: Deleuze and feminist theory, which is
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shaping the ways in which I am able to continue to trace the materiality of the body—
from Braidotti to Anzaldúa. Rosi Braidotti argues that the
body is an inter-face, a threshold, a field of intersecting material and
symbolic forces, it is a surface where multiple codes (race, sex, class, age,
etc.) are inscribed; it's a cultural construction that capitalizes on energies
of a heterogeneous, discontinuous and affective or unconscious nature.
This vision of the body contains sexuality as a process and as a
constitutive element. Embodiment provides a common but at best very
complex ground on which to postulate the feminist project. On the lunapark that marks the website of this conference, the body would definitely
be on the roller-coaster.294
Braidotti theorizes a way to consider bodies as multiply constitutive of differing and
competing ‘matter,’ perhaps best understood as elements or moments of discursivity.295
While she maintains a materialist theory of the body, she leaves openings for discursive
realities to intersect with the materiality of the body. Braidotti, affirming the
cosmopolitanism of material effects that manifest in things like race, ethnicity, and
sexuality, among others texturize the body, but in material ways; these each mentioned
above are material realities and should not be reduced to discursive realities in an attempt
to manage bodies. Certainly, the scripts of race and class have material effects on bodies.
We see this in the #blacklivesmatter movement here in the United States.296 Race and
class, though socially constructed, have managed to surveil bodies in ways that have had
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lasting material effects. It is important to recognize the scripts that have been deployed
against bodies of color and name their material effects, and these scripts have also helped
to shape these bodies. What Braidotti generates in her work is an enfleshed materiality or
an embodied materiality; she uses these terms interchangeable. Concerning bodies and
matter—a key composition to Braidotti’s argument regarding embodiment and sexuality,
both matters of feminist struggle:
Being embodied means being in and of sexualized matter. This sexual
fibre is intrinsically and multiply connected to social and political
relations; it is anything but an individualistic entity. Sexuality is
simultaneously the most intimate and the most external, socially-driven,
power-drenched practice of the self. As a social and symbolic, material
and semiotic institution, sexuality is singled out by feminism as the
primary location of power, in a complex manner which encompasses both
macro and micro relations. Sexual difference - the sexualized bi-polarity,
is another word for power in both the negative or repressive (potestas) and
the positive or empowering (potentia) meaning of the term.297
Braidotti skillfully illustrates bodies as networked processes, which are materializing
along a plane of difference. In this quote, Braidotti claims sexuality is matter, or a
material reality, even calls it a fiber. Sexuality participates in the materializing of
experiences within relationships. Bodies are sexualized matter, different in their
becoming, but already existing on a plane of becomingness. In this way, bodies are
networked realities and matter exists on an ontological plane, multiply connected and
always becoming, as a result of the body’s politically networked relations. Braidotti, a
theorist whose multiplicity and plurality of identities, and interculturality, speaks into the
existing discourse concerning bodies, helps re-imagine embodied (nomadic) subjects that
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are affected by what is often cited as the post-modern reality. Likewise, Anzaldúa
theorizes about plural identities, plural bodies, and Mestizaje, which is parallel to
Braidotti’s work in many ways. Braidotti theorizes in the above quote a way to consider
the dynamics of power relations relative to embodiment. That, embodiment and
enfleshment are interchangeable and contribute to a robust understanding of becoming as
transformation. For Braidotti, it is matter qua becoming and bodies qua becoming. This
syntax contributes to the interrelatedness of being a networked ontology that contributes
to knowledge production and action in the world. It is because of this networked ontology
that the idea of mattering bodies becoming are part of the active and enfleshed
materialism. Further in her lecture, she correlates bodies and embodiment:
The sort of ‘figurations’ of alternative subjectivity, which feminism has
invented, like the womanist/ the lesbian/ the cyborg/ the inappropriate(d)
other/ the nomadic feminist etc. differ from classical ‘metaphors’ in
calling into play a sense of accountability for one's locations. They express
materially embedded cartographies and as such are self-reflexive and not
parasitic upon a process of metaphorization of ‘others.’ They provide, on
the critical level, materially embedded and embodied accounts of one's
power-relations.298
A materially embedded cartography as a metaphor for ‘figuration’ speaks to a Deleuzian
technology for plurality and multiplicity that the subject enfleshes. This plurality further
materializes along the matrix of becoming.
It expresses the subject's capacity for multiple, non-linear and outwardbound inter-connections with a number of external forces and others. This
model of inter-relations works as well in Deleuze and Guattari's many
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references to animals, plants, viruses, and to the chaosmos as a whole. It is
about multiple alliances, symbiotic connections and fusions.299
Braidotti’s work, from the three-volume series on Deleuzian manifestations in
feminist thought300 to her very insightful work on ethics and ontology, theorizes and
invites her readers to engage critically with issues important to the feminist struggle and
bodies. In fact, the body that she creates in her ‘materialist theory of becoming’ is a body
that resides in the interstices of thought—in between the ‘no longer and not yet,’ as does
her feminist theory; this, in many ways, is similar to the Anzaldúan body which is always
residing in the borderlands or in nepantla—an already and not yet reality. This standpoint
where the body is constituted further roots bodies in a materiality that is becoming.
Braidotti’s feminist thinking and theorizing is analogous to Anzaldúa’s mestiza
consciousness, where blurring the boundaries and always becoming multiple due to
transformation, speaks to a new kind of feminism. She says,
Feminist thinking takes place between the no longer and the not yet, in the
in-between zone between willful, conscious political practice and the notnecessarily conscious yearning for transformation and change. I see
feminist theory as the activity aimed at articulating the questions of
individual gendered identity with issues related to political subjectivity,
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the production of knowledge, diversity, and epistemological
legitimation.301
What Braidotti’s feminist theory does for those of us who engage in the act of theorizing
across genres is enable us to have tools that address the intersecting realities of
materiality and discursivity alongside three philosophical domains: ethics, ontology, and
epistemology. This web of philosophical domains is a hallmark of the New Materialist
movement. They theorize at the entanglement of ontology, epistmeoloyg, and ethics. I
find that Anzaldúa’s work also intersects with these three philosophical domains. These
elements become part and parcel of the bodies we investigate, engage, and ultimately
enflesh. Feminist theories and feminist activities, a la Braidotti, enflesh a struggle to rematerialize not only the body but also the subject’s capacity to know, as well as the
body’s production of knowledge, and reality / one’s being and becoming in the world. “In
the end—Feminists are proud to be flesh.”302
Bodies materialize in a particularly dynamic way in Braidotti’s work. “I prefer a
deeply embedded vision of the embodied subject. In the light of contemporary genetics
and molecular biology, it is more than feasible to speak of the body as a complex system
of self-sustaining forces.”303 For Braidotti, the body remains a “bundle of contradictions”
as it is a related animal entity, a composition of genes comprised into a genetic data-bank,
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while also remaining a “bio-social entity.” The body is a socio-sensory reality304 that is
always being re-materialized in its own becoming. This material socio-sensory reality is a
self-organizing and self-transformative single matter substance that relies on its relational
processes that are fiercely network in this world. That is to say that the body is a set of a
systematized and personalized inscriptions or memories that is bundled together into a
‘thing,’ but is not a passive site of citation, as Butler argues in Bodies That Matter.305 As
such, Braidotti articulates the body as it has materialized in postmodernity: “it is part
animal, part machine but the dualistic opposition of the two, which our culture has
adopted since the 18th century as the dominant model, is inadequate today.”306 She
concludes, “This means that we can now think of the body as an entity that inhabits
different time-zones simultaneously, and is animated by different speeds and a variety of
internal and external clocks which do not necessarily coincide.”307 By this assertion, the
materiality of the body is more than what is contained in the body. Materiality is ever
expansive extending beyond the contact zones of my own bones and muscles that
constitute my “body.” Bodies, especially in an age where virtuality dominates our means
of communication, stipulate an ever-growing reality of materiality, and we should
recognize this as a new material turn in understanding bodies.
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Conclusion: Anzaldúan Bodies that Matter
This chapter traced three mainstream feminist thinkers’ theories of bodies. While
Braidotti’s theory of the body is the theory I find most compelling, it is not without
critique. Braidotti, a thoroughly embedded European scholar, fails to articulate the
materiality of the marginalized body, or the body that is perpetually displaced by the
ideological center. This is where Anzaldúa’s theorizing multiple realities and a formative
theory of the material universe intersects with Braidotti’s Deleuzian feminism.
Anzaldúan materiality is a materiality that is fiercely networked, participating in the
process of materialization and related to all persons and things and participates in
ongoing cycles of difference and repetition that is often articulated as cycles of nepantla.
While noting the failed materiality of Butler and Bordo, Braidotti offers Anzaldúan
scholars a way to reimagine materiality existing along the plane of becoming. This
necessarily means the inclusion of Gilles Deleuze with Anzaldúa’s theories. But, this
intersection is not without differences or uncomplicated. Given the subordination of
matter to language in the work of Butler, it is important to utilize thinkers who privilege
matter in their theorizing to help bring material bodies into clearer view. I think Braidotti
does this and Anzaldúa certainly does this. Though many argue that Butler creates a
mutually constitutive dynamic of matter and language, I disagree with this read of her
and rather look to the New Materialists who help bring bodies into a more material
reality; this motivates my own thinking concerning the materiality of bodies which are
becoming.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A CONCLUSION
“Becoming-” is a process of change, flight, or movement within an
assemblage. Rather than conceive of the pieces of an assemblage as an
organic whole, within which the specific elements are held in place by
the organization of a unity, the process of “becoming-” serves to account
for relationships between the “discrete” elements of the assemblage. In
“becoming-” one piece of the assemblage is drawn into the territory of
another piece, changing its value as an element and bringing about a new
unity. An example of this principle might be best illustrated in the way in
which atoms are drawn into an assemblage with nearby atoms through
affinities rather than an organizational purpose. The process is one of
deterritorialization in which the properties of the constituent element
disappear and are replaced by the new properties of the assemblage—
“becomings-molecular of all kinds, becomings-particles”
—Deleuze & Guattari
Mattering Bodies and Queer(y)ing Bodily Materiality: Toward an ‘Intra-Active’
Ontology of Becoming and the Replacement of Interrelatedness
I have come to this work from multiple angles: philosophy, critical theory,
feminist studies, and women of colors theorizing. I see these particular interconnections
or angles as exacerbating the entanglement of materiality and bodies, exposing the
dichotomy between matter and discourse. I have sought to privilege materialism over
language, not advance a mutually constitutive dynamic of interplay between them. While
I have used language to communicate these ideas, I maintain that the ideas, themselves,
are material, as is language. It is perhaps contemporary materialism and the work of
Deleuze and Barad through the lens of Anzaldúa who illustrate a way to mobilize the
materiality of ideas and the agential cuts that create quantum realities for matter to
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become and for bodies to equally become mattering. Notably, I have used Gloria
Anzaldúa as my primary interlocutor, deploying her first published poem as a way to
rethink matter and bodies, and have sought to privilege her theories and thought (her
writing-art-theory) as I reread materiality in the works of Gilles Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti,
Spinoza, and others. What Anzaldúa has done is re-center and re-politicize the account of
materiality, essentially subverting the existing reigning norms concerning materiality by
using image, theory, poetry, and multiple languages to disrupt discursive norms. Like the
New Materialisms movement that seeks to respond to the linguistic turn by showing the
linkages of epistemology and ontology, Anzaldúa’s work shows the radical
interrelatedness of epistemology (what we know of the world) and ontology (what is in
the world) and the ways in which we act (ethics). Though Anzaldúa never formally made
this link in her work in these precise words, her last essay which was published in the last
years of her life, “Now Let us Shift,” illustrates this interrelated commitment to an ethicoonto-epistemology. While Anzaldúa’s work is non-traditional from an analytic
perspective and also under-recognized as a contribution to critical theory, that is not
sufficient reason to disregard the complexity of what she is doing in her theories and
poetry. Granted, when she mentions that she apologizes to a chair after bumping into it,
or when she recounts a story of when her body expanded beyond her container of a body
attached to muscle and fat to reach fruit, I find it odd. But, I am aware that Anzaldúa has
access to a shape and form of consciousness that had radically shaped her identity and
way of being in the world; her material consciousness has become her in radical ways.
Henceforth, it has also shaped her epistemologies and ontologies. Using Anzaldúa means
that I am further destabilizing the landscape of materialism by placing Anzaldúa’s
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thought and theories not only in conversation with New Materialisms, but as a proto-New
materialist thinker.
This dissertation has privileged Anzaldúa as a primary interlocutor in detailing the
materiality of the body, and has done so by utilizing the language of entanglement and
interrelatedness. There are entanglements of theories existing in this dissertation that
create new modes of traction in theorizing about matter and discourse, bodies and sites. I
read Anzaldúa as a materialist philosopher308 whose thinking has shaped feminist
theorizing and women of colors theorizing, though this largely goes unnoticed in the New
Materialisms movement. I wish to raise up Anzaldúa as a significant theorist whose
thinking and theorizing is parallel to the strands of Spinoza we find in Deleuze, Guattari,
and Braidotti. In so doing, I call her a philosopher. Recognizing and reconfiguring this
not only dispels Anzaldúa’s critics that she is only a creative fiction writer, but also helps
incorporate women of colors’ theories into the larger philosophical discourse.
I have read Anzaldúa with Deleuzian, Spinozist, Merleau-Pontian, and Braidottian
lenses. Likewise, I have read Deleuze, Spinoza, Merleau-Ponty, and Braidotti with
Anzaldúan lenses and have crafted theorizing at the intersections of multiple theories.
This was the deployment of Barad’s diffractive methodology, something that she borrows
from Donna Haraway.309 Utilizing diffraction as the key element in theorizing across
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multiple theories that have produced radical differences helps further elucidate the
‘replacement of interrelatedness.’ Diffraction not only increases one’s awareness to
multiple theories existing together, but also situates these theories in conversation with
one another. At times there is tension existing in between these theories, and at other
times there is fluidity. Diffraction subverts the reigning norm of the singular monolith
interpretation and allows for multiplicity to emerge and is situated as the norm.
Difference, then, takes root during the process of diffraction that displaces norms and
values that would otherwise displace the intersections of theories existing together. What
results is a harmony of difference that attracts further theorizing in the borderlands, or
thresholds, where tension of differences stimulates ongoing discussion. Diffraction is
more than an additive; it is the very modality that stimulates difference and multiplicity,
materializing along a plane of becomingness that displaces norms and hierarchies and
invites a radical interconnectedness.
As a way of concluding, I give an account of materiality as I have used it in this
dissertation. I mobilize this account of materiality to point toward an ‘intra-active’
ontology of becoming, and use the ontology of becoming that I find inherent in the work
of Deleuze and Barad central to the reality or ontology of becoming and interrelatedness
that emerges in Anzaldúa’s work. Deleuze and Barad are not the only ones who deploy
an ontology of becoming, and I equally fuse together Catherine Keller’s theorizing
becoming with these thinkers. The plumb line that holds these thinkers together is
Anzaldúa herself; she is the material becoming whose body of work re-materializes
thought and theory. I combine an active orientation to queer theory to re-imagine
materiality as intra-activeness, then look to the intra-active ontology of becoming
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residing at the intersection of Barad and Anzaldúa. I conclude this dissertation as an act
of queer(y)ing bodily materiality and the ‘replacement of interrelatedness.’ It is in this
chapter that the intersection of matter, meaning, and interrelatedness become clearer and
an ethico-onto-epistemology can begin to take shape. It is because of redressing matter as
a formative site for theorizing that this can take root.
Accounting Materiality, or a Material Account
The account of materiality spanning from the New Materialisms movement,
Deleuze, Foucault, Jane Bennett, and Vicky Kirby all have a type of vibrancy or vitalism
attached to their theories. While I take this idea of ‘vibrant matter’ to be important to the
study of materiality and bodies, I wish to talk about vibrant bodies, materializing along
the matrix of becomingness, and I do this by attaching Gloria Anzaldúa’s theories of both
materiality and bodies. This creates a mosaic horizon when thinking the connection of
bodies and materiality. Bodily materiality, as I call it in this project, is a materiality of
doing and becoming that shapes and forms bodies, broadly construed throughout this
project. That which shapes and forms (for Jane Bennett) stems from either élan vital
(taken from Bergson) or entelechy (taken from Hans Dreisch).310 Another way to
consider matter and the process of materialization, one that I take to be significant for this
research, is that matter “does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is substance in
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its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency.”311 For
Butler, the process of materialization is highly constrained by her discursive strategies,
largely due from her ‘linguistic turn’ and investment in placing language prior to
materiality and further by subordinating matter to language.312 Matter, however, is both a
“stabilizing and destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity” that creates the process of
what I am calling the ‘replacement of interrelatedness.’ It is not that matter and language
intersect. It is not that language is prior to matter. I privilege matter as the becoming
component in reality that shapes language, so it must be prior to language in radical
ways, rooted in its own becoming different. To take this further, language cannot be prior
to matter because language is material. This ‘replacement of interrelatedness’ helps shore
up matter as the vital impetus for a radical becoming and for mattering bodies to take
shape in the world.
Given that I consider materiality a relational phenomena and bodies (both human
and nonhuman animal) are also material realities and relational, it is important to note
that matter comes to matter through the process of ongoing ‘intra-activity,’ a particular
phenomenon of interrelatedness that is meaning making; this is key to understanding an
ontology of becoming. Intra-activity refers to a type of agency, and is not something that
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someone has. Rather, it is an enactment of “iterative changes to particular practices.”313
This agential doing (or intra-active becoming) is a reconfiguring existing along the
relational matrix of a dynamic intra-activity. Likewise, both matter and bodies come to
matter not by the kind of citaitonality for which Butler advocates, but rather in the
phenomena of ongoing relational materialization. Both bodies and matter become a
material reality not by linguistic constructions but by discursive productions “in the
posthumanist sense that discursive practices are themselves material (re)configurings of
the world through which the determination of boundaries, properties, and meanings is
differentially enacted.”314 Discursive practices are “boundary-making practices (that) are
fully implicated in the dynamics of intra-activity through which phenomena come to
matter.”315 This further elucidates matter as an active agent in the process of
materialization. Bodies, too, congeal as matter in an active state or phenomenon, and
materialize along the borderland axis of becoming. The process of materialization, while
highly relational, is also a dynamic process, a participatory flow. So, where Bergson and
Dreisch ascribed a type of vitalism to matter, I much prefer Barad’s material orientation
in that “mater is a dynamic intra-active becoming that is implicated and enfolded in its
iterative becoming.”316 The folding of matter and the enfolding of matter is the becoming
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and also the becoming different. Bodies here reside in the fold; they are becoming.
Likewise, Gloria Anzaldúa defined materiality in this way: “The material universe is not
made up of things—it is only energy and lines of force continuing to produce temporary
forms that are in a state of continuous flow.”317 Together, in conversation, Barad and
Anzaldúa clearly articulate bodily materiality as not things-in-themselves, but rather a
type of mattering that is “in a state of continuous flow,” dynamic and intra-active in their
becoming. Bodily materiality, or bodily mattering, then, is a “dynamic articulation or
configuration of the world,” relying on single matter substance.318
Bodily materiality emerges as a particular material phenomenon in tandem with
the relational processes of materialization, and these bodies (both human and nonhuman)
are marked by material-discursive practices thereby constituting their differential
realities. This happens, matter becomes or materializes, when difference takes shape
outside of a norm existing. Materiality becomes because matter is difference-in-itself, not
a thing that exists without sufficient agency. Situating matter as that which is differencein-itself reformulates the manner in which tokens and signs function beyond the
traditional representationalist account. Matter, in its dynamism, becomes the locutionary
act to create the ontological inseparability of words and things. Therefore, a critical turn
toward bodily materiality (or bodily mattering) dislodges traditional representationalism
that separates the “world into the ontologically disjointed domains of words and
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things.”319 What emerges during the process of materialization is a performative
metaphysics and a new ontology emerges; I call this an ontology of becoming.
No longer can bodily materiality be a passive site for the inscriptions of signs.
Locutions also must be recalculated in order to give a more robust account of
materialization. Having a different metaphysical point of departure relieves this problem
of materiality being a non-active force. Recalculating our ontology into one that is
relational in turn enlivens bodies, materiality, and nature into their fullness of becoming;
a new metaphysical point of departure is established in this recalculation. Matter and
things no longer reside as “dead things;” they are alive and acting in today’s world—they
become part of the relationship that bodies share in the world. This initiates the
ontological inseparability of ‘intra-active’ material elements.
While matter is able to become part of a relational process and the ontological
inseparability of material components are active, bodies materialize as an ‘intra-active’
force that are always becoming different-in-themselves. To further materialize bodies, I
suggest the intersection of queer theory with bodily materiality. This further mobilizes
materiality toward an ‘intra-active’ ontology of becoming, reliant on diffractive readings
of both queerness and materiality. Suggesting a turn to queer theory intentionally
dislodges the discursive body by initiating a horizon of materialization that gestures to an
ever-widening reality of excess of matter becoming.
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Queer theory has a history of leveraging language against the body, resulting in
the formation of what is often termed a discursive body. In most cases, the body
disappears in the discursive horizon of difference, and differences never materialize as
things-in-themselves; they are fragments of language measuring discursive forms. The
eternal question that I have is what happens when the body is thought of in material
terms, following in the genealogy of Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-Diderot-Deleuze with
a sprinkling of Merleau-Ponty, over against the more common feminist tradition that
traces materiality from Hegel-Marx-Adorno and Historical Materialism. If this genealogy
is my point of departure relative to matter, what happens to bodily materiality when the
works of Karen Barad and Gloria Anzaldúa intersect it as new theoretical turns in queer
theory? Secondly, what happens when Catherine Keller’s commitment to a philosophy of
becoming and plantetary entanglements meet with my own theorizing matter and bodies?
A matrix of borderlands as material agency initiates a new contour in understanding
queer theory with materiality. Furthermore, queer theory, in this sense, surfaces as a
material phenomenon, and the discursive horizon is shaped by the real material reality of
bodies (or by bodily materiality). What this evokes, then, (in Barad’s language) is an
‘intra-active’ ontology of becoming. The beingness of bodily materiality is no longer a
stable site for socio-analyic mediation; it is a de-stabilized site of ongoing material
becomingness that initiates a bodily and material reality that is always traversing the
domains of ethics, ontology, and epistemology and is always corresponding to its
relational processes. The becomingness of bodily materiality signals a new material turn
for the study of bodies in the humanities that braids together the entangled fruits of
science, philosophy, theology and religion in compelling ways. Likewise, the production
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of knowledge stems from materiality, and bodily ways of knowing are thereby initiated.
This further deepens the entanglement of ethics, ontology, and epistemology.320
An Intersecting Juncture of Queer Theory, Materiality, and Intra-Activeness
I conceive of matter in part in Deleuzian phenomenological terms—that single
matter substance and perception with experience help us relate to objects, or with other
material things, and this perception initiates a dynamic relationship yielding a particular
type of experience with the world (an entanglement, which is part of our materiality). In
addition, I think of matter in Deleuzian and Braidottian terms who both enliven Spinoza’s
theory of the body and theorize around an ontological plane of consistency and advocate
for the non-seprability and non-locality of matter that is becoming. The body exists on a
plane of consistency and is managed by longitude and latitude—speed and consistency.
The material body is an extension of the infinite substance for Spinoza, and Deleuze
captures this type of body as that which is dynamic and existing in a matrix of
becomingness, folding and unfolding in the interstices of infinite folds; it is in fact a
mobile assemblage.321 Deleuze’s reliance on the relational processes that initiate the
body’s materiality are important here, for matter that is passive or a stable site can not
exist on the ontological plane of becoming. Bodily materiality, conceived of in queer
terms, initiates the ongoing retorcer of matter. It is a twisting and turning process that
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exists between bodies and in bodies and is fundamentally relational. Think here of the
‘amazing double helix.’ Its strategic internal movement, a movement that places
materiality within the matrix of the borderlands and creates new modalities of agency,
destabilizes bodily materiality. Barad theorizes about meaning and matter as an
opposition to a static or stable reality. She writes,
Matter, like meaning, is not an individually articulated or static entity.
Matter is not little bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively
awaiting signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for scientific,
feminist, or Marxist theories. Matter is not a support, location, referent, or
source of sustainability for discourse. Matter is not immutable or passive.
It does not require the mark of an external force like culture or history to
complete it. Matter is always already an ongoing historicity.322
Materiality means something for Barad and matter is more than something; it is a doing.
Matter is not a dead element in this world; it is a becoming reality that emerges in the
material interstices of bodies. When this happens, a new form of relationality and agency
is initiated and an ‘intra-active’ ontology of becoming commences.
Because matter is an “already ongoing historicity,” matter continues to revolve in
the matrix of becoming; this is a dynamic intersection of being and becoming that relies
on the connectionist framework of ontology and epistemology that has implications for
ethics and meaning in today’s world. Matter is both an ontological possibility and
epistemological rupture, opening up new contours of being and becoming that further
initiate material ways of knowing. Anzaldúa illustrated this by theorizing about mestizaje
bodies that are part of the borderlands and impacted by the politics of the nation-state.
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These material-discursive realties always impact the existing intersections of bodies and
the state, a particular apparatus that governs borderland bodies into new forms of being
and becoming. Bodily materiality, then, negotiates the intersections, thresholds, or
borderlands of bodies, the chasm existing between material bodies that are related
because of the process of materialization. These thresholds also materialize along the
plane of becoming. The chasm, or threshold, plays a careful role in connecting bodies
together with other matter, and play a significant role in becoming; herein lies a
collective relationality of boddies and matter and becoming.
Bodily materiality, while fiercely networked and existing in the borderlands of
becoming, negotiates these in-between spaces between bodies and nature. Queer(y)ing
materiality, or matter itself, necessarily means that this theory materializes over against
discursive strategies that have called bodies into being through the process of iterative
citation.323 The discursive horizon of difference becomes a material reality because
difference emerges outside the reality of a norm existing and bodies, therefore, become
different-in-themselves during the process of materialization, a relational and ontological
material reality that is always multiplying, as a result of this process.
Language is displaced as the overarching strategy that “materializes” and
localizes bodies, and matter is given the space and time to ‘intra-act’ with bodies (though
here there is the reality of the non-separability of matter and bodies), a new form of
agency that is not reliant on normative or stable theories of causality; this demands an
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entanglement of agencies. This move exists on an ontological plane whereby bodily
materiality cycles through the difference and repetition of becoming and being. Quoting
Barad, she says:
The notion of intra-action is a key element of my agential realist
framework. The neologism “intra-action” signifies the mutual constitution
of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which
assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their
interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do
not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to
note that the “distinct” agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an
absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their
mutual entanglement; they don't exist as individual elements.324
Barad further explains in chapter four of Meaning the University Halfway, “the
notion of intra-action constitutes a radical reworking of the traditional notion of
causality.”325 What results, she suggests, is a lively new ontology, motivated by dynamic
relational process that I believe is radically material. This entanglement is the world for
Barad, which is decidedly materialistic, and “the world’s radical aliveness comes to light
in an entirely nontraditional way that reworks the nature of both relationality and
aliveness.”326 Here the world is used in place for bodies. The world, too, for Barad, is a
body that is participating or implicated in an ongoing materialization that is becoming.
This reimagines “vitality, dynamism, and agency.” This is the ontological plane that
emerges, dynamic, vital, and existing on the plane of becoming, a matrix of intersections
or borders that do not close off relational material, but rather motivate the entelechy and
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dynamic process of an intra-active agency that is ontological by nature. The matrix of
thresholds that coalesce material bodies generate a new and lively materialism that I have
traced in Anzaldúa’s writing-art-theories. Her theories of the imaginal helps situate
bodies and becoming along an intra-active ontological frame. Bodily materiality is the
agent in this new intra-active ontology, and resides in the borderlands of becoming, an
ontological plane whose agency (or agential realism) is one of radical material becoming.
Negotiating an ‘Intra-Active’ Ontology of Becoming with Material Bodies
I borrow this term “becoming” from Deleuze and Guarttari who define becoming
“as a process of change, flight, or movement within an assemblage.”327 “A becoming is
not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or
at the limit, an identification.”328 It is neither filiation. It is sufficient to say that bodily
materiality is a mobile assemblage that becomes-bodily, through its relational processes
that are rooted in matter becoming material, to this larger ontological framework of
becoming, motivated by new forms of agency existing in today’s entangled world. The
becoming-bodily is partly due to the physiomateriality that is advanced by Anzaldúa in
conversation with the vitalism of Deleuze and Barad’s intra-activity. Becoming bodily
does not re-inscribe particular boundaries; becoming stimulates a reworlding of bodies’
materialization as becoming-bodily. These relational processes are not correspondences
with one another but rather a moment when bodies become nothing other than
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themselves; there is no subject that is becoming, only matter materializing along the
thresholds that are always in the process of becoming. “This is the point to clarify: that a
becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself; but also that it has no term, since its term in
turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and which
coexists, forms a block, with the first.”329 Bodily materiality in this sense is
deterritoralized. The body, as a mobile assemblage, is not an organic whole, where
specific elements are held in place by the organization of a unity, the process of
“becoming.” In becoming, “one piece of the assemblage is drawn into the territory of
another piece, changing its value as an element and bringing about a new unity.”330 An
example of this principle for Deleuze and Guattari is best illustrated by atoms, which are
drawn into an assemblage with nearby atoms through affinities rather than an
organizational purpose. This is the process of deterritorialization whereby properties of
the constituent element disappear and are replaced by the new properties of the
assemblage. This is bodily materiality existing on an ontological plane of intra-active
becomingness that is radically deterritorialized.
Recalling the ways in which the body is a mosaic existence living in the
borderlands of becoming, bodily materiality is on an ontological plane of an indefinite
becoming and multiplicity. The borderlands, then, a type of “mosaic territory” challenges
the normative horizon of homogeneity, because borderlands, as plural material (that are
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always materializing), are marked by multiplicity and congeal with an ‘intra-active’
ontology of becoming. Bodies are always in relationship with these borderlands.
As Deleuze and Guattari explain,
the process of becoming is not one of imitation or analogy; it is generative
of a new way of being that is a function of influences rather than
resemblances. The process is one of removing the element from its
original functions and bringing about new ones.331
Becoming then, seen as the ontological inseparability of multiplying the materiality of
bodies and existing on the ontological plane of difference and multiplicity, marks bodily
materiality as differential material and that which is becoming in the world “as an endless
process of self-transformation” and self-organizing material. The process of
materialization in relationship to the process of becoming-bodily relies on the duration of
their communication; hence, the ongoing relational processes take place in the matrix of
the borderlands. The ‘event’ or ‘intra-active’ becoming, though in relationship with other
matters that are becoming, is not an evolution of materiality or agential bodily
materiality. “Becoming produces nothing by filiation; all filiation is imaginary.”332 The
‘intra-active’ becoming produces differential material that is an alliance with bodies. Said
differently, ‘intra-active’ becomings produce bodily materiality as difference-in-itself that
further materializes along (or in) the matrix of borderlands. An ontology of ‘intra-active’
becoming produces radically different bodily material that are in alliance with other
bodily materials. These bodily materials invoke the speciated divide of human and non-
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human. These alliances, emerging as bodily materiality participates in the materialbecoming-different process, thereby supporting difference as becoming, and an ‘intraactive’ reality further materializes on an ontological plane of difference as consistency.
This ontology of ‘intra-active’ becoming is always involving bodily materiality as
difference and multiplicity.
Concluding and Looking Ahead: On Queer(y)ing Bodily Materiality and the
‘Replacement of Interrelatedness’
The act in recognizing the entanglement of queer(y)ing bodily materiality
signifies the onto-epistemological designation that bodies are more than the flesh, fat,
muscles, and bones that make up the humanist definition of a body. Queer(y)ing bodily
materiality is the recognition that bodily materiality is the finite mode extended from the
infinite substance, as detailed in Spinoza’s Ethics. Bodily materiality is the materialdiscursive signifier that negotiates the posthumanist turn in the study of bodies. This
finite mode of infinite substance that I term bodily materiality is difference becoming
multiple, a process of materialization that participates in the entanglement of ontology,
epistemology, and ethics. This process of materialization does not rely on language or
discursive practices for matter to become, or an ‘intra-active’ ontology to exist; rather,
language is displaced by the process of materialization in relationship with the ontology
of ‘intra-active’ becoming. Language is displaced in terms of it being or having priority
or preceding matter. In this we show that matter precedes language, yes, but is
ontologically prior to language. Queer(y)ing bodily materiality, then, initiates a type of
difference in action whereby materialization is not blocked by filiation and linguistic
structures but rather transcends these humanist designations (en)abling bodily materiality
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to multiply along the matrix of borderlands that are becoming different in themselves.
Bodily materiality, as difference in action, compels us to rethink existing ontologies and
epistemologies that do not privilege relationality. Anzaldúa’s work does this certainly, as
does Karen Barad’s work. Likewise, thinking along a “moving horizon, always from a
decentered center, & from an always displaced periphery”333 (like Anzaldúa’s
borderlands) helps us to reimagine bodies and materiality as ‘intra-active’ becomings.
The dissertation reestablishes Anzaldúa as a philosopher and critical theorist
whose work falls outside the traditional domains of academic disciplines. The future of
this work stimulates new critical turns in the thought and theory of Gloria Anzaldúa and
material contours in Anzaldúa’s writing-art-theory. Positioning Anzaldúa as a significant
contributor to critical theory helps shape the content and form of a metaphysics of
interrelatedness and establishes the ‘replacement of interrelatedness.’ By this, I mean that
both ontology and epistemology become significant features to theorizing that are seen in
Anzaldúa’s work, but have not fully been explored as theories in and of themselves. In
many ways, theorists have used Anzaldúa as supporting material, not as the core of their
thinking. What this dissertation project establishes is the ability to use Anzaldúa as the
primary source in thinking about ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Establishing the
importance of Anzaldúa’s epistemology and ontology in conversation with other feminist
theorists and philosophers, including critical theorists and queer theorists, further initiates
thresholds of theories as enactments of diffraction.
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Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota: 1988), 57.
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The “replacement of interrelatedness’ as the entanglement of bodily knowing
produces new meaning in the world, establishes not a geometrical model of ethics, but
rather a model that privileges relationality. Matter, meaning, and interrelatedness all
relate to one another in the entanglement of bodily knowing. The productions of
epistemological contours that stem from an ontological awareness help futures replace
the reality of interrelatedness. Anzaldúa’s work accomplishes this throughout her corpus;
Barad explores this in Meeting the University Halfway; Braidotti enlivens Spinoza and
Deleuze. Existing here are strands of both difference and multiplicity that further
generate the mode of interrelatedness as an entanglement in the world.
Interrelatedness is a particular material phenomenon that privileges the
ontological and epistemological inseparability of matter and meaning. Anzaldúa is a
perfect example of this, and her work pushes the boundaries of interrelatedness into a
horizon that continues to materialize beyond what we are able to comprehend and into the
shape-shifting consciousness of la naguala. Privileging the entanglement of Anzaldúan
materiality as bodily knowing further roots matter, meaning, and interrelatedness as the
primary means of understanding what is in the world, producing knowledge, and enacting
difference. This is the work of transformation and using theory as the political basis for
radical social change and the politics of radical difference.
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